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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Chet Lisiecki 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Comparative Literature 
 
September 2014 
 
Title: Lyric Poetry, Conservative Poetics, and the Rise of Fascism 
 
 
As fascist movements took hold across Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, there 
emerged a body of lyric poetry concerned with revolution, authority, heroism, sacrifice, 
community, heritage, and national identity. While the Nazi rise to power saw the 
deception, persecution, and brutalization of conservatives both in the Reichstag and in 
the streets, these themes resonated with fascists and conservatives alike, particularly in 
Germany. Whether they welcomed the new regime out of fear or opportunism, many 
conservative beneficiaries of National Socialism shared, and celebrated in poetry, the 
same ideological principles as the fascists. 
Such thematic continuities have made it seem as though certain conservative 
writers, including T. S. Eliot, Stefan George, and Hugo von Hofmannsthal, were proto-
fascist, their work cohering around criteria consonant with fascist ideology. My 
dissertation, however, emphasizes the limits of such cohesion, arguing that fascist 
poetry rejects, whereas conservative poetry affirms, the possibility of indeterminacy and 
inadequacy. While the fascist poem blindly believes it can effect material political 
change, the conservative poem affirms the failure of its thematic content to correspond 
entirely to material political reality. It displays neither pure political commitment nor 
aesthetic autonomy, suspending these categories in an unresolved tension. 
Paul de Man’s work on allegory hinges on identifying a reading practice that 
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addresses this space between political commitment and aesthetic autonomy. His 
tendency to forget the immanence of history, however, is problematic in the context of 
fascism. Considering rhetorical formalism alongside dialectical materialism, in 
particular Adorno’s essay “Lyric Poetry and Society,” allows for a more rounded and 
ethical methodological approach. The poetic dramatization of the very indeterminacy 
that historically constituted conservative politics in late-Weimar Germany both 
distinguishes the conservative from the fascist poem while also accounting for its 
complicity. Fascism necessitated widespread and wild enthusiasm, but it also succeeded 
through the (unintentional) proliferation of political indifference as registered, for 
example, by the popularity of entertainment literature. While the work of certain 
conservative high modernists reflected critically on its own failures, such indeterminacy 
nonetheless resembles the failure to politically commit oneself against institutionalized 
violence and systematic oppression. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: WHY “FASCIST LITERARY MODERNISM” NOW? 
 
In the introduction to the 1993 book Fascist Modernism: Aesthetics, Politics, and the 
Avant-Garde, Andrew Hewitt poses the question, “why fascist modernism?” This 
question seems even more pressing for a study of fascism and modernism today, when 
the possibilities for thinking through the subject may seem exhausted, ranging from 
fascism as anti-modern (Nolte) to fascism as a form of modernism (Griffin) to fascism as 
reactionary modernism (Herf).1 With regards to literary modernism and fascism, Hewitt 
implicates the avant-garde in Italy, Robert Norton implicates Stefan George and Hugo 
von Hofmannsthal in Germany, Paul Morrison identifies Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot in 
Britain, Alice Kaplan identifies Georges Sorel and Robert Brasillach in France. More 
broadly, and among many other critics, Claudia Koonz has argued that high-profile 
academics like Martin Heidegger gave National Socialism the intellectual credibility it 
needed to succeed among particular demographics, an argument that has risen again to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Throughout my dissertation, I make occasional references to Ernst Nolte’s concept of fascism as 
a “resistance to transcendence,” a highly ambiguous term that has come under considerable 
scrutiny. My project does not attempt to intercede in debates central to the Historikerstreit; it does 
not seek to legitimate Nolte’s conversial claims, particularly those made after the publication of 
Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, which have been interpreted as approximating an apologist 
position. I am struck less by Nolte’s concept of “practical transcendence,” by which he seems to 
mean social progress and modernization, than by that of “theoretical transcendence,” which he 
describes as, “the reaching out of the mind beyond what exists and what can exist to an absolute 
whole; in a broader sense this may be applied to all that goes beyond, that releases man from the 
confines of the everyday world” (Nolte 433). I find Nolte’s implicit argument that fascism 
struggles against a release from the confines of the everyday world compelling because it implies 
that the phenomenological emergence of fascism (in Nolte’s construction) is consonant with a 
teleological privileging of that which confines. In my dissertation, I consider such confinement in 
aesthetic terms, as the rejection of failure: a parallel between human failure and the failure of 
language to escape the bounds of power. I do not, however, support Nolte’s overarching 
phenomenological approach to fascist metapolitics, nor do I endorse a purely ideological 
approach to understanding fascism. Quite the contrary, I hope to ground my aesthetic analysis in 
prevailing historical research. For one of many critiques of Nolte’s phenomenology, see Kitchen, 
“Ernst Nolte and the Phenomenology of Fascism.” 
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academic consciousness following the publication of Heidegger’s black notebooks. 
Yvonne Surratt takes this argument even further in her recent book in which, identifying 
Heidegger as a collaborator with National Socialism, professes to tell “the story of how 
philosophy was implicated in genocide” (xvi). Donna Jones has recently made 
arguments regarding Nietzsche as a forerunner to National Socialism, as has Richard 
Wolin, who draws on Isaiah Berlin’s notion of the Counter-Enlightenment to implicate a 
tradition of German irrationalism that culminates in post-modernism. Evelyn Barish’s 
new book tries once again to establish how Paul de Man and deconstruction were fatally 
tainted by fascism. This concern with identification or association has been one 
necessary framework for understanding how many modernist writers and thinkers were 
drawn to the ideological lineage of fascism. It does not, however, compare “fascist 
modernists” with those more average literary works that emerged and circulated under 
fascism, a topic that has received considerable scholarly attention in the last few years. 
This approach allows a comparison on the grounds of aesthetic form rather than 
thematic content and thus offers new insight into how, and to what extent, aesthetic 
objects such as the lyric poem were complicit in the success of fascism. Furthermore, it 
introduces work by the conservative beneficiaries of National Socialist ideology and 
practice. The relative political passivity of these figures leading up to and following their 
failure to prevent Hitler’s dictatorship, orchestrated as it may have been by Nazi terror, 
emerges as a lyrical indeterminacy that, while constitutively distinct from National 
Socialist literature, was nonetheless unconsciously or indirectly complicit in the success 
of the regime.   
What many of the above studies fail to consider is the distinction between 
fascism as an “aestheticization of politics” more generally, a conception that seems to 
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invite comparison with “high” modernism, and specific fascist (“low”) cultural 
productions themselves. In light of the fracturing of “Modernism” into a plurality of 
“modernisms” – a critical event also unintegrated into this scholarship – what better 
sample of “fascist modernism” than what Alice Kaplan names “other-than-
masterpieces.” For Kaplan, as a cultural historian concerned with the representation of 
everydayness, such “banal but persistent topoi condense the traces of a fascist 
sensibility” (43-47). While my project does not focus on the specific details of the 
humdrum fascist life per se, it does assert that the project of Gleichschaltung historically 
necessitated not only the well-documented coordination of active participation and 
suppression (or execution), but also, where that may have been difficult, inaction and 
indifference, in the sense of Hannah Arendt’s notion of a failure to think. It was a 
program that strove to assimilate totally the necessary inadequacy immanent to the 
event of failure. Particularly among former members of the Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei (DNVP) and the “conservative revolution,” this failure to think was 
associated with a turning towards the aesthetic sphere as the privileged yet displaced 
site of political activity. While National Socialists, obviously, did not actively seek an 
indifferent populace, the success of the movement did result in part from a group of 
otherwise nonfascist writers who remained in Germany and passively endorsed the 
regime by retreating into art. The most compelling example of such “low” or mass art is 
“Unterhaltungsliteratur,” which publishing records and anecdotal evidence 
demonstrate was immensely popular both in terms of sales and actual readership.2 
Considering such “other-than-masterpieces,” then, is one way to account for the large !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 “Eine Auswertung der Romanbestseller der Jahre nach 1933 ergab, daß traditionelle bürgerliche 
Unterhaltungsliteratur dominierte und nur 20% der Bestseller völkisch-nationalsozialistische 
Romane waren, die entweder das Thema Krieg oder die ökonomische und soziale Entwicklung 
in der Weimarer Republik spiegelten” (Haefs 15). 
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body of literature written by and for fascists during the period of modernism that does 
not resemble the work of George, Marinetti, Pound, and Eliot and that does not bespeak 
questions of being and time, political theology, or the will to power.  
Alongside the great studies of fascist modernism mentioned above, and in order 
to focus on one particular national context in which fascism emerged, I propose 
considering the original research of Uwe-K. Ketelsen and Ernst Loewy, two of the first to 
anthologize National Socialist (NS) literature; recent historical research by Jan-Pieter 
Barbian and Christian Adam on literary politics and publishing trends under National 
Socialism; and theoretical work by Wilhelm Haefs and Ralf Schnell, who consider the 
extent to which NS literature emerged either within a literary-historical continuity or as 
aberrance within, though still indebted to, German literary tradition. Unless we want to 
make of fascist modernism canon-fodder, shifting canonized figures from one category 
to another, it seems necessary to include in any account of the subject ordinary literature 
that may have little or nothing to do with theories or practices of fascism yet was 
nonetheless produced and circulated by and among fascists. 
Doing so, however, raises an important question about the complicity of certain 
canonical modernists in the rise and success of fascism, namely, do the conclusions of 
writers like Paul Morrison and Robert Norton still hold? That is, if we imagine fascist 
modernism to be a banal and underwhelming reiteration of neo-classical idealist 
platitudes that have little to do with politics, not to mention ideology, then can we still 
speak of the “complicity” of Eliot or George? Are there in fact different complicities at 
work, such that Eliot’s failure to condemn the Holocaust is inexcusably complicit in 
perpetuating anti-Semitism, one fundamental feature of German fascism, but not 
complicit in the development of a literary aesthetic that either represents National 
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Socialist ideology or reproduces the failure to think, what I call indifference throughout 
this project, on which National Socialism was able unconsciously to capitalize? My 
dissertation argues that this is in fact the case. Such “indifferent” art does not fit neatly 
into the categories of “autonomous” and “engaged” but rather describes art that is both 
negatively fascist, in the sense of not thematizing fascist ideology and fostering a sense 
of political indifference, and anti-aesthetic, in the sense of refusing the possibility of art, 
in this case a poem, to be read against itself. Insofar as this indifferent literary aesthetic is 
constitutive of what I would call “fascist modernism,” Eliot resists (the materiality and 
ideology of) fascism precisely insofar as he engages it on an aesthetic level in a way 
entirely distinct from literary propaganda and vapid neo-classicism. His poetry, as well 
as that of Stefan George and Friedrich Georg Jünger, represents a different side to a 
different coin. 
This is the coin of conservatism, a political movement that the “third way” of 
National Socialism also purported to oppose. Throughout this project, the term 
“conservative” carries both a political and an aesthetic meaning. Politically, it refers to 
those ideological tenets of National Socialism that overlapped with the beliefs of self-
identified conservatives, including anti-liberalism, anti-socialism, anti-Semitism, cultural 
essentialism, anti-modernism, and anti-rationalism. In Germany, many prominent 
conservative Weimar writers and intellectuals have been associated with fascism 
because of one or more of these tenets, including Stefan George, Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, Gottfried Benn, Ernst Jünger, Hans Grimm, Arthur Moeller van den 
Bruck, Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, and Edgar Julius Jung. The charges of fascism 
vary for each author: George’s millenarianism, Hofmannsthal’s cultural conservatism, 
Benn’s irrationalism, Jünger’s total mobilization and celebration of violence, Grimm’s 
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anti-Semitism, van den Bruck’s nationalism, Spengler’s pessimism, Klages’s vitalism, 
Jung’s authoritarianism. While there was never a successful unified effort among these 
writers to form a cohesive political movement, they are commonly grouped as members 
of the “conservative revolution.” While historians of the conservative revolution have 
stressed to varying degrees the political significance of each of the above tendencies, 
they agree that the conservative revolutionaries were all, to borrow from the title of 
Martin Travers’s book on the movement, “critics of modernity.” This argument, in light 
of Jeffrey Herf’s notion of reactionary modernism, is hardly enough to render the 
broader movement complicit in the support of fascist ideology. Arguments connecting 
the conservative revolution to fascism tend therefore to rely either on individual case 
studies or, as Robert Norton has recently argued, a more generalized sense of an 
aesthetic revolution.3 
While Norton’s point is well taken, he places considerable emphasis on political 
activism, on the desire to enact social and political reform. While the conservative 
revolutionaries were “critics of modernity,” this often meant that they were drawn in 
one way or another to fascism less as the aestheticization of politics and more as 
aestheticization as politics (one exception to this is Edgar Julius Jung, the speechwriter 
for Franz von Papen who was murdered in the Night of the Long Knives). This is an 
important distinction that, while it most certainly does not hold for many writers who 
joined the NSDAP in the 1930s, still qualifies a conservative position vis-à-vis fascism 
prior to the Machtergreifung. I therefore also define “conservative” in an aesthetic sense 
as a hybrid of autonomous and engaged art, a kind of indifferent art, and it is by this 
definition that I both reimagine high modernism’s complicity in the success of fascism !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 “In the decades leading up to 1933 and during the twelve years that followed there was a 
concerted effort first to envision and then to enact the so-called ‘conservative revolution’ 
described by Hofmannsthal” (Norton 271). 
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but also distinguish on aesthetic grounds between the conservative and the fascist poem. 
The conservative poem produces the effects of “engagement” only insofar as it makes 
constant recourse to nonpolitical (or politically permissive) autonomy; however, it also 
registers the failure of this recourse by opening itself up to being read against itself. The 
fascist poem (or literary work more broadly, though this study focuses on poetry) rejects 
the possibility of this failure, performing either pure autonomy or escapism (like 
entertainment literature) or pure engagement (like propaganda). In his book Sublime 
Failures: The Ethics of Kant and Sade, David Martyn also draws on deconstruction – 
namely de Man and Derrida – to argue similarly that Kantian systematizing, when read 
alongside Sadean libertinism, makes constant recourse to its own failure. It is precisely 
such failure that Martyn associates with the ethical and the sublime. “[The strength of 
Kant and Sade] is the steadfastness with which they stick to their totalitarian desire for 
purity and wholeness, thereby to occasion a failure of totalization more ethical and more 
sublime than anything they or any other ‘subject’ could ever have desired” (169). In this 
sense, the aesthetic event of failure in the poetry of Stefan George or T. S. Eliot 
distinguishes it from the totalizing fascist poem. I associate this event with conservatism 
because it is not strictly anti-fascist but rather performs the failure implicit in, and 
rejected by, fascism. It does this by taking seriously either some aspect of fascist 
ideology, like masculine hero worship, or the aestheticization of politics more generally.  
 For writers such as George, Hofmannsthal, Kommerell, Benn, and Jünger, 
revolution was mediated and contained by the literary-aesthetic-spiritual realm. It 
necessitated a kind of aesthetic experience that was distinct from the material, socio-
political revolution promised by fascism. This difference is slight, and it bears asking if 
we should maintain it at all, if it really matters to historical understandings of aesthetic 
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conservatism and political fascism. Why I insist that it does, however, is precisely 
because of the large corpus of nonpolitical fascist cultural production. By splitting this 
hair, the continuity from the aesthetics (rather than aesthetic) of the conservative 
revolutionaries to banal fascism is rendered more pronounced, a complicity that does 
not rely on the identification of or association with an ideology but rather with the 
unconscious and material proliferation of its desired effect, coordination. A more purely 
psychoanalytic approach might consider this the inverse of Klaus Theweleit’s notion of 
Männerphantasien, whereby the allure of fascism for World War I veterans derived from 
the violent misogyny cultivated during their experience at the front, such that fascism 
capitalizes on the desire to overcomplicate politics.  
In this sense of the material proliferation of indifference as one aspect of the 
program of Gleichschaltung, George’s or Eliot’s nonpolitical poetry might be considered 
complicit. However, to accuse art of political complicity purely on the basis of not 
committing itself to political resistance fails to account for art’s multiplicity, its ability, as 
Barthes says, to allow us “to understand speech outside the bounds of power.” It is in 
this sense that I draw on another accused fascist, Paul de Man, as well as the great critic 
of fascism Theodor Adorno, in order to further delineate the nonpolitical dimension of 
fascist modernism but also to challenge the accusations of historical indifference that 
have haunted deconstruction. In fact, by demonstrating how deconstruction allows the 
possibility of re-inscribing the historicity of affect, I argue not only for the socio-
historical relevance of deconstructive methodologies, but also the potential of such 
methodologies to lay bare an aesthetic critique of affect impossible on the political plane. 
Such readings reveal how poetry can dramatize a critique of indifference the possibility 
for which fascist modernism necessarily forecloses.  
 9 
The privileging of high art is therefore one undercurrent that runs through this 
project, and for good reason. The writers in question were conservative; they believed in 
high art, whereas the fascists did not. Or rather, fascism sought to annihilate dominant 
critical perceptions of high art, to impose from above the parameters by which art is 
considered “high” or “low” (degenerate). In this very narrow sense of imposing the 
standards for high art from some privileged vantage point, the high modernists, Adorno 
and de Man, and Goebbels are not so different. But deconstruction, as a particular mode 
of literary analysis, need not eschew entirely historical context. When employed 
alongside Adorno’s argument that lyric poetry reads the sundial of history, this 
modified deconstructive methodology provides the tools for understanding art free 
from the relativity of which deconstruction is often accused. Art itself thus provides the 
grounds for similitude and differentiation, such that fascist modernism is constituted by 
a rejection of aesthetic indeterminacy, which in turn confirms historical scholarship on 
popular opinion that has demonstrated the uncritical nature of the widespread 
enthusiasm for the regime. While disengaged from politics, the conservative aesthetic 
that I examine in this study does not actively question or challenge such enthusiasm; it 
does, however, lay bare the grounds for critiquing fascist ideology’s rejection of the 
possibility of failure. This argument could hold for the relationship between any 
aesthetic regime and political category, such that a nonpolitical and uncritical poem 
from the Soviet Union could be classed as communist, just as one written in the US 
today could be classed as democratic, insofar as it proliferates the effects of that political 
ideology without challenging it (à la Brecht) or opening it to an aesthetic critique (à la 
George, Eliot).  
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This argument, however, does not simply set out to exonerate certain poems and 
poets from an association with fascism, a point that can be demonstrated in the context 
of gender. The gendering of poetic debates, as we see with fascist subjects and their 
enemies, was central to scholarly and popular literary debate at the turn of the century 
and following World War I. Essentializing concepts of gender were used as a paradigm 
to understand and categorize poetic form in both the Anglo-American and the German 
tradition. For the polemical English writer T. E. Hulme, the romantic was feminine and 
the classical masculine. Referring to Rousseau’s notion of man in the state of nature, he 
considers the romantic a feminine state of infinite possibility, free from the ordered 
confines of “inequality” and social and political structures; its opposite is the classical, or 
masculine, to which he repeatedly refers as “dry,” “hard,” “ordered,” and “finite.” 
These ontological categories for the state of man correspond to aesthetic categories, and 
the qualities and modifiers he applies to each view similarly correspond to the mode of 
aesthetic production from that period. “The dry hardness which you get in the classics is 
absolutely repugnant to [the Romantics]. Poetry that isn’t damp isn’t poetry at all. They 
cannot see that accurate description is a legitimate object of verse. Verse to them always 
means a bringing in of the emotions that are grouped round the word infinite” (126-7). 
Hulme's polemics present poetry in dichotomous terms: dry or damp, hard or soft, 
descriptive or emotional, finite or infinite. Each of these adjectives bespeaks in turn both 
a gender, male or female, and a politics, conservative or liberal. Romanticism, by 
Hulme’s logic, is therefore feminine, liberal, metaphysical, and stagnant. These 
arguments were highly influential for Ezra Pound, who took to the radio to support 
Mussolini almost thirty years after helping found imagism, a movement much indebted 
to Hulme’s influence.  
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 Debates about poetry in Germany were similarly gendered, with perhaps more 
immediately visible political ramifications. As Mark Elliot argues, “debates [about 
modern German poetry] were governed on all levels and across the political spectrum 
by a gendered paradigm: a hierarchical opposition between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
that had been established by right-wing ideologues before 1933” (Elliot 908). As Elliot 
goes on to argue, this dichotomy could be mapped onto two poets. “[Stefan] George was 
largely equated positively with masculinity, discipline, and associated aesthetic 
categories, such as formal restraint, and Rilke negatively with femininity, decadence, 
and fluidity of aesthetic form.” One can see the influence of such rhetoric in an essay-
letter from 1939 by the Austrian poet Josef Weinheber, a supposed inner emigrant who 
often wrote in support of National Socialism during the later years of the regime, 
reflecting on his relationship to Rilke from years earlier. “[I]ch begann ihn zu hassen, ich 
machte ihn bei mir selbst verächtlich, als form- und zuchtlos, molluskenhaft und 
weibisch” (in Berger 213). This masculinist perspective persisted even after the war. In 
recounting her education immediately following her release from the camps, Ruth 
Klüger writes, “Another of our teachers, a veteran who was doing his first year of 
practice teaching at a local school, complained about the discipline problems he 
encountered. He told us that boys at least had a sense of honor to which he could 
appeal, which was lacking in girls… While Germans had to revise their judgment of 
Jews, however reluctantly and sporadically, they didn’t even try to revise their Nazi-
bred contempt for women. I learned so little from this man that I don’t even remember 
what subject he taught. I was also told that Rilke, whose poetry I had just discovered, 
was too feminine. No man should write such verse, which was only good enough for 
poetesses” (162). Gottfried Benn, in his “Rede auf Stefan George” also emphasizes the 
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importance of form, in a classical and masculine sense. “In der Dichtung entscheidet 
nicht der Sinn, sondern die Form… Es gibt nur den Geist und das Schicksal, die Religion 
ohne Götter, oder die neuen Götter: Form und Zucht” (487-489). Drawing on the Nazi 
ideologue Alfred Rosenberg’s notion of the aesthetic will, Benn relates George’s formal 
hardness to the masculine German will to overcome.  
 The irony here is that even by the political, gender-essentializing standards of 
Hulme, Weinheber, and Benn, there is no unifying formal, aesthetic quality among the 
nonpolitical works of Pound, Weinheber, and George that corresponds to a political 
category. In fact, an Adornian-deconstructive approach foregrounds how “masculine” 
and “feminine” as qualifiers of poetry are discursively constructed (ultimately for non-
aesthetic purposes). Among thematically similar poetry by all three poets, there are 
radical formal differences. More importantly, many poems by all three men – which a 
gendered poetics would describe as masculine and affectless – actively reinscribe both 
subjectivity and emotion, allegorizing the relation between subject and feeling in ways 
that fail to cohere around some essential “masculine” or “feminine” set of qualities. The 
notion of a fascist modernist poem, thus, requires determination by a set of aesthetic 
criteria (the foreclosure of aesthetic indeterminacy and the rejection of allegory) that 
adhere to an observable aesthetic trend (the imitation of neo-classical forms and the 
thematizing of neo-idealist platitudes) during a particular historical moment (the 
political reign of fascism, whose success was facilitated in part by escapist entertainment 
literature). The poetry of Agnes Miegel therefore belongs as much to fascist modernism 
as does that of Josef Weinheber, a grouping that reveals the violent homogenizing 
impulse of fascism, its assimilation of all that challenges the hegemonic masculinity on 
which it depended. 
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 In this sense, my dissertation draws on the central thesis of Roger Griffin’s recent 
book Fascism and Modernism. “The thesis explored in this book,” Griffin writes, “is 
unrepentantly ‘big’. It maintains that a fundamentally homogeneous and uniform 
psycho-cultural matrix generates not just the bewildering proliferation of heterogeneous 
aesthetic, cultural, and social forms of modernism, but conditions – without determining 
them – the ideologies, policies, and praxis of generic fascism as well. In short, it claims 
that fascism can be usefully, but not exclusively, analyzed as a form of modernism” 
(Griffin 38). My dissertation considers fascism as a form of modernism by isolating the 
convergence between one of its particular political (the conservative revolution) 
precursors and aesthetic (literary) emanations. 
 There immediately arises one problem in conflating the aesthetic with the literary 
in the context of de Man, since de Man himself resists this conflation: “In [The Resistance 
to Theory], he contrasts aesthetics with poetics in terms of the concern in poetics with ‘a 
nonconvergence between “meaning” with “the devices that produce meaning,”’ 
aesthetics by implication basing itself on such a convergence” (Loesberg 89). Critiquing 
what he calls “aesthetic ideology” became the object of much of de Man’s late criticism, a 
concept that Martin Jay finds resonant with Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Nancy’s notion of 
eidaesthetics, “whose task is the overcoming of differences, contradictions, and 
disharmonies. Although implicitly challenged by a counterimpulse they call ‘romantic 
equivocity,’ the telos of eidaesthetics is the closure of a complete work produced by an 
omnipotent subject, who realizes the Idea in sensual form” (46). As Jay writes, “for de 
Man, it was literary language’s resistance to closure, transparency, harmony, and 
perfection that could be pitted against the aesthetic ideology” (48). In Jay’s reading of 
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Jonathan Culler’s defense of de Man, “de Man’s realization of this opposition 
demonstrates his rejection of his earlier collaborationist position.”  
 For Jay, de Man’s notion of aesthetic ideology is “one-dimensionally negative” 
and “reducible to the nightmare of seductive sensuality that appears to have kept de 
Man restlessly tossing and turning in his bed of linguistic austerity” (51). However, with 
regards to the very specific context of fascist (literary) aesthetics, the extremeness of de 
Man’s “hostility to natural metaphors of organic wholeness” serves to foreground the 
political nature of such metaphors (48). Considering Adorno’s dialectical understanding 
of lyric poetry’s ability to register the materiality of social conflict, my dissertation 
claims that the fascist modernist poem collapses the tension between the literary and the 
aesthetic such that lyric poetry performs, rather than registers, the material forces 
driving social conflict (whether in the form of hegemonic masculinity, biological racism, 
political indifference, etc.). In this sense, de Man’s distinction between poetics and 
aesthetics bears a heavy political burden worthy of the overstatement with which de 
Man warns of sensual and transparent language. By maintaining a tension between 
meaning and the devices that produce it, certain modernist poetry is able to dramatize 
the failure of conservatism, no less than the failures of fascism, in such a way that fascist 
modernist poetry disallows.  
 If we follow Stanley Payne’s argument that fascism was anti-liberal, anti-
communist, and anti-conservative, then my research also posits an implicit, arguably 
more speculative, argument that hinges on the discrepancy between the poetic 
discontinuity and aesthetic continuity between conservative and fascist modernists. On 
the one hand, both conservatives and fascists insisted on the utmost social and political 
value of poetry; their respective enactment of poetic form, however, speaks precisely to 
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either the acknowledgement or refutation of political failure. In this sense, it might be 
possible to theorize fascism’s negation of conservatism as an aesthetic phenomenon. 
This negation would not be grounded on the aestheticization of politics but rather 
aestheticization as an almost psychoanalytic process of sublimating the very failure 
immanent in the paradoxes of fascist ideology and praxis. The failure of this sublimation 
of failure thus acts as a defense mechanism whereby one is tempted to strive for the 
permanence seemingly offered by natural and transparent representation. Obstructed by 
this temptation, the fascist modernist poem produces a regime of signification 
pathologically determined to annihilate the difference between meaning and the devices 
that produce it. Unobstructed by such temptation, the conservative modernist poem 
makes both this failure as well as its own failure (indeterminacy, helplessness) its object. 
In this way it is no less complicit in the success of fascism, though it nonetheless insists 
on the very rhetoricity, and absence, that fascism seeks to destroy. 
 Chapter II begins with the controversy surrounding major events of Stefan 
George’s life, including his study with Mallarmé, the founding of the George Circle, his 
correspondences and interactions with key National Socialist officials, and finally his 
trip to Switzerland at the end of his life. Drawing on Stefan Breuer’s notion of “aesthetic 
fundamentalism,” I argue that George’s conception of conservatism sought to fashion 
itself constitutively apolitical, or disinterested in direct social or political engagement, 
insofar as it conceived of politics as circumscribed by aesthetics. Drawing on de Man’s 
notion of allegory and Adorno’s argument in “Lyric Poetry and Society,” I then proceed 
to perform readings of three of George’s most political poems: Algabal, “Der Dichter in 
Zeiten der Wirren,” and “Einem jungen Führer im ersten Weltkrieg.” Each of these 
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poems, I argue, dramatizes the failure of political indifference in such a way that opens 
such indifference up to an aesthetic critique. 
 Chapter III broadens the scope of my dissertation to include poetry from the 
Anglo-American tradition in order to account for the question of “protofascism” 
removed from the geographical locus of National Socialism. It begins with a reading of 
Shelley’s “Ozymandias,” a poet and poem traditionally grouped with the political left. 
By arguing that “Ozymandias” presents not only a critique of authoritarianism and 
empire but also a critique of revolution, I identify a conservative strain in the poem in 
which the indeterminacy of poetic language dramatizes a way out of political 
commitment to one side of the Hegelian dialectic. After surveying critiques of T. S. 
Eliot’s sympathy to fascism in his poetry and the Criterion, I then draw on this reading of 
“Ozymandias” to consider two of Eliot’s most direct meditations on politics, Four 
Quartets and (the unfinished sequence) Coriolan. Each poetic sequence, I argue, 
thematizes political failure while dramatizing the relationship between politics and art, 
what Eliot calls the “pre-political.” This relationship is summarily expressed in the final 
words of Coriolan, “RESIGN RESIGN RESIGN,” which operate both diegetically and 
rhetorically. That is, while the poem ends abruptly with a call for the dictator to quit his 
position, it also calls for the poem to quit its attempt at political engagement. The 
repetition of these capitalized words calls attention to their ultimate signification, the 
necessary re-signing of political aesthetics, from a critique of material failures to a poetic 
and ultimately spiritual affirmation of those greatest of human failures, mortality and 
finitude. 
Chapter IV begins by considering the material failures of Weimar conservatives, 
most notably the DNVP, who believed that forming a coalition with the NSDAP would 
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allow them the opportunity to exert some degree of influence over Hitler. It first 
establishes for one particular strain of conservative thought a general backdrop of 
failure, from the perception of Weimar democracy to the ineffectualness of Hugenberg, 
von Papen, and other conservative political leaders. It is against this backdrop that the 
“conservative revolution” is not only born but also developed throughout the 1920s and 
into the 1930s. Tracing this idea through Thomas Mann’s early conservatism and 
glossing its various manifestations in the work of writers such as Spengler, Ernst Jünger, 
Hofmannsthal, and Kommerell, I demonstrate the recourse to literature in conservative 
revolutionaries’ effort to overcome failure. Following Keith Bullivant’s argument that 
this idealist-literary aspect of the conservative revolution was constitutively nonpolitical, 
I argue that the movement helped give credibility to National Socialism because of its 
failure to distinguish art from politics, a difference fundamental to my understanding of 
the poetry of George and Eliot. 
 Chapter V then considers the transformation of conservative thought on 
literature into the 1930s, comparing it with Nazi literary policy and cultural practice, and 
individual accounts of literature by Nazi party members and officials, most notably 
Hans Friedrich Blunck, who served for a period as president of the 
Reichsschrifttumskammer (RSK). Namely, I demonstrate how conservative and fascist 
writers tried to reclaim political significance for nonpolitical, ostensibly neo-classical, 
literature. Together with the relative success of nonpolitical “Unterhaltungsliteratur,” I 
theorize this proliferation of indifference as one aspect of the Nazi program of 
Gleichschaltung, the (likely unconscious, or at least unintended) coordination of a banal 
disinterest in politics where active political participation was ruefully absent. Finally, in 
the Conclusion, I consider Friedrich Georg Jünger’s poem “Der Mohn,” which 
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represents a conservative attempt, in the sense of my readings of George and Eliot, to 
politicize indifference in an effort to actively combat the proliferation of a nonpolitical 
literature (for an audience, presumable, more inclined to stay out of things) theorized by 
the conservative revolutionaries. 
 Some fifty years after Hofmannsthal delivered his address on language and the 
conservative revolution to a Munich auditorium, another pronouncement of the 
revolutionary power of language was uttered in Paris. In his inaugural lecture as the 
Chair of Literary Semiology, Roland Barthes referred to literature as a “permanent 
revolution of language.” Language, Barthes says, “is quite simply fascist; for fascism 
does not prevent speech, it compels speech. Once uttered, even in the subject’s deepest 
privacy, speech enters the service of power.” Insofar as language is both authoritative 
and stereotypical, whenever I speak I am both master and slave, “I assert tellingly what I 
repeat.” The lesson of semiotic post-structuralism, as Barthes indicates, is that 
interpretation provides us a way out of language’s fascist control. Literature provides us 
the tools necessary “to understand speech outside the bounds of power.” It is precisely this 
mode of understanding, of interpretation in its most basic sense, which fascism sought 
to coopt, if not annihilate entirely. To accuse the poetry of Eliot or George of fascism, 
even protofascism, is to overlook the desire in their writing to challenge the fascist desire 
to compel speech, a desire evident in the poetry produced and circulated under National 
Socialism’s program of coordination. To accuse deconstruction of fascism, even of 
relativism, is to overlook its most basic tenet: the Nietzschean will to interpretation 
demands that language be put under scrutiny such that where possibilities for meaning 
are actively rejected, readerly suspicion and condemnation are aroused. In a sense, this 
is precisely what characterizes National Socialism: the rejection of the possibility for 
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meaning in human life. In his 1963 study of National Socialist literature, Joseph Wulf 
wrote the following. 
Ein so undeutscher Geist—um im NS-Jagon zu sprechen—wie Friedrich 
Sieburg mit seinem brillanten Verstand verfiel damals auf die Idee, unter 
Umständen müsse ‘ein Volk eines Tages zwischen sich selbst und der 
Humanität’ wählen.  
Schrieben sie alle für ihr Volk oder vielmehr für das Regime?  
Da steckt der Verrat! 
Niemand mußte unbedingt NSDAP-Mitglied sein, um als Schriftsteller 
solchen Treubruch zu begehen… Der Scheideweg lag damals nicht zwischen 
rechts und links, war keine Frage von radikal oder konservativ, sondern lediglich 
eine Frage des Charakters und der menschlichen Haltung. (10) 
Ultimately, my study is an attempt to understand this question of the human character 
as it presents itself in what historically has been considered the most human of literary 
forms, the lyric poem. While it does focus primarily on conservative beneficiaries of 
National Socialism, to borrow a term applied most recently to white Afrikaners under 
apartheid, I try never to forget that any study of this period is a study of the betrayal of 
people, humanity, in the name of “the people.” The methodology with which I proceed 
in this dissertation provides what I consider to be the clearest way of revealing how the 
Nazi rejection of difference and rejection of meaning manifest in poetic form. In 
performing such rejection, the Nazi fascist poem also rejects the possibility of finding 
meaning in and empathizing with others, one cornerstone of being human that National 
Socialism not only disregarded, but sought actively and violently to annihilate. 
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CHAPTER II 
“DIE GESETZE DES GEISTIGEN UND DES POLITISCHEN”: ALLEGORIES OF 
INTERPRETATION IN STEFAN GEORGE’S POLITICAL POETRY 
 
In his recent, award-winning monograph on the “afterlife” of Stefan George 
(1865-1933), Ulrich Raulff describes how the critical discourse surrounding George’s life 
and poetry has been marked by a complicated relationship with National Socialism. 
“Spätestens seit diesem Augenblick, Ende 1933, hat sich ein dauerhaftes Diskursschema 
etabliert: Hier George der politische Seher (oder Scharlatan), dort George, der reine, tiefe 
Dichter.” Shaped like a “Y,” or what Ernst Jünger calls a “Zwille,” the political half of 
the schema is further bisected, such that there have developed three distinct Stefan 
Georges. “[Des Schemas] politischer Ast ist in zwei Zweige gespalten: Der eine führt zu 
George, dem Visionär und Warner, der andere zu George, dem Verführer und 
Wegbereiter des Faschismus. Auf der anderen, ungespaltenen Seite des Y-Schemas steht 
Georges reines, einzig der Kunst ergebenes Schöpfertum” (Raulff 51). This interpretive 
split has occurred in large part because George, who studied under Mallarmé, abided by 
the principles of l’art pour l’art, and insisted throughout his life that poetry’s preeminent 
role in cultural renewal was as high art, both behaved in a manner and composed poetry 
that resonates eerily with the practices and revolutionary ideology of the emerging 
NSDAP.4 Critics have turned to a number of sources to detail George’s indirect 
complicity, including: the George Circle, which was structured around a charismatic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 As Paul de Man notes, “George claimed that ‘from him, no road led to science’” (“Modern 
Poetics in France and Germany” 157). 
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figure of authority; the work of his disciples, which was occasionally anti-Semitic;5 his 
association with Verlag Georg Bondi, which, as the exclusive publisher of George’s 
Geistbücher and Blätter für die Kunst, stamped a swastika on the front of each publication 
(and this despite his association with the Jewish historian Ernst Kantorwicz); and of 
course both George’s own actions, such as his decision to remain in Germany after 1933, 
as well as his most political poetry.6 
Furthermore, understandings of George’s poetry and politics are often 
anachronistically overdetermined by the Holocaust. The same interpretive schema that 
has emerged regarding George’s biography has in turn established itself around this 
poetry, such that rhetorical readings – implied as descendants of the nationalist 
component of Gottfried Benn’s argument in Rede über Stefan George, in which he likens 
the poet to the Nazi intellectual Alfred Rosenberg – have become regarded as 
increasingly fraught.7 Any rhetorical reading that would take seriously George’s 
insistence that poetry is a “formal organization of language” now finds itself suffocating 
from the need to address George’s appropriation by, and sympathy with, nationalist, 
and often by extension fascist, causes: they must either dissociate the poet and/or his 
poetry from the context of National Socialism entirely or perform readings in spite of his 
complicated biography (Travers 22). In light of recent research that demonstrates the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Klaus Landfried, among others, insists that George did not share the enthusiasm for anti-
Semitism rampant among conservatives. “Der im deutschen Konservatismus oft anklingende 
Antisemitismus blieb George fremd. Seine ‘Vaterländische Wendung’ nach der 
Wiederentdeckung Hölderlins war faktisch eine Wendung zur deutschen Kulturtradition, 
sozusagen eine Wendung von der Innerlichkeit eines internationalen Künstlerkreises zur 
Innerlichkeit eines metaphysicshen ‘Herkunftsgemeinschaft’” (243).  
 
6 “[The swastika] continued to be used to identify the works of the George Circle even after 
[George’s] death.” (Norton 278). 
 
7 Appropriate to this argument, Benn also maintains in the same speech that George’s poetry 
embodies the tenants of l’art pour l’art.
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extent to which George’s life provided intellectual and artistic credence to the Zeitgeist 
that pervaded late-Weimar Germany and led to the success of the NSDAP, to ignore this 
relationship would be to perform an historical injustice. However, implicitly dismissing 
a rhetorical approach in the act of proving that George’s poetry is a reflection of his 
“nascent fascism” performs a disservice of its own, namely to the poet’s insistence both 
on the authority of his spiritual craft and, as he said late in his life, that “die gesetze des 
geistigen und des politischen sind gewiss sehr verschieden.” Formalist criticism, rather 
than further obstructing or concealing some “secret” desire or sympathy for fascism, 
provides a way of reading the ambivalence towards the movement, and towards the role 
that poetry could or must play in its instatement, that George himself expressed 
explicitly in his personal life. 
 Of George’s large body of work, three of his poems give voice to a concrete 
political position: Algabal, “Der Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren,” and “Einem Jungen 
Führer im Ersten Weltkrieg.” Each of these poems thematizes a conservative desire for 
cultural renewal (as opposed to liberal, cosmopolitan modernity), a kind of social 
revolution, by featuring a political leader determined to remake the world: respectively, 
a ruthless emperor, a young leader in the aftermath of World War I, and a mythological 
savior who will found “das Neue Reich.” However, rather than subordinating the 
innovative possibility inherent in poetic form and language to a political position, each 
of George’s poems acutely calls attention to itself as poetry. As prominently as they 
depict political subjectivity, the poems foreground poetic agency – the poetic will, the 
poetic utterance, and the poetic trope – thereby performing the limit that art reaches 
when striving to effect (or affect) the revolutionary politics that it describes. Each of 
these poems therefore allegorizes an orientation towards the relationship between art 
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and politics that it deems fundamentally inadequate. They dramatize the ambiguities 
and problems that historicist accounts have uncovered in George’s own biography: 
namely that the George Circle, designed as a platform for discussing purely aesthetic 
concerns, was a microcosm of the cult of National Socialism, and that George, despite 
rejecting an invitation to join the Nazis’ reconstituted Writers’ Academy in 1933 and 
traveling to Switzerland, nonetheless spiritually remained in Nazi Germany.8 
The rhetorical methodology employed here determines George’s political poetry 
as a dramatization of his own conflicted orientation towards politics comes primarily 
from two sources: Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) and Paul de Man (1919-1983). In “Rede 
über Lyrik und Gesellschaft,” Adorno claims that lyric poetry and the poetic subject are 
able to “read the sundial of history” by registering social conflicts and injustices, which 
are immanent to the form of the work of art. “Das lyrische Gebilde,” he argues, “sei stets 
auch der subjektive Ausdruck eines gesellschaftlichen Antagonismus.”9 In the case of 
these three poems, this antagonism is a negative, though arguably conflicted, 
relationship to fascist politics. Unlike what Adorno calls “representational” art, such as 
German naturalism, or “engaged” art, such as Brecht’s epic theater, George’s poetry is 
not altogether disinterested in politics; on the contrary, it is interested in delineating, if 
at all possible, where art ends and politics begins, a project that concerned and troubled 
George not only in his art, but also in his personal life.10 Like Adorno’s understanding of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 While George’s friend Robert Boehringer initially made this claim about his travel to 
Switzerland shortly after George’s death, numerous critics have sought to dispute this 
interpretation. 
 
9 Adorno continues, “Da aber die objektive Welt, welche Lyrik hervorbringt, an sich die 
antagonistische ist, so geht der Begriff von Lyrik nicht auf im Ausdruck der Subjektivität, der die 
Sprache Objektivität schenkt.” (58).  
 
10 Adorno’s argument is keenly aware of this tension in George’s work, which he sees embodied 
by the single word “gar.” “Aber die großen Kunstwerke sind jene, die an ihren fragwürdigsten 
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autonomous art, George’s lyric retreats into itself as the site of political revolution; as I 
demonstrate in Chapters IV and V, however, this event carries the possibly unintended, 
or unconscious, political effect of disengaging with material politics, an indifference, or 
“failure to think,” on which National Socialism was opportunistically able, 
unintentionally or unconsciously, to capitalize. 
The following reading also requires a look back at deconstruction, particularly 
the trajectory of its most divisive advocate. Not incidentally, the insistence on 
historicism in George criticism is emblematic of a theoretical paradigm shift that 
occurred in the 1980s, in the wake of the controversy surrounding the discovery of Paul 
de Man’s wartime writings.11 “To judge from various recent publications,” de Man 
writes in the opening essay of Allegories of Reading from 1979, “the spirit of the times is 
not blowing in the direction of formalist and intrinsic criticism” (3). Such criticism, 
however, is key to reconciling the various poles of Raulff’s schema, insofar as it opens 
up a way of thinking through how “social antagonisms,” and even biographical 
indeterminacy, are emergent in a work of art. Incidentally, the trajectory of de Man’s 
own work, no less than the work itself, provides a framework for revealing an 
orientation towards politics in George’s most political poems that insists on its own 
powerlessness in the realm of direct political influence. Namely, in his most political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Stellen Glück haben… [so verhählt es] sich auch mit dem ‘gar,’ einem Goetheschen ‘Bodensatz 
des Absurden,’ mit dem die Sprache der subjektiven Intention entflieht, die das Wort 
herbeizog…. Zog ihr Ausdruck sich zusammen in den individuellen, so wie sie ihn ganz mit 
Substanz und Erfahrung der eigenen Einsamkeit sättigt, dann wird eben diese Rede zur Stimme 
der Menschen, zwischen denen die Schranke fiel” (67-8). 
 
11 “The de Man affair, as though orchestrated by some hidden hand of history, curiously 
coincided with a downturn in those intellectual fortunes, and some at least of the ill feeling 
associated with the rumpus sprang from a current of theory which now felt that its back was 
increasingly to the wall. Rightly or wrongly, deconstruction stood accused among other sins of an 
unhistorical formalism; and throughout the 1980s, not least in the United States, there had been a 
gathering swell floating literary theory back in the direction of some brand of historicism.” 
(Eagleton 197).  
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poems, George draws attention to this political limit of aesthetic form through what de 
Man calls allegory, a “distance in relation to its own origin,” the deferral of political 
revolution through its poetically- (formally- and linguistically-)constituted realization.12 
Such a reading salvages the aesthetic merit of George’s poetry by defining it not as a 
suspiciously apolitical allegory for the ambitions of art, but rather as a (political) 
allegory for the process of working out the relationship between art and politics. 
Rather than conceiving of Raulff’s Y three-dimensionally, such that to analyze a 
poem is to drop it on the apex and see down which side it tumbles, this argument 
instead abstracts from the Y a Venn diagram in which aesthetics and politics overlap. 
Seeking to move beyond the association of formalism with a disinterest in, and even 
rejection of, history, it therefore proceeds from both George’s own emphasis that “die 
gesetze des geistigen und des politischen sind gewiss sehr verschieden” as well as 
Robert Norton’s argument that “[i]t was owing in no small measure to the extraordinary 
prestige, even veneration, that George enjoyed among his German contemporaries that 
it was possible for Hitler to benefit from the conflation of aesthetic and political 
authority George represented in the public mind and for Hitler’s form of rule to enjoy 
the legitimacy it did” (Norton 279). While these two analytical points of origin seem 
contradictory – the one separates aesthetics and politics whereas the other brings them 
together – that is precisely the point.13 George did not seem to know what he wanted (to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This characterization of allegory is not unlike George’s notion of “Denkbild.” See Berghahn, “A 
View Through the Red Window: Ernst Bloch’s Spuren” 204-210. 
 
13 Stefan Breuer identifies a similar tension with his concept of “aesthetic fundamentalism.” This 
philosophy, which he traces from German Romanticism through Wagner and Nietzsche to 
George and his disciples, viewed art as the most essential means of inspiring social 
transformation but is not, in itself, in the service of politics. “[Dieses Buch] geht… um das, was 
sich maßgebliche Gruppen der deutschen Gesellschaft zu einer bestimmten Zeit von der Kunst 
erhofften, nämlich Impulse für eine Neugestaltung des Ganzen schlechthin” (Breuer 8). 
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believe), and drawing on de Man’s notion of allegory and its place in the development 
of his work allows a way of reading George’s poetry as a dramatization of the 
ambiguities, the problems, and especially the contradictions implicit in both interpreting 
his poetry and reconstructing his biography. I will go on to argue throughout my 
dissertation that this indeterminacy, what Klaus Landfried calls the “politik des 
Unpolitischen,” is a kind of poetic dramatization of what publication records show to 
have been the widespread retreat to nonpolitical or entertainment literature that 
contributed to an Arendtian “failure to think” and contributed, in some small way, to 
the rise and success of fascism.14  
In de Man’s dissertation on Mallarmé and Yeats from 1960, which had originally 
been planned to include a third part on Stefan George, de Man develops the concept of 
the emblem, distinguishing it from the poetic image. Yeats, he argues, begins his career 
by using primarily natural, mimetic images. In his later poetry, however, he experiences 
a kind of crisis of the natural image because it reveals itself as contradictory: it is 
indispensible as the necessary starting point of an image, but “by its mere presence [it] 
voids the poet’s hope to find permanence in words” (“Image and Emblem” 160). These 
natural images, in Yeats’s mature work, become emblems, linguistic events, accretions of 
signification, which reveal the inadequacy and downfall of the image while also seeming 
to offer up access to something more eternal. As de Man argues, what were once 
“mimetic nouns referring to natural objects which the poet claims to present to us as 
perceived by him” no longer have any mimetic reference whatsoever. “The images have 
given up all pretense at being natural objects and have become something else. They are 
taken from the literary tradition and receive their meaning from traditional or personal, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See Landfried, Stefan George—Politik des Unpolitischen 187-249. 
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but not from natural associations” (164-5). For de Man, the emblem springs up from 
“literary tradition,” what he later figures more explicitly as language itself; rather than 
signifying, the emblem emerges as signification from signification. However, as Forest 
Pyle elucidates, “the course of Yeats’s mature poetry is marked by a series of 
progressively powerful failures: the ‘downfall’ of the image and the inability of the 
emblem to fulfill the profound ‘hopes Yeats had invested’ in them… As de Man 
understands it, the trajectory of Yeats’s poetry is one of sheer and successive negations” 
(Pyle 187). As a result, de Man’s later work engages very similar questions through a 
modified conceptual framework. 
The basic impulse of de Man’s chapter on Yeats – establishing the difference 
between the mimetic and the arbitrary – thus becomes the basis for his much later work 
“The Rhetoric of Temporality,” which, rather than image and emblem, uses the concepts 
of symbol and allegory.15 Drawing on Coleridge’s conception of the symbol as 
transparent, “conceived as an expression of unity between the representative and the 
semantic function of language,” de Man challenges the notion that the hallmark of 
romantic poetry was its use of the symbol (“Rhetoric of Temporality 189). “Unlike the 
impressionists, whose light almost possesses volume, Yeats's light is pure transparency, 
the fitting lack of texture for the sign which is there to reveal, not itself, but what stands 
behind it” (205). Rereading Yeats against Frank Kermode, de Man argues that the 
totalizing symbol of unity and reconciliation that Kermode reads in Yeats is actually 
allegory. “Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, 
allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing 
the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For a more thorough reading of this trajectory, see Balfour, “History against Historicism, 
Formal Matters and the Event of the Text: de Man with Benjamin.” 
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temporal difference. In so doing, it prevents the self from an illusory identification with 
the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self” (207). Like 
the emblem, the allegory is an event born from language into language, offering a 
glimpse of something that both “stands behind,” and stands before, itself. 
De Man’s argument that allegory recognizes itself as a non-(identical) self – that 
it is not the signification (and identification) with something achieved by metaphor, but 
rather the signification (and deferral) of signification achieved by metonymy – indicates 
a “temporal” gap, or “void,” between form and content, which do not directly 
correspond to each other. This emphasis, while it derives from de Man’s early work on 
the emblem, is representative of what Jeffrey Librett calls de Man’s “passage from a 
nationalist aestheticism which has as necessary condition the firm belief in the value of 
natural and adequate form [the “image”]… to an anti-nationalist anti-aestheticism which 
incessantly restates the implausibility of any belief in (this) value while acknowledging 
its own capacity to cease precisely addressing the problem of value” (320). Such aesthetic 
complicity in the political arena, which de Man rejects, has as its necessary condition 
“the commitment to the mutual and natural appropriateness of form and content” (314). 
Instead of this appropriateness, de Man’s notion of allegory instates the notion of 
temporal distance, a distance always already occurring in language and unveiled by the 
act of deconstruction. George’s poetry likewise rejects a “natural and adequate” 
nationalist form – one in which political value corresponds to and derives from aesthetic 
form, the poetic image – in an effort, however troubling, to render the belief in such 
mimetic and natural adequacy implausible. Forest Pyle has shown convincingly that for 
de Man, because the poetic image is self-originating, it is likewise “intentional,” in the 
archaic sense of “an appearance,” what the seventeenth-century Dutch logician Francis 
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Burgersdicious calls “species and specters of the sense and understanding, and other 
things whose essence only consists in their apparition” (in Pyle 197). For Pyle the de 
Manian image (in this case Percy Shelley’s “a shape all light” from The Triumph of Life) 
“produces no historical illumination… we might call it an event, but only if we 
understand by event that which undoes the possibility of historical reckoning. If this is a 
visual image, there is nothing ‘pictorial’ about it” (201). Making this very same 
distinction between a pictorial and rhetorical image, my reading of George’s poetry 
proposes that we include to what Pyle refers to as “history” the concept of political 
commitment and value.  
George’s poetry dramatizes this “undoing [of] the possibility of historical 
reckoning” primarily through its use of prophecy, a temporal difference, the 
signification of signification, immanent in George’s most political poems, particularly 
two from Das Neue Reich.16 These prophecies involve the convergence of a projection into 
the future and an exposition in the present; they are the instantaneous presentation of 
simultaneity and sequence, the collapsing of an origin and a distance, the necessarily 
inadequate paradox of which can be neither natural nor desirable. The “signification” of 
such a prophecy – the emblem that is “Das Neue Reich,” for example – is (dis)avowed in 
the “void of temporal difference,” the distance of the poetic prophecy in relation to its 
own origin, poetic language. This is not to liberate George’s poetry from fascist or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 “[The Circle’s] approach was antiphilological in the extreme (not footnotes, sources, or 
bibliographies), but their merit lies rather in their respect for the autonomy of the poetic mind 
than in their attacks on traditional methods. The writer on literature must come as close as 
possible to the creative experience itself, helped in this by admiration and love for his subject 
rather than by scruples of accuracy and objectivity. There is great emphasis, also, on the 
messianic role of the poet as an almost superhuman figure, to be dealt with in a language closer 
to that of myth or religion than that of science…In… George himself, the tangible expression of 
the transcendental value of poetry was to be found in the perfection of the form; it was by the act 
of extreme formal discipline, a kind of ascesis of the form, that the poet earned the right to 
statements of prophetic weight.” (“Modern Poetics in France and Germany” 157). 
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totalitarian politics, but indeed quite the opposite, to read the poems as political insofar 
as they allegorize and think through, “figure and act out,” as Librett says, their own 
political impotence. “De Man’s ‘passage’ from adherence to the authority of form to 
adherence to the authority of (de)form(ation) names, then, neither an excuse nor a 
condemnation but the task to figure and act out political transformation at all times in 
terms other than those that promote the installation of any naturalized propriety of the 
desirable” (Librett 321). When read rhetorically, George’s poetry comes to “figure and 
act out” the political limit, rather than the untrammeled potential, of the poem. This 
process, explicit in George’s later poems such as “Der Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren,” is 
immanent primarily in his early, political aestheticist poem Algabal. Rather than 
represent the symbolism with which this poem is generally associated, it in fact 
allegorizes, or performs, George’s own indeterminate position towards aesthetics and 
politics embodied, at this point in his life, by the George Circle. 
Rainer Werner Fassbinder painted one of the most critical images of George in 
his 1976 comedy Satansbraten, which satirizes Hitler’s charismatic yet destructive 
authoritarianism through the aspiring, revolutionary, and financially and morally 
bankrupt poet Walter Kranz (played by Kurt Raab). In the film, Kranz, suffering from 
severe writer’s block and having never heard of Stefan George, suddenly begins 
composing inspired, verbatim reproductions of his poetry while the lives of those 
around him slip further into tragedy and absurdity. Kranz comically goes so far as to 
pay a coterie of young, attractive men to stage meetings of the famous “George-Kreis,” 
in which participants, dressed like classical writers such as Dante and Virgil, gathered to 
recite and discuss poetry. Historically, the George Circle, thought of by some as a 
microcosmic precursor of Nazi Germany’s cult of the charismatic individual with 
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George at its center, had its beginnings in the literary journal Blätter für die Kunst, which 
George and his disciples began publishing in 1892, when George was still attending the 
gatherings of Mallarmé, “le maître,” on which he modeled the Circle, and the same year 
that he published Algabal.  
Algabal the poem concerns Algabal the politician, a Roman emperor alone in his 
underground kingdom of coal and crystal bent on overthrowing the base natural world 
through poetic will. Both the symbolist influence and the subject matter itself have led to 
political readings of the poem as a rebellion not only against the socio-political 
conditions of the period, but also nature itself. While this might seem contradictory, 
insofar as the material world is set in contradistinction to the natural world, such 
contradictions are in fact integral to George’s privileging of the aesthetic sphere. As 
Adorno writes more generally, “George ruft gegen jene Welt, die ihm als wurzellos 
erscheint, die Eindeutigkeit der Natur auf. Eindeutig aber wird dieser Moderne Natur 
nur durch Naturbeherrschung… Wer Natur nur denken kann, indem er ihr Gewalt 
antut, sollte nicht das eigene Wesen als Natur rechtfertigen. Solcher Widersinn ist das 
Georgesche Gegenbild zur Hofmannsthalschen Fiktion” (217). 
Regarding politics specifically, Algabal makes no direct political commentary and 
is as much “about” poetry as it is about a tyrannical Roman emperor. While Algabal is 
typically considered distant enough from George’s “nascent fascism” that it escapes 
allegations of complicity, it nonetheless serves to dramatize the historical disagreement 
surrounding and contradictions of the George Circle, namely its ambitions to be the 
“secret” – and eventually real – Germany. By ascribing constructive authority to Algabal 
the poem, or to poetic language itself, rather than Algabal the ruler, the text allegorizes 
the inadequate relationship between (revolutionary) poetry and (authoritarian) politics, 
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the inability of the poetic to render fully and completely the political and the inability of 
the political to overcome the poetic. 
This understanding of allegory derives from de Man’s famous reading of the 
unity between the dancer and the dance in “Among School Children.”17  The dancing 
subject, in this case Algabal, and the material of dance, in this case poetic language, are 
“united.” This unification is explicitly captured in the title, the doubling of signification 
that references both content and form, subject and object. In de Man’s argument, 
however, what presents itself as unity is really characterized by an underlying 
confrontation: between the literal/thematic, Algabal the political ruler, and the 
rhetorical/formal, Algabal as poetic language. As de Man says of Yeats’s famous line, 
“[t]he two readings have to engage each other in direct confrontation, for the one 
reading is precisely the error denounced by the other and has to be undone by it” 
(“Semiology and Rhetoric 12). This is precisely the problem faced by Raulff’s 
schematization of George scholarship: either Algabal is a political text, or it isn’t. De 
Man’s work, however, allows the possibility that the text is political insofar as it explores 
within the formal and rhetorical mode of poetry the (im)possibility of being political. 
Because Algabal is a political figure only insofar as he is Algabal, the text poetically 
constructs and limits the possibility of the political, reining it back into a confrontation 
with the text. Rather than referencing something outside of the text – whether past, 
future, or future anterior – or sending a message to that world, the text formally and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The final paragraph of Lolita also makes explicit that the novel is an allegory for the distance 
between art, as the collapse of subject and material, and life. “Thus, neither of us is alive when the 
reader opens this book. But while the blood still throbs through my writing hand, you are still as 
much part of blessed matter as I am, and I can still talk to you from here to Alaska. Be true to 
your Dick... And do not pity C. Q. One had to choose between him and H. H., and one wanted H. 
H. to exist at least a couple of months longer, so as to have him make you live in the minds of 
later generations. I am thinking of aurochs and angels, the secret of durable pigments, prophetic 
sonnets, the refuge of art. And this is the only immortality you and I may share, my Lolita.” 
(Nabokov 309). 
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even thematically points reflexively back at itself as an event in language. This self-
reflexivity inverts the hierarchy that the poem initially presents, of a political figure 
creating his own artificial kingdom, suspending the two in unresolved tension. 
An example of this self-reflexive allegorizing of the distance between art and 
politics occurs in the second section of Algabal, “Im Unterreich,” which calls attention to 
itself as a poem through the thematic, formal, and rhetorical emphasis on mirrors and 
mirroring in the second stanza. 
  An allen seiten aufgereiht als spiegel 
  - Gesamter städte ganzer staaten beute -  
  Die ungeschmückten platten goldnen ziegel 
  Und an der erde breiten löwenhäute. 
There are three key images in this stanza – the “unadorned stones,” the “golden bricks,” 
and the “broad lionskins,” – each of which serves to allegorize the relationship between 
art, the material of the poem, and politics, the subject of the poem. On the one hand, 
politics, as the poem’s subject, materializes metonymically as these adornments of the 
emperor’s Unterreich, the “booty of every state and city.” These metonymic stones and 
bricks, however, are imbued with, and comprised of, poetic tropes: metaphor, as they 
are strung up “like mirrors,” and symbolism, as they are “golden.” The stones and 
bricks thematically adorn the poet’s Unterreich, making the text “about” politics, but 
they also reflexively comprise one’s experience (reading) “Im Unterreich,” making the 
text as much “about” poetic language. And because metonymy and metaphor are not 
identical, since they refute each other, so too does each interpretation of the text refute 
the other. Because language itself constitutes this mutual refutation, the poem therefore 
dramatizes the foreclosure of the possibility of a purely political message. 
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 This foreclosure derives from the fact that the experience of the Unterreich, as the 
second line indicates, is characterized as “beute.” The poem emphasizes this word 
spatially: it appears at the end of the line and right before a dash. The syntax of this line 
is also inverted such that it appears at the end of a clause. This emphasis is important 
because it calls attention to a word that represents the site of both political and aesthetic 
signification. On the one hand, “beute” connotes both “bounty,” “booty,” or “prize” as 
well as “prey.” As the potential “prey” of other cities and states, which wish to claim it 
as “booty,” this line figures the Unterreich as an object of political desire. On the other 
hand, however, the word is strikingly similar to the French “beauté” and the English 
“beauty,” a similarity that figures the Unterreich in terms of the poetic language used to 
describe it. Like EA Robinson’s Richard Cory, an object of both aesthetic and political 
desire who shoots himself in the head, George’s poem renders both forms of desire 
incomplete as it implies a secret. And here the poem, in trying to “figure out” this 
relationship between art and politics, “acts out” its (anti-)resolution.  
The rendering of desire as incomplete, the suspended tension between political 
and aesthetic concerns, is captured by the word “beute,” which is rhymed with the word 
“löwenhäute” in the final line. The image of lionskins, like the syntax of the second line, 
is one of inversion that reflects, like a mirror, back on the word “beute.” While these 
lions are predators-turned-prey, they are also yellow, like the “beautiful” booty of 
golden bricks that comprise the Unterreich. On the one hand, this wordplay emphasizes 
the dual nature of the Unterreich, as something political that is outwardly desired but 
inwardly grim, while also foregrounding its constructed origin in (poetic) language. In 
emphasizing that “Im Unterreich” is comprised of literary tropes such as metaphor, the 
poem seduces us from, but still lays bare, the political limits of the poem. For the 
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“unadorned stones” are only strung up like mirrors; they are not, in fact, mirrors, and 
they only ever offer the semblance of a mirror. This semblance is of aesthetic significance 
not only because it is a metaphor, but also because the word “spiegel” is rhymed with 
the beautiful “goldnen ziegel.” But the rhyme is deceptive, as the stones, like the poem, 
can never really reflect anything; they can only ever be artificial imitations, aesthetic 
imposters. And such is Algabal the text: originating in language and signifying language, 
the poem can only ever allegorize the unnatural and indeterminate relationship between 
poetry and politics that the George Circle, which eventually fractured into several 
satellite Circles, embodied. George’s disciples, all at one time members of the Circle, 
ranged in political orientation from the eventual Nazi Woldemar Graf Uxkull-Gylleband 
to the Jewish emigrant Ernst Kantorowicz, from the social conservative Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal to Claus von Stauffenberg, who orchestrated the failed plot to assassinate 
Hitler.18   
This motif of the “unnatural” (recalling the poem’s rejection of “a mutual and 
natural appropriateness of form and content”) is repeated throughout the poem as 
Algabal distances himself from nature and is politically elevated to the status of a 
singular God ushering in a new poetic reality to supplant a debased and bourgeois 
“natural” world. The de Manian “emblem” that most summarily conveys this political 
impulse is the “dunkle große schwarze blume,” a wholly unnatural rendering of the 
most beloved of poetic subjects, the flower, which like the ziegel can never really be a 
flower. This emblem is political because the poetic agent is not understood as a product 
or feature of the flower but is rather its lord and progenitor. The flower is a product of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 “Der Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren” is dedicated to Uxkull-Gylleband’s brother. Furthermore, 
“[Uxkull’s speech] ‘Das revolutionäre Ethos bei Stefan George’… depicted the National Socialist 
‘revolution’ as a continuation of George’s struggle against the corrosive legacies of nineteenth-
century individualism, materialism, and rationalism” (Ruehl 224).  
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poetic language: the lowercase noun, the lack of punctuation, the containment on a 
single line, these are all intended by or emergent in language rather than some other 
authority, either within or outside the text. In the words of de Man, the flower has been 
“taken from the literary tradition and receive[s its] meaning from traditional or personal, 
but not from natural associations.” Rather than symbolizing an emotion, an experience, 
or a political position, the black flower spontaneously creates a vortex of signification 
made possible by and in language that has as its only referent an absence of reference.19 
It therefore, in striving to overthrow the base natural world, reveals its own limits to 
existing outside of language.20  
 This reading of the black flower crystallizes in the context of the broader section 
in which it appears, a description of Algabal’s garden as an allegory for the text that 
produces it: the garden is the timeless and otherworldly space of the poem, a prophecy 
or, as the final section of the poem is (self-reflexively) titled, a “Vogelschau.” “Mein 
garten bedarf nicht luft und nicht wärme . / Der garten den ich mir selber erbaut.” A 
garden, like the poem, is an attempt to overcome nature, to control the natural world by 
making it into an aesthetic object. Algabal’s “garden,” like the kingdom-poem he has 
built by himself (“ich selber”), is unnatural, existing only as a possibility, only in 
language, and only for himself (“mir selber”). Rather than associations with rebirth and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See de Man’s analysis of “nun, nun müssen dafür Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn,” in which he 
acknowledges the impossibility of the naturalization of language. “By calling them natural 
objects, we mean that their origin is determined by nothing but their own being… Hölderlin’s 
phrase ‘Wie Blumen entstehn’ is in fact a paradox, since origination is inconceivable on the 
ontological level…. For it is in the essence of language to be capable of origination, but of never 
achieving the absolute identity with itself that exists in the natural object” (“Intentional Structure 
of the Image” 4-6). This is the basis for his later analysis of Heidegger’s ontological reading of 
Hölderlin as a witness to authentic Being. “[Hölderlin] says exactly the opposite of what 
Heidegger makes him say” (“Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin” 255).  
 
20 George is also, of course, critically responding to Novalis’s “blaue Blume” from Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen, which symbolized the Romantic dialectic of the finite self and infinite nature. 
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renewal, “seiner vögel leblose schwarme / haben noch nie einen frühling geschaut.” The 
trees are made of coal, the fruits never ripen, dusty vapors hang in the air, and the entire 
scene is perpetually gray: “Ein grauer schein aus verborgener höhle / verrät nicht wann 
morgen wann abend naht.” Like the life of Algabal that the poem recounts, the garden 
is, on the one hand, dreary, secretive, ambiguous, and on the other, a construction of 
language, a linguistic refuge from the corrupt natural world.  
Algabal ends this section, breathing the black flower into life, with a rhetorical 
question: “Wie zeug ich dich aber im heiligtume / … Dunkle grosse schwarze blume?” 
On the one hand, the syntactical proximity of “ich dich” mirrors, again, the “ich mir 
selber” in the second line of the poem. Syntactically, both “dich” and “mir” are objects, 
establishing a metonymic relationship between the poet-poem and his unnatural 
linguistic creation. The nature of the question, however, is such that two questions, 
whose answers provide two ways of reading the poem, are raised at once: “How can I 
engender [zeugen] you in the spiritual world of art?” and “How can I (politically) testify 
[zeugen] to the world that you are an aesthetic-spiritual creation?” The condition for the 
possibility of the second question – the more directly political of the possibilities – 
presumes the realization of the first. However, in questioning how to reveal the black 
flower, the poem calls attention to the flower’s own unnatural inadequacy to represent 
any specific thing: the flower is a metonymy for the garden, which is a metonymy for 
Algabal, who is a metonymy for Algabal. The rhetorical question, therefore, which by its 
nature does not provide an answer but rather foregrounds the urgency of its utterance, 
serves as an allegory for the limits art faces in trying to force the unnatural black flower, 
and the chain of signification behind it, on the natural world.21 The revolutionary ethos 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See de Man, “Intentional Structure of the Image” 3-7. 
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the poem performs therefore relies on the discord it produces between two incompatible 
worlds: a known natural world and the world of the poem. Just as these two worlds are 
incompatible, or unnatural and inadequate to each other, so too are the two readings of 
the poem incompatible, such that “the one reading is precisely the error denounced by 
the other and has to be undone by it” (“Semiology and Rhetoric” 12). This is, however, 
not to say that the poem is without an argument or position. Rather, its deconstruction 
helps to foreground de Man’s “anxiety of ignorance” (rather than an “anxiety of 
reference”) that it seeks to induce. This ignorance of political action is dramatized by the 
poem itself, which is constituted by the distance that it purports, and fails, to overcome. 
In 1933, towards the very end of his life, George was asked by Bernhart Rust to 
join the reconstituted Writers’ Academy, from which many esteemed writers (including 
the Mann brothers) had already been forced to resign. In the letter declining the 
position, George makes an important statement, claiming that the principles of the 
political and the spiritual are “gewiss sehr verschieden.” He goes on to say, “Ich kann 
den herrn der regierung nicht in den mund legen was sie über mein werk denken und 
wie sie seine bedeutung für sie einschätzen.” The phrase “ahnherrschaft der neuen 
nationalen bewegung” was highlighted by Rust in his obituary of George, presumably 
in an effort to politicize George’s poetry and legacy. “Er, der sich noch kürzlich in einem 
Briefe ausdrücklich zur geistigen ‘Ahnherrschaft der neuen nationalen Bewegung’ 
bekannte, wird bei uns immer lebendig bleiben” (in Raulff 52-53). Critics have also 
found in the letter evidence of George’s (if nothing else) passive complicity in the new 
regime’s success, focusing particularly on comments in which George “welcome[d the 
Academy’s] reorganization under a ‘national sign’ and acknowledged himself 
[‘positively’] as the ‘forefather’ of the new national movement” (Norton 728-729). This 
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unresolved tension between, or even paradox of, an insistence on the distance between 
the spiritual and the political and a welcoming of the reorganization of the Academy 
under a national sign is staged most explicitly in “Der Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren,” a 
poem from George’s final collection of poetry. 
Remaining formally indebted to aestheticism, his final collection of poems, Das 
Neue Reich, is arguably the most political of a body of later work that became more 
directly engaged with political questions of the day.22 “George’s Das Neue Reich contains 
a number of somberly impressive poems denouncing modern civilization and foretelling 
its apocalyptic overthrow and renewal under an autocratic leader” (Robertson 198). 
Some critics even see a relationship between this desire and the promises of fascism.23 
While there are certainly some undertones of fascist ideology to be found in these later 
poems, and accounting for Norton’s argument that the effect of such language may have 
given intellectual or artistic credence to this ideology, the poems also foreground the 
poetic nature of George’s political prophecy, allegorizing, rather than overcoming, the 
distance between art and politics. 
 While popular readings of “Der Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren” focus on the figure 
of the Mann who founds the “Neue Reich,” the poem is primarily a direct reflection on 
the relationship between art and politics (George 28). The poet of the poem’s title, after 
all, is the one who calls the Mann into being in the first place. Aside from the final nine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The title of Das Neue Reich shares language common with National Socialist propaganda, and 
German periodicals drew a comparison between George and the rise of National Socialism. 
“Almost all of [the German newspapers] took the opportunity to draw an explicit connection 
between George and the current political situation” (Norton 740). 
 
23 “George came to see himself as the leading spirit in a holy war against modern civilization…. 
[His] longing for a new social order cleansed of the evils of modernity found a powerful echo in 
his next volume of poetry, Das Neue Reich…. In this, his last work, George moves quite explicitly 
into the ambit of nascent fascism” (Travers 29-30). 
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lines in which the Mann materializes, though, the poem is focused on describing the role 
and characteristics of a poet during periods of war, conquest, plague, starvation, or, as 
the title says, wirren. Like Algabal, the poem is concerned with exploring the power and 
limits of poetic utterance rather than poetically declaring a nationalist political agenda.24 
Three observations undergird this reading: 1) the poem is reflexively concerned with the 
literary nature, or possibility, of revolution; 2) it does not mention or indicate specific 
historical periods or geographical regions, referring rather to a spiritual or mythical 
world outside of time that it equates with poetic language; 3) prophecies are poetically 
realized, rather than politically constructed as moral imperatives. 
The poem establishes from the very beginning a concern with the relationship 
between politics and art insofar as the “meaning” of the poet is determined by socio-
political affairs. It opens with a statement about the poet, that he has a particular 
meaning relative to the political condition of his age. “Der Dichter heisst im stillen gang 
der zeit / beflügelt kind das holde träume tönt / Und schönheit bringt ins tätige 
getrieb.” In times of peace, the poet is romantically referred to as a singer and a seer, set 
apart from others who are unable to see and hear. That is, while the political sphere 
determines the poet and his art’s meaning, the poet nonetheless has a privileged and 
distinctive social position, emphasized a few lines later by the period-dash: “Wenn alle 
blindheit schlug . er einzig seher.” The poet is alone, we learn, in his ability to “see,” 
“reveal” (enthüllen), and prophecy coming strife. “Wenn alle blindheit schlug . er einzig 
seher / Enthüllt umsonst die nahe not . .” The double period that surrounds these lines, 
and that is only used two other times throughout the entire poem, further emphasizes 
the unique ability of the poet to prophesy. The poem then proceeds to detail how, in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 While the word “völkisch” has been given considerable attention, it is important to keep in 
mind that George composed the poem in 1918. 
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times of chaos and confusion, the poet continues to “see” in vain. Over the next fifty-two 
lines, the poet is ignored, silent and sighing in a period of war, alone and isolated in one 
of conquest.  
The opening lines of the second and final stanza, the age of “trauer-läuften,” 
begin similarly to the opening lines of the first, except the word “Dichter” has been 
changed to “Sänger” and the word “aber” is inserted before the verb, which has gone 
from “heissen” to “sorgen.” While there is therefore some continuity – the poem moves 
through a progression of mythological, rather than historical, epochs – the word “aber” 
indicates that a major shift has occurred: the “seeing” poet rife with meaning is now 
actively producing, “singing,” the future rather than passively witnessing it. That is, his 
creative capabilities are less ambiguous (the word Dichter can mean poet but also simply 
writer), as they have become imbued with musicality and lyricism. In a “mournful age,” 
the poet “sorgt,” which means both to worry about something but also more actively to 
tend to it. And here again the poem foregrounds its constitutive tension, the 
irreconcilability of the aesthetic and the political, for to worry about something is 
precisely not to tend to it. And this something, the poem reveals, is the germ, or “keim,” 
of a revolutionary spirit. The poet’s role here is not merely to produce beautiful poetry 
but to actively protect against decay – what we might think of as a spiritual, yet 
ultimately aesthetic, decay – keeping the cells of revolution from asphyxiation and 
fanning the holy fires (“schürt die heilige glut”) that will form in its belly. The poet 
works with the “chosen ones” to prepare and educate a younger generation that will 
“save the world,” a phrase also emphasized with the third double period. All together, 
they will work towards summoning the leader who we meet at the end of the poem, 
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“der Mann,” the emblem of redemption who overshadows the poet and plants das Neue 
Reich. 
The poet nonetheless brings these cells of revolution to life, and to do so he uses 
literature. He “holt aus büchern 
Der ahnen die verheissung die nicht trügt 
Dass die erkoren sind zum höchsten ziel 
Zuerst durch tiefste öden ziehn dass einst 
Des erdteils herz die welt erretten soll . . 
In refuge and isolated, the poet actually turns to books and poems like the one in which 
he exists. He helps to bring forth this heroic savior – an act of poetic will not unlike the 
black flower – by actively exhuming from ancestral books (“holt aus büchern / der 
ahnen”) the promise, or the prophecy, of this new, singular generation “chosen for the 
highest goal.” These “chosen ones,” like Hölderlin’s flower, are events in language that 
spring up (quite literally) from acts of signification. The savior that in turn emerges from 
them is similarly constituted, an emblem of the limits of poetic possibility. The savior,  
sprengt die ketten fegt auf trümmerstätten  
 
die ordnung . geisselt die verlaufnen heim 
Ins ewige recht wo grosses wiederum gross ist 
Herr wiederum herr . zucht wiederum zucht . Er heftet  
das wahre sinnbild auf das völkisch banner  
er führt durch sturm und grausige signale  
der frührots seiner treuen schar zum werk  
des wachen tags und pflanzt das Neue Reich. 
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While there are some rather obvious parallels here between George’s language and the 
ideological platform of the Nazis, the poem is at four removes from its own labors: from 
it springs the poet, from whom come the chosen ones, from whom emerges der Mann, 
who then “plants” the Neue Reich. 25 This Russian doll-like structure is thematized in 
these final lines, which allegorize their own distance from any direct involvement, 
insisting on the existence in the spiritual realm. Of particular note here is the image of a 
breaking “chain” (of signification) revealing entry into the “eternal,” which de Man 
describes in Yeats as “the fitting lack of texture for the sign which is there to reveal, not 
itself, but what stands behind it” (“Image and Emblem” 205). But the poem also formally 
doubles the notion of a chain through the chain-link and chain-like repetition that 
constitutes this “eternal right” to which the breaking of the chain grants access: 
Ins ewige recht wo grosses wiederum gross ist 
Herr wiederum herr . zucht wiederum zucht . 
These chains constitute the prophecy – itself a simultaneous deferral and realization – of 
der Mann, who does not “found” das Neue Reich but rather “plants” it. De Man’s 
metaphor of Hölderlin’s flower is even more apt here: like the flower, an event 
“planted” in language insofar as it springs up from it, so too is das Neue Reich an event of 
signification that springs up from signification, a distance in relation to its own origin. 
As a political gesture the poem therefore allegorizes the potential and limit that art, 
represented metonymically by the forgotten poet and his ancestral books, faces in 
making such a gesture and, in turn, George’s own inability to clearly commit to a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 These parallels include: the image of breaking free from oppressive forces (the chain as 
metaphor), the rising of a new, eternal order from debris and ruins, the restoring to greatness 
what was once great, the “völkische banner,” the “einzigkeit” and exceptionalism of this new 
generation, and of course the “Neue Reich” itself. It is important to note, however, that the 
nationalist implications of “Drittes Reich” were not really immanent until 1923 when it appeared 
in a novel by Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. 
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political position. “[I]t is nevertheless manifest that the place of art is still found in 
opposition to social realities, no less in this late poem than in, say, Algabal’s ‘Mein 
garten’ or in ‘Komm in den totgesagten park.’ What changes, through the diverse 
periods of George’s writing, is the articulation of this underlying constant opposedness” 
(Waters 45).26 
Thematically, the poet is set in a mythological time. The descriptions of the 
various “ages” in which the poet lives are in no way historically indicated, and the 
events of the poem never seem to correlate with specific, landmark historical events. The 
opening lines of the poem, in fact, are set in the peaceful “gang der zeit,” an ambiguous 
passage or passing of time, rather than a particularly delineated age. In addition to the 
various references to Christian and Eastern theology throughout the poem, this 
mythological time is also captured by the conflicting tenses in the line “dass einst / des 
erdteils herz die welt erretten soll . .” The redemption is placed outside of time, or in 
some ahistorical (mythological, poetic) time, insofar as the word “einst” implies 
something that has or will have happened. “die welt erretten soll,” however, 
authoritatively implies something that will definitively happen. Insofar as the language 
here calls attention to the mutual refutation of possibility and certainty, so too does the 
poem call attention to its own irreducibility and deconstruction.27 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 In this case, Robert Norton’s critique of Waters’s essay, that he “contradicts himself,” is 
appropriate to the argument that George’s poetry stages precisely the event of such 
contradictions. 
 
27 The word “erdteil” arguably has a degree of specificity, as is indicated in the 1974 translation of 
the poem by Olga Marx (Carol North Valhope) and Ernst Morwitz, a close friend of George who 
published the poet’s collected works after his death. Morwitz, who was Jewish, fled to the USA in 
1935; his two stepsisters, who remained in Germany, were murdered by the Nazis. There is little 
reason to assume that Morwitz would have had any interest in consciously politicizing his 
translations of George’s poetry, which is why the decision to translate “erdteil” as “Europe” 
instead of “continent” is striking. “Continent” is a much more ambiguous landmass that, through 
its mythological indeterminacy, calls attention to itself as a word, an arbitrary signifier.  
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 Though George seldom capitalizes nouns, he does so for several in this poem.28 
Among these are words with religious connotations (Assur, Heilige Stadt, Vesper), words 
that depict pseudo-mythological or archetypal figures (Dichter, Krieger, Lenker, Sühner, 
Heutigen, Sänger, Fremder), and words associated with the savior and leader of the new 
kingdom (Mann, Neue Reich). The only word that stands out as not fitting into one of 
these lexicons is the word “Rat,” which is the domain of the poet, who counsels through 
his prophetic poetry. Formally, then, the poem calls attention to these words as concepts 
and archetypes, as literary representations rather than historical correlatives. Whereas 
the capitalization seems to mobilize these signifiers in the service of some extra-aesthetic 
intention, as motivated and substantial signifiers, this overall lexicon of the supernatural 
undermines the possibility of undivided and historically-situated political intentionality. 
The language, however, also anticipates as closely as possible the Nazi apotheosis of 
Hitler. The capitalization therefore foregrounds a paradox that dramatizes the conflict 
implicit in George criticism: the poem is simultaneously indifferent to historical and/or 
political referents (or reference) and deeply entrenched in such history.  
Like Algabal, the final words of the poem, also capitalized, recall the title of the 
collection, a fundamentally aesthetic, and spiritual, task. While this does not prove that 
George believed in, or even intentionally practiced, his insistence on the distance 
between the aesthetic and the political, it does reveal the immanence of this 
indeterminacy – and its ensuing critical debate – in his poetry. 
In July 1933, not long after he turned down Rust’s invitation to join the Writers’ 
Academy, George, whose health was declining, traveled to his hometown of Bingen and 
then on to Berlin. From Berlin, where “his close friend Ludwig Thormaehlen was under !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 These capitalized nouns are: Dichter, Assur, Rat, Heilige Stadt, Krieger, Lenker, Sühner, Heutigen, 
Vesper, Sänger, Fremder, Mann, and Neue Reich. 
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the impression that the Master expected the arrival of [a National Socialist] emissary,” 
George went to Wasserburg on Lake Constance and, in August, “took the ferry across 
the lake to Heiden in Switzerland.” Friends and critics of George have arrived at widely 
divergent understandings of the political implications of these travels. “Robert 
Boehringer… claimed that George’s subsequent remark to the effect that halfway across 
the lake he had been able to breathe more easily was meant as a political statement,” a 
tempered rejection of National Socialist ideology. Peter Hoffmann, however, emphasizes 
the fact that “George suffered from respiratory difficulties in the oppressively humid 
climate of the Wasserburg lakefront and moved to the more elevated Heiden in order to 
escape it” (Hoffmann 302). Furthermore, it is very likely that “George was simply 
continuing his normal habit of visiting Switzerland in the autumn, and in any case he 
considered Switzerland to be part of Germany” (Robertson 201). And in response to 
those who, like Boehringer, consider these travels exemplary of a voluntary exile, Robert 
Norton has argued that “the other [myth] is that [George] went to Switzerland in exile to 
express his revulsion toward the National Socialists and everything they stood for. 
Neither tale is true. They are legends created by George’s apologists” (Norton 723).  
 One last poem from Das Neue Reich serves to demonstrate how George’s poetry 
dramatizes the very same indeterminacy – even when such indeterminacy has been 
proven historically obfuscating – exemplified by criticism of George, a mysteriousness 
and ambiguity that the poet himself may very well have striven to exude. That is, the 
different Stefan Georges that have emerged in critical studies reflect the fragmented 
poetic subject(ivity) immanent to his final, arguably most political, collection. “Im 
,Neuen Reich’ gibt es keine einheitliche, die einzelnen Gedichte verklammernde 
kultische Person mehr: Nach einer ekstatischen, ganz unverhohlenen Vergöttlichung 
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Maximins im ,Siebenten Ring’ und einer verborgenen im ,Stern des Bundes’ fächert sich 
nun das poetische Subjekt in ganz verschiedene Figurationen auf” (Gutschinskaja 117). 
Parts of this politically disjointed subjectivity – namely the politically-interested and 
politically-disinterested – are manifest in “Einem Jungen Führer im Ersten Weltkrieg,” 
which concerns the rebirth of Germany and the crowning of a new leader that critics 
tend to situate in the wake of the perception that the outcome of World War I was a 
national embarrassment. By staging a dialogue between a political leader and a 
disembodied advisor, which quickly yields to the language and form of poetry itself, the 
poem yet again allegorizes a confluence of the possible orientations towards 
(conservative or fascist) politics that constitute the afterlife of George and his poetry. 
 The poem’s form immediately calls attention to itself as text, as it makes use of 
both typical Georgean devices, such as invented grammatical signs and a general lack of 
capitalization, as well as the more innovative formal construction of spatially breaking 
up each individual line on the horizontal plane. The form is consistent; each stanza has 
five longer lines, of thirteen to fourteen syllables with a visible gap after the sixth or 
seventh syllable, followed by a concluding five-syllable line. These gaps, impossible to 
ignore, haunt the poem, which is ultimately “about” trying, and failing, to overcome 
gaps: the gap in understanding between the two speakers, the temporal gap between the 
present condition of disrepair and the future prophecy of glorious triumph, the gap in 
signification that preconditions and defers the possibility of overcoming either, and the 
gap between aesthetics and politics. 
The poem is an address, a kind of pep talk, from an unnamed speaker, a 
disembodied poetic voice, to an anonymous young leader as the two men walk side by 
side. The subject of this pep talk is how the leader will overcome military defeat, which 
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hinges on his difference from the drone-like masses. “Du aber,” the poetic voice says to 
the leader, “tu es nicht gleich.”  
Du aber tu es nicht gleich     unbedachtsamem schwarm 
   Der was er gestern bejauchzt     heute zum kehricht bestimmt 
   Der einen markstein zerhaut     dran er strauchelnd sich stiess. . 
Jähe erhebung und zug 
The double period indicates and foregrounds that the leader is distinct from the instable, 
“imprudent sheep” who undermine themselves at every turn. The leader, however, will 
do things differently (“nicht gleich”). This difference is not only key to understanding 
the leader’s constitution, but it also provides a framework for reading the entire poem as 
an allegory for the unresolved relationship between art and politics. The poetic voice 
figures the leader’s success as a revolutionary prophecy, which, constitutively rhetorical, 
calls attention to itself as an event simultaneously deferred by and realized in language. 
The gaps that regularly disrupt the poem’s form therefore serve as visual reminders of 
the irreducible gap not only metaphorically between the leader and the 
“unbedachtsamem schwarm,” but also metonymically between the poetic voice and its 
prophecy, language and action. 
This tension is foregrounded by the use of both metaphor and metonymy. A 
number of metaphors comprise the poem, imbuing it with a sense of political immediacy 
and relevance. At the start of the third stanza, for example, the poetic voice consoles the 
leader. “Anders als ihr euch geträumt     fielen die würfel des streits. .” But as a poem 
about the gap between metaphor and metonymy, this unexpected roll of the dice yields 
the possibility of creating not Germany, but rather meaning itself, anew. 
Jähe erhebung und zug     bis an die pforte des siegs 
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Sturz unter drückendes joch     bergen in sich einen sinn 
Sinn in dir selber. 
There are two prominent metaphors in these lines: “pforte des siegs” and “drückendes 
joch.” These metaphors comprise a subordinate clause set apart by horizontal gaps, the 
positioning of which causes the clause to be read from the upper right to the lower left. 
Opposite this is the main clause, which is read from the upper left to the lower right. 
Visually, then, these two clauses create an X: “jähe erhebung und zug … / bergen in sich 
einen sinn” and “bis an die pforte des siegs / sturz unter drückendes joch” Comprising 
the other half of the X, rather than metaphor, is an explicit statement about meaning, 
“sinn.” The key words in this clause are “in sich bergen.” By itself “bergen” means “to 
salvage” something, whereas “in sich bergen” means “to hold,” “to retain,” or “to 
conceal” something. This something, as the repetition over the enjambment between the 
final two lines emphasizes, is “sinn” itself. The phrase therefore signifies two 
possibilities: to save meaning from something (to salvage) or to save it for something (to 
hold on to). That is, the “erhebung und zug” described in these lines doubles as a 
“procession” of signification, the movement from meaning in relation “from” something 
to meaning in relation “for” something.  
The X therefore would seem to signify the intersection of metaphor and 
metonymy, were it not for the gaps at its center. Instead these gaps are asymptotic, 
rendering the X more of a hyperbola: )( . The center that the poem names, the leader 
himself, is therefore transferred to the final line of the stanza where, representing 
meaning both (and neither) metaphorically and metonymically, his presence serves to 
allegorize the distance between, or collapse of, a metaphorical, political reading and a 
metonymic, rhetorical reading. The poet’s command to “sinn in dir selber,” to “reflect” 
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or “mean (or retain meaning) within yourself,” doubles as both political counsel, “trust 
your instincts,” and aesthetic commentary, “you are poetic trope.” He therefore 
embodies Librett’s notion of de Man’s turn from a belief in the value of “mutual and 
adequate form” such that resolution – politically fraught as this nonetheless may be – is 
rendered by the poem as unnatural and inadequate. The gap between metaphor and 
metonymy, politics and poetry, is transferred to both the political leader, “you create 
meaning,” and poetic utterance, “you are meaning,” such that each is incomplete, 
constituted by the gap that doubles those gaps in understanding ubiquitous in 
reconstructions of the life, and afterlife, of George himself. 
 In the final stanza, the poem explicitly reveals itself as an allegory of 
interpretation. Following the double period, the stanza concludes: 
Sieh . als aufschauend um rat     langsam du neben mir schrittst 
Wurde vom abend der sank     um dein aufflatterndes haar 
Um deinen scheitel der schein     erst von strahlen ein ring 
Dann eine krone. 
As with the singer-prophet of the previous poem, the poetic voice here commands the 
leader to “see.” This word is isolated between the double period and the floating period, 
doubly emphasizing its importance as an indication of the prophetic, poetic image that 
is to follow. In fact, the notion of seeing is so important that the word “schauen” is 
repeated in the word “aufschauen” immediately after the floating period. Like in “Der 
Dichter in Zeiten der Wirren,” the poem also places considerable emphasis on the word 
“rat,” which comes immediately before a horizontal gap. The command to “see” is a 
form of counsel, and the object of this sight is the political prophecy, rendered as poetic 
trope, in the past tense. This prophecy materializes ambiguously and is the projection of 
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the past onto the future. The poet is speaking of an act in the future, but he makes note 
that the leader is counseling in the present, indicated by the present participle 
“aufschauend,” but speaking of the past, indicated by the verb form “schrittst.” The text 
does not describe the actual appearance of the ring and the crown with a verb but rather 
with half of the construction for the passive voice in the past tense. Even this image is 
not concrete, as it is the image at first of the luminance of a ring and then either of the 
luminance of a crown, or of the crown itself. The crown is not presented metonymically, 
however, but metaphorically as a symbol for triumphant cultural rebirth in the wake of 
the destruction wrought by World War I. The prophecy therefore rhetorically collapses 
the past, present, and future, positioning itself outside of historical time while also 
specifically eschewing a purely mythological setting by resolving into commentary on 
real, historical events. 
 All of this is to say that the poem continuously resists presenting the advisor and 
the leader as metaphors for the direct involvement of poetry in politics, just as it resists 
reducing the two to a chain of metonymic signification. Rather, the indeterminacy that it 
stages – the simultaneous possibility, and therefore mutual refutation, of metaphor and 
metonymy – allegorizes the indeterminacy that constitutes George’s afterlife. While we 
can only argue whether George was more the poet or the politician, his poetry performs 
the undecidability that pervades his biography no less than the biography of many 
prominent German intellectuals and aesthetes implicated in one way or another with the 
rise of the NSDAP.  
In his 1934 Rede über Stefan George, Gottfried Benn argues that George’s poetry 
expresses a “Weltwille,” which was primarily a formal, rather than political, 
undertaking. For Benn, however, who associated himself for a time with the Nazi party, 
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this Weltwille is nonetheless political. It embodies not only an aesthetic will, what he 
calls “formal rigidity,” but also a national, German, will. “Es ist vielmehr die 
unerbittliche Härte des Formalen, die über seinem Werk liegt, durch die er sein Werk 
schuf, ihm Einheit und Norm erkämpfte, und der er sein Leben zum Opfer brachte; es ist 
das, was Alfred Rosenberg den ‘ästhetischen Willen’ nennt, diesen deutschen Willen, 
der im Kunstwerk eine Welt aufrichtet und eine überwindet, formend überwindet, das ist 
es, was George in die große abendländische Perspektive der Zukunft stellt” (Benn 487).29 
Manifesting in the work of art, the German/aesthetic will both constructs a world and, 
by constructing a world, overcomes another, which it achieves by nature of its form: 
“formend,” or “formatively”. This argument, which invokes the prominent Nazi 
intellectual Alfred Rosenberg, seems aptly to capture the interpretive ambiguity in 
George’s life and poetry that has in turn grown to constitute his legacy.  
The rhetorical argument laid out here therefore speaks more broadly to the 
methodological binaries we impose on ourselves, and expect, as literary critics. The 
morally fraught and historically complicated relationship between George’s life and 
poetry calls attention to the need, particularly in politically controversial instances such 
as this, for an integrative theoretical approach that incorporates elements of both 
formalism and historicism. Otherwise why read George’s poetry at all – which, 
incidentally, was considerably less popular under fascism than Rilke’s – but as another 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Alfred Rosenberg became one of the most intellectually influential ideologues of the Nazi 
party. He edited the party newspaper, Völkischer Beobachter, and in 1930 had published the widely 
read, anti-Semitic, and anti-Catholic Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts. Jay Baird, author of Hitler’s 
War Poets: Literature and Politics in the Third Reich refers to him as Hitler’s “ideological high priest 
and gatekeeper” (187) While there is some scholarly disagreement over the degree of his 
influence, and some evidence of high-ranking Nazi officials including Hitler disregarding Der 
Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts, he was nonetheless hanged after the Nuremberg trials having been 
found guilty on four counts: conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war of aggression, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
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defense against that indeterminate and omnipresent threat of fascism within as well as 
without?30  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 See Adam, Lesen unter Hitler 252-4, 268, 309, 324. 
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CHAPTER III 
“RESIGN, RESIGN, RESIGN”: T.S ELIOT AND THE AFFIRMATION OF FAILURE31 
“How confused and obscure my own mind has been.”  
-T. S. Eliot, “Last Words,” 1939 
 
The story behind the composition of Shelley’s “Ozymandias” is not one of 
failure. Challenged amiably by Horace Smith to compose a sonnet on the subject of 
Ozymandias, Shelley successfully published the poem two weeks later, on 11 January 
1818, and it has gone on to become one of the most familiar works of British 
Romanticism. Like the irony through which the poem is organized, there is irony to this 
success, since the poem is principally concerned with failure: the failure of empire, but 
also the failure of poetry. More specifically, as the poem becomes implicated in the 
nested levels of representation and narration, its signification begins to splinter. While it 
purports to contain and overcome the political, it also reproduces, ironically, the same 
conditions of failure that it documents. In this sense, the poem is in dialogue not only 
with the fall of empire, but also with the process of revolution. Insofar as revolution 
represents a counterforce to empire building, it is the means by which empire fails. 
However, the impossibility of failure constitutes the concept of revolution, which can 
fail by either not overcoming existing political structures or reproducing those 
structures. In “Ozymandias,” Shelley is able to stage this failure in a way that political 
revolution necessarily cannot, thereby ascribing to art a vantage point from which, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 This title alludes to Paul Morrison’s chapter on T. S. Eliot in his book The Poetics of Fascism: Ezra 
Pound, T. S. Eliot, and Paul de Man. 
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through its own movement towards failure, to imagine a critique of revolution without 
the material risks a failed revolution would entail. 32 
Shelley’s poem therefore frames a problem that becomes much more pronounced 
in the 1930s: can poetry contain the political, can it even exceed the political, and if so, 
what might this mean? Like revolution, fascism also necessitates the impossibility of 
imagining failure. It is through this lens that “Ozymandias” bears on the work of T. S. 
Eliot (who, incidentally, much preferred someone like Coleridge to Shelley). By 
imagining and performing political failure through the medium of poetry, 
“Ozymandias” takes a critical view of revolution the possibility of which revolutionary 
politics must necessarily deny. While Shelley did generally support revolutionary 
movements, the agnosticism implicit in “Ozymandias” bears much greater 
consequences for Eliot as he works through his position on the emerging fascist 
movements across Europe, most notably in France and Germany. Just as “Ozymandias” 
can be read in the context of Shelley’s complex views on revolution, Eliot’s poetry of the 
late 1920s and early 1930s – most notably Four Quartets and Coriolan – provide insight 
into the ways that poetry is able to think through politics in a way that politics 
themselves are unable to do.  
This chapter will read all three of these poems as the working out of a shifting 
orientation towards, and negotiation of the possibilities and limits of, political 
revolution, of the left in the case of Shelley and of the right in the case of Eliot. The 
poetic, rather than political, rendering of failure in each instance thus reveals the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 My unconventional reading of Shelley’s poem is an attempt to think through the political 
possibilities of “Ozymandias” in a way that consonant with de Man’s reading of Hölderlin. 
“Standing at the beginning of the romantic tradition,” he writes, “Hölderlin also points beyond it, 
away from it” (“Hölderlin and the Romantic Tradition” 119). Likewise, I consider this specific 
instance in Shelley’s writing to point beyond any adherence to a symbolic poetic unity 
corresponding to totalizing political commitment (in this one instance, to revolution). 
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necessary inadequacy implicit in revolution that was acknowledged and affirmed by 
each poet, but vehemently rejected by the Jacobins and National Socialists.   
The narrator of Shelley’s sonnet tells the story of a traveler “from an antique 
land” who has seen the ruins of a statue of the once-great king Ozymandias. The statue, 
like the empire it represents, has collapsed, and the central irony of the poem hinges on 
the words written on its pedestal: “My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: / Look on 
my works, ye Mighty, and despair!” Like the powerful emperor, so have the empire and 
the symbols of its power fallen, impotent against the forces of history. However, 
Ozymandias’s words are not only ironic: if one is to despair at the works of 
Ozymandias, it is not out of fear for the wrath of the long dead “king of kings” but 
rather of the force that toppled him from his throne and brought his kingdom to ruins, 
the futility of glory and the brevity of human life. While most notably a critique of 
power and a statement on the finitude of empire, Shelley’s poem is also a reminder of 
our own mortality, our own helplessness against the currents of time, and the despair 
that this can instill in us. 
 The text captures this sense of helplessness in the final lines, in which the poem 
pans out from the image of the broken statue to reveal a barren and desolate landscape: 
“Nothing beside remains. Round the decay / Of that colossal wreck, boundless and  
bare / the lone and level sands stretch far away.” The second half of the sestet, lines 
traditionally assigned to providing poetic resolution, is saturated with images of 
disintegration and loss: “nothing,” “decay,” “wreck,” and “bare.” These lines also 
reiterate how feeble and powerless man is against such inevitable loss, as the narrator is 
left with the image of nothingness, the “boundless” and infinite landscape. He is as 
“lone” as the sands around him, an image that recalls Caspar David Friedrich’s famous 
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painting “The Monk by the Sea,” which contrasts the tiny figure of a monk with the vast 
and sprawling, seemingly “boundless,” image of shore, sea, and sky. The monk, while a 
student of religion, God, and the eternal, is small, finite, and bounded in comparison to 
the world of God’s creation. In this way he is like Ozymandias, the self-proclaimed 
“king of kings,” who is unable to overcome the forces of history, change, and progress 
that bring him, and his empire, to ruin.  
This romantic irony, the Faustian striving to overcome the limits of mortal man, 
is a central feature of Romanticism writ large. For Shelley in particular, such overcoming 
was tied to social and political reform, an aspiration that – in the case of the French 
Revolution, for example – was not without its own irony. “Again and again in his 
comments on the French Revolution [Shelley] argued that the attempt to overthrow the 
old order by violent revolution merely perpetuated the spirit of that order” (Dawson 6). 
Thus for Shelley, such revolutionary ends, “the necessary transformation of society can 
only come through the step-by-step purification and improvement of the old order, 
rather than by a single apocalyptic stroke” (7). This gradualist understanding of 
progress is implicit in the final image of the poem: the “long” and “boundless” sands 
that “stretch far away.” Like the statue that serves as a metaphor for corrupt power, 
these sands are a metaphor for time, particularly the progression of reforms and 
revolutions that can ultimately corrode that power. The immoral king Ozymandias 
proves unable to triumph over the immortal sands of time.  
The overtly political message, however, comes to us as a declaration by 
Ozymandias embedded in the stone pedestal of his broken statue, which is embedded in 
the memory of the traveller, which is embedded in the language of the poem, which is 
embedded in arguably the most traditional of poetic forms, the sonnet. The events of the 
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poem, and those recounted in/narrated by the poem, are examples of what Shelley 
would call “human activity”: not only the history of Ozymandias the tyrant, but also the 
carving of the statue, its discovery by the traveller, the traveller’s recounting of the 
inscription, and then the creating of these events into the sonnet, the expression of each 
layer in their supposed totality. Insofar as the poem presents these events in accordance 
with its themes of the corruption and ephemerality of power, however, the individual 
events are subordinated to the relations among them. These relations structure the 
poem, which is ultimately a staging of collisions: both between subjects – the poet and 
the traveller, the traveller and the “lifeless” ruins, the sculptor and the king – and 
between modes of expression – political address, sculpture, storytelling, poem. In this 
sense, then, the poem does not simply embody the very totality for which Ozymandias 
the tyrant strove; rather, it embodies the (aesthetic) fragmentation that performs the 
(political) inadequacy Shelley finds necessary for revolution that does not become the 
very thing it strives to overthrow. “The fragmented construction is doubtless a verbal 
replication of the fractured statue it describes. But it is also part of the system of filtering 
postponements that steal not initial but delayed and considered attention from the 
simpler message. Or rather, it shifts attention from the obvious substance of the moral to 
the conditions of its realization” (Freedman 66). In shifting attention to the conditions of 
the realization of the moral and thus foregrounding the poem’s aesthetic operations, 
“Ozymandias” performs Ozymandias, ironically doubling the king’s failure in order to 
render it applicable to revolutionary anti-absolutism/monarchism. 
The importance of these relationships is foregrounded in the first two lines: “I 
met a traveller from an antique land / Who said.” In the first two words, the poem 
presents the speaking poetic subject, “I,” and the chance encounter during which he 
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“met a traveller.” The reference to this second speaking subject as a “traveller” evokes 
the encounter not just between two people but also between two ambassadors of 
geographically, culturally, and politically disparate places. Because the traveller hails 
from an “antique land,” there is the implication that this cultural difference is a result 
not only of spatial, but also temporal, distance, a distance that is then doubled when the 
traveller tells of his own encounter with an ambassador of an antique land, the statue of 
Ozymandias.  
Ozymandias demands with hubris that his “works” be looked upon. The 
referentiality of this term is tripled: it means at once the products – political, 
architectural, legal, aesthetic, assimilated, conquered, etc. – of his reign, what his reign 
produced, but it also refers back to the statue, both as a physical immortalizing of 
Ozymandias’s body and spirit, and as a metaphor for power. In the final line of the 
poem, the theme of power’s ephemerality crystallizes with yet another metaphor: the 
immortal sands of time will wash over power’s claim to immortality, rendering the 
irony of Ozymandias’s triumphant statement. That metaphor, by way of the image of a 
desert, is the instrument by which the poem calls attention to the significance of 
figurative and poetic language [de Man on Hölderlin].33 In fact, the tension between 
language and the visual is foregrounded in the inscription on the ruins: “Look on my 
works, ye Mighty, and despair!” While Ozymandias’s words have withstood history, his 
sculpture has not. And his imperative to “look” and “despair” is actually rendered 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 For his part, de Man did identify Eliot’s indebtedness to the romanticism he ostensibly 
challenged. “We are well used to such ironies of history as T. S. Eliot attacking romanticism in the 
name of ‘dissociation of sensibility,’ a concept which is itself one of the most characteristic 
intuitions of romanticism. Nor should the apparent objectivity of stylistic criticism blind us to the 
fact that it deliberately (and often consciously) takes for its object the formal attributes of 
romantic and post-romantic poetry: our interest in metaphor, for instance, can not be separated 
from the predominantly metaphorical structure of romantic poetry” (“Hölderlin and the 
Romantic Tradition” 109). 
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ironic precisely because the words survived and the statue didn’t. The “Mighty” to 
which his words refer is therefore also triply referential insofar as it, too, is a metaphor 
for the eternal state to which Ozymandias aspired. There are three audiences “looking” 
at Ozymandias’s triply-referential works: ye Mighty gods look upon the historical 
products of his reign, ye Mighty sands look upon the statue that they have eroded, and 
ye Mighty poem looks at the rhetorical statue, a metaphor for power. 
As aesthetic representation built on language, the poem embodies the timeless 
and eternal condition to which Ozymandias strove. It is, one could say, the “lone and 
level sands” that “stretch far away,” or the gods who, observing Ozymandias’s hubris 
from a vantage point outside time, laugh at his boastful naivety. The poem achieves this 
infiniteness through the compression and expansion of time, which imputes a mythical 
quality to the poem such that it becomes untethered from particular temporal 
limitations. The first eleven lines of the poem progressively inhabit previous historical 
periods, and the poetic subject shifts accordingly. The first narrator meets a traveller 
from an “antique land.” This traveller then becomes the new narrator, telling of his 
experiences finding the statue of Ozymandias, who becomes the next new narrator 
issuing his commandment to despair. However, as the poem proceeds backwards in 
time, the tense with which these past events are narrated remains in the present. This 
present tense is brought to attention by the enjambment after the second line, 
emphasized all the more strongly by the alliteration of “stone” and “stand.” This sonic 
consistency, as well as the enjambment which makes “stand” the first word of the third 
line, reinforces the fact that “stand” is in the present tense.  The sixth line also begins 
with an active verb in the present tense, as the face of the statue “tells” the traveller 
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about the history of Ozymandias, whose present-tense declaration is also reproduced 
verbatim. 
Despite this compression of history into the present, however, the poem also 
gestures towards the expansion of time, most significantly with the final image of the 
poem. These last three lines, in addition, also mark a break from the shifting narrator. In 
these final lines, it is unclear who is speaking, indicating that the various poetic voices 
have come together to chant in unison that, “Nothing beside remains.” Because of its 
punctuated brevity, and the trochaic “nothing” that interrupts the iambic cadence, this 
motto stands outside the narrative and reflects on the poem. It tells us three things 
simultaneously. First, it emphasizes that there is nothing left to the ruins other than the 
inscription and “half-sunken visage” embedded in the sand; nothing beside this head 
and these words remain. It also indicates that there is nothing at this site besides the 
remains of this statue, fragments of the past. And finally, if we read the sentence in 
keeping with the iambic meter, then it tells us that “no thing beside remains,” shifting 
the emphasis of the poem to be about language and objects and recalling the famous line 
by Stefan George, “kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht,” “where word breaks off no 
thing shall be.” That is, to borrow again from de Man, the “thing”ness of the statue is 
emergent in, and constituted by, language. There is “no thing” besides the linguistic, 
and specifically poetic, remains of it, its rendering in poetry, its catapult into eternity and 
the ensuing Aufhebung whereby to disappear is to appear forever. 
And it is this poetry that is given a degree of authority and agency in the final 
lines of the poem, during which each individual voice blends into the other, converging 
at the moment of poetic resolution into a voice as timeless and “boundless” as the sands. 
In this sense, the poem is less about power and more about poetry, or the power of 
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poetry. It makes sense that Shelley would choose the form of the sonnet for making such 
an argument – despite the irony we could now say is implicit in choosing a traditional 
poetic form to criticize “traditional” power structures – as the sonnet is one of the most 
recognizable poetic forms. Because any reader would know that sonnets resolve, this 
resolution is implicit in the poem from the very first word – “I” – which transforms over 
the duration of the poem from a particular “I” to a universal one. On the one hand, the 
resolution of the poem is the transformation of the particular poetic subject into the 
universal one. But on a more global level, the resolution of the poem is self-referential. 
While it thematically makes the argument about the inevitable decline of power, it also 
shows how the power of poetry lies less in the content or message that it depicts than in 
the formally traditional composition of that content. 
And this is why Shelley’s poem depicts the relationship between the expression 
of different “activities”: meeting, telling, mocking (both the sculptor mocking 
Ozymandias and Ozymandias mocking “ye Mighty” gods), etc. By dissolving the 
narrative voices into each other, Shelley creates an onus of interpretation at the level of 
form: recognizing the gradual dissolution of voices as the poem moves backwards in 
time – mirroring Shelley’s understanding of history as the gradual progression of time – 
and eventual convergence of voices depicting the infinite expansion of time. That is, 
these voices, and the activities they recount, are the result of the work of the 
imagination. For Shelley, “all human activity has its source in the imagination.” The 
imagination, then, is the constructive and mediating force between each level of 
utterance. It is “vitally involved in all purposeful and creative human activity,” the 
expression of which is the poem (Dawson 224).  Furthermore, “Shelley’s account of the 
imagination was originally developed as part of his moral philosophy.” The poetic 
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voices in “Ozymandias,” particularly when they sing in unison in the final lines, 
therefore have a political role that Gerald MacNiece connects to Shelley’s revolutionary 
politics. “The imagination awakes the power of the will. Service to the method of the 
imagination and to the symbols it creates will reconstruct the mind and redirect its 
strategies for shaping reality. Only thus may the worship of reason and the dangerous 
bias of modern civilization be corrected. Poetry is the instrument of the imagination. In 
his poetry Shelley set himself the task of recharging the power of revolutionary ideas” 
(MacNiece 6). By thematizing and performing the inadequacy, and failure, of totality, 
the poem is able to stage its political argument on the level of experience mediated by 
the imagination. 
On the one hand, then, the political message of the poem – that worlds exist 
where empires have fallen long ago – is an allegory for the act of reading poetry, which 
is the act of thinking the possibility of such worlds. Just as the poem expands time and 
space, the act of reading poetry expands the imagination. This expansion, this entry into 
eternity, is constituted by a loss – of empire no less than the poetic subject himself – an 
absence that, when repeated and multiplied ad infinitum, constitutes the dialectical 
ontology of the poem. Like standing between two mirrors, the subject(s) – the content of 
the poem no less than the poem itself – simultaneously appear(s) and disappear(s). 
Through the disappearance of the possibility of revolution, such possibility reappears, 
and yet the expansive totality evokes endless repetition, the failure of revolution that 
does not acknowledge the limits of its realization. The appearance of resolution, once 
multiplied, reveals itself as the disappearance of that resolution, the perpetuation of the 
corruption and violence that inspired a call for resolution in the first place. Poetry is 
uniquely suited to lay this bare because in positing its irony, it also performs that irony, 
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implicitly elevating itself among modes of political commentary while simultaneously 
acknowledging the limits of its realization as a political commentary. 
Like revolution, art must be necessarily permanent in its inadequacy. This logic 
is how T. S. Eliot links poetry to politics. In his 1955 lecture for the London Conservative 
Union, he defines “political thinking” as “thinking that concerns itself with the 
permanent principles, if any, underlying a party name, [which] can follow two 
contrasted lines of development” (141) In one case, he says, the theory may precede the 
practice, such that adherents to a political doctrine espouse its enduring truth. In the 
other, opposite, case, however, “a political party may find that it has had a history, 
before it is fully aware of or agreed upon its own permanent tenants.” In this instance, 
such tenets to which the political party realizes it ascribes value preexist their 
embodiment and codification under a particular political banner. It is up to each 
generation to distinguish anew between the permanent, which must be embraced, and 
the transitory, which must be excised from their political philosophy. Eliot privileges 
this process, of course, which he associates with conservatism. My own understanding 
of conservatism follows from Eliot’s in its concern for what Eliot calls the “pre-political,” 
the human ephemerality, transitoriness, indeterminacy, and failure that precondition 
any permanent political principles.  
Eliot links this conception of permanence with the concept of cultural tradition, 
which for him revolves around the literary. In the same speech, for example, he insists 
that, “I have been making the point that there should be no complete separation of 
function between men of thought and men of action” (142). In this sense, he argues that 
literary production – the work of men of thought – can influence the political sphere, 
admitting that such attempts may not yield immediate, apprehensible results. That said, 
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he nonetheless claims that the literary, as a humanist discipline, is a “pre-political area… 
the stratum down to which any sound political thinking must push its roots, and from 
which it must derive its nourishment” (144). And this “pre-political area,” in fact, is not 
just the realm of the literary or the philosophical, but also the imagination. “But we can 
look still further for literary influence, not only philosophical, but imaginative, upon 
politics” (144). The imagination, Eliot implies, is capable of engaging not only with the 
ethical, but more importantly with the theological, insofar as it can posit possible 
answers to “the question of questions, which no political philosophy can escape, and by 
the right answer to which all political thinking must in the end be judged… What is 
Man? what are his limitations? what is his misery and what his greatness? and what, 
finally, his destiny” (144)? It therefore has the potential to influence politics insofar as it 
is grounded in the ethical sensibilities he derives from Christianity. 
Eliot addresses these questions in Four Quartets, which like Shelley’s poem is 
concerned with the problem of impermanence, or more specifically the relationship 
among literary tradition, poetic language, and the eternal. While “Ozymandias” is 
thematically political, its poetic rendering performs what Eliot calls the “pre-political,” 
insofar as the poem reveals itself to be more “about” the human (whether Ozymandias, 
the traveller, or the speaker) than empire. The fragment of statue, more than serving as a 
metaphor for the collapse of empire, allegorizes the fragmentation of human nature and 
the power of the imagination to make sense of such fragmentation (as opposed to fascist 
totality). What Shelley calls the Imagination, however, Eliot refers to as language, the 
“word.” 
 Words move, music moves 
 Only in time; but that which is only living 
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 Can only die. Words, after speech, reach 
 Into the silence. Only by the form, the pattern, 
 Can words or music reach  
 The stillness. 
In Part V of “Burnt Norton,” Eliot sketches the seeming paradox of poetic language. In 
these lines, he conceives of the temporal, the utterance, in terms of the spatial, the 
written word. The phrase “after speech” therefore connotes both the period of time after 
a word is spoken as well as the form that language has taken after the advent of speech, 
that of writing. Whereas words, like music, “move,” or come into being, in a particular 
temporal moment, they also possess the ability to persist into timelessness. This 
timelessness is represented metaphorically as a “stillness” that opposes “movement,” an 
existence outside the constraints of human activity, the goal of human endeavor. This 
conception of poetic language does not resemble the specifically fascist political goal of 
totality, however. Like Shelley, Eliot recognizes that the only attainable form of 
permanence is impermanence. 
 Words strain, 
 Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
 Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
 Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
 Will not stay still. 
That is, just as language is able to reach the stillness, it cannot itself remain still. In this 
sense, while it provides us access to the eternity beyond mortal limits, it also imposes on 
us the impossibility of truly accessing that eternity. The very constitution of language – 
decay, imprecision, cracks and breaks – is fundamentally at odds with the concept of 
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totality, requiring as it does physical stillness, temporal limitlessness (history and future, 
possible and realized), and spatial wholeness. 
 In the first section of “Burnt Norton,” the past conditional mood made possible 
by language renders this fragmentation by representing “what might have been.” In 
fact, creative language in particular can give equal weight to the mythological and the 
historical, the possible and the particular. And both of these stories “point to one end, 
which is always present.” That is, in the spirit of Nietzsche, language is capable of 
presenting – as well as present-ing, or making present – possible interpretations of 
history. The present moment is thus always the culmination of these events that both 
did and did not occur, such that any moment could conceivably be any other moment. 
The poem refers to this infinitely expansive landscape of alternate moments as the “rose-
garden,” which it attaches to the “echoes” of poetic language – in this case, made explicit 
by the metaphor of the rose garden – that makes it possible for the imagination to create 
these alternatives. The echoes that comprise and make possible access to the metaphor of 
the rose garden are attached to a variety of human emotions, beginning with regret. 
“Footfalls echo in the memory / Down the passage which we did not take / towards the 
door we never opened.” In this sense, the echoing footfalls (one of the numerous 
paradoxes employed by the poem) leading to the rose garden comprise Eliot’s concept of 
the objective correlative, which calls forth a subjective, universal emotion. The purpose 
of following certain echoes, of “disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves,” is beyond 
the realm of human understanding. “But to what purpose / … / I do not know.”  
And yet, language makes it possible, even incites us, to follow the footfalls of any 
number of echoes. And here the bird, like Yeats’s artificial bird, guides the human 
subject like Virgil through the rational impossibility of simultaneous possible pasts. It is 
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here that we encounter the drained concrete pool, the first image of stone, which serves 
in the poems as a metonym for the eternal. In this case, the anthropomorphized footfalls 
of echoes of poetic language move “in a formal pattern / … / to look down into the 
drained pool.” The pool fills with sunlight like water and, once a cloud passes to cover 
the sun, is suddenly rendered empty again.  
Dry the pool, dry concrete, brown edged, 
And the pool was filled with water out of sunlight, 
And the lotos rose, quietly, quietly, 
The surface glittered out of heart of light, 
And they were behind us, reflected in the pool. 
There are two important moments in these lines. The first is the phrase “lotos rose,” 
which is simultaneously an act of movement, as in the lotus flower rising from the pool, 
and a still image of the “lotos rose.” In the second section of “Burnt Norton,” the poem 
describes such a paradoxical moment, the collapse of sequentiality and simultaneity, as 
“Erhebung without motion.” The self-referential misspelling of “lotus” as “lotos” calls 
attention to the way in which such a paradox is only possible in language, in the realm 
of the imagination. The “lotos rose” is only one letter away from the “logos rose,” the 
rose garden, or the rising up, of poetic language.  
The second moment of note is the visual reflection of the sonically echoing 
footfalls, another of the poems’ many paradoxes. The poetic subject looks forward to see 
backward, a spatial representation of the collapse of time future and time past, the 
encounter with eternity, with which the poem is continuously engaged. In this moment, 
the two converge in the sunlight that fills, and thereby obstructs, the cement pool. As a 
cloud passes overhead, however, this illusion is quickly shattered and the pool revealed 
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to be empty. The transcendence made possible by the echoes of the footfalls of poetic 
language is shown to be divorced from the permanence of the cold and dark cement 
pool. The rose garden is thus a site of dialectical tensions: between living roses and dead 
cement, the fullness of light and the emptiness of shade, the immobile permanence of the 
pool and the movement of the echoes of poetic voices, the reassuring dreariness of 
certainty and the frightening exhilaration of possibility. 
That is, the pool represents a second example of the objective correlative, this 
time linked to the glum monotony of modern life. In this sense, both the pool and the 
roses that surround it, which “had the look of flowers that are looked at,” embody 
various emotional states wrought by the condition of being mortal. The seeing, poetic, 
and above all human subject, like the subject reading the words that “echo / Thus, in 
your mind,” is implicit in the rose, sees himself reflected back in the living flower and 
again in the dead concrete. The speaker here is following the echoes of poetic language 
through a rose garden when he discovers the pool, at which point he sees those echoes 
reflected back in the light. The echoes of the written word are like the dry concrete of the 
pool, permanently empty but rendered visible by the light. Insofar as they are a 
reflection, they are thus also a part of the subject who sees them who, striving for the 
permanence of the pool, must also recognize the metaphorical dreariness, the emptiness, 
and the passivity necessitated by attaining such permanence. 
 The central problem with which Eliot wrestles throughout Four Quartets is how 
to lead a spiritually meaningful life amidst such dreariness, the only experience of 
permanence possible for the mortal human bound by the limits of the material world.  
 Yet the enchainment of past and future 
 Woven in the weakness of the changing body, 
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 Protects mankind from heaven and damnation 
 Which flesh cannot endure. 
While time and change imprison the human, they are also a form of protection against 
that which a mortal being cannot comprehend. The concept of physically enduring the 
eternal, or immortality, illustrates the limits of human cognition and reason, which like 
the body are bound by the restrictions put on them by existing within the confines of 
temporality. The only possible thought systems that can emerge within such confines 
are those that necessarily assume sequentiality, progress, history, and time. Recognizing 
this, Four Quartets ponders how poetic language, itself subject to the very same 
restrictions, can posit an alternative, aesthetic, and imaginative reality. This alternate 
reality is embodied by the “unheard music in the shrubbery” that coexists with the roses 
and the pool. “Go, said the bird, for the leaves were full of children, / Hidden excitedly, 
containing laughter.” It is such children’s laughter that Four Quartets encourages us to 
hear. The Virgilian bird commands the poetic subject to leave the garden in an effort to 
proselytize this message. “Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind / Cannot bear very 
much reality.” That is, human kind cannot bear its reality very much longer without the 
respite offered by the poetic imagination, a tempered, Hegelian respite that – only ever 
capable of presenting anything in the fragmented nature with which it must come to be 
– can nonetheless call attention to the fragmented nature of experience and offer a 
variety of alternatives to the dreary permanence engendered by such fragmentation. 
That is, the act of aestheticizing impermanence renders such impermanence bearable. 
 Eliot’s sense of children’s laughter seems a hybrid of Wordsworth and Nietzsche, 
insofar as it is associated with the affirmation of experience through memory. Like the 
poetic subject above Tinturn Abbey, whose experience of the abbey is enhanced by the 
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memory of innocent and imaginative childhood activity, the second section of “Burnt 
Norton” (1935) emphasizes the power of memory – a concept whose existence would be 
impossible without the concept of time – to overcome, like the sunlight, the dreariness of 
the empty pool of existence.  
 To be conscious is not to be in time 
 But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden, 
 The moment in the arbour where the rain beat, 
 The moment in the draughty church at smokefall 
 Be remembered; involved with past and future. 
 Only through time time is conquered. 
Insofar as “to be conscious is not to be in time,” these memories are, like Proust’s 
madeleine, involuntary; along with the emotions that accompany them, they are 
triggered by experiences with poetic language. The moments described in these lines are 
not specific and can thus function as objective correlatives, capturing emotions that can 
be associated with a range of memories recalled by a vast range of human subjects. 
The caesura in the final line of the second section anticipates that of the final two 
lines of “Burnt Norton,” which read: “Ridiculous the waste sad time / Stretching before 
and after.” On the one hand, this formal trope rhythmically captures the opposition that 
comprises the paradox, a conceptual trope that recurs throughout the poems. That is, 
like the paradox, the caesura is disruptive; it foregrounds the fragmented experience of 
reading the poem and our inability to fully determine its meaning. This line alludes to 
“Ozymandias,” the “lone and level sands that stretch far away.” The version of 
permanence critiqued in the third section of Four Quartets is like these sands: alone, 
unchanging, and static. Asymptotically approximating this stasis, however, provides the 
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great, meaningful, pre-political thrill of mortal existence: the acknowledgement and 
affirmation of our finitude. For in this affirmation we are granted access to a different 
form of eternity: the universality of human emotion.  
Love is itself unmoving, 
Only the cause and end of movement, 
Timeless, and undesiring 
Except in the aspect of time 
Caught in the form of limitation 
Between un-being and being. 
That is – and it does seem to me that Eliot believes in a form of the will, perhaps an 
irrational or unconscious will – we are given three choices, as we are made of flesh and 
are thus “caught in the form of limitation / between un-being and being,” between 
death and life. On the one hand, we can  
    Descend lower, descend only 
 Into the world of perpetual solitude, 
 World not world, but that which is not world, 
 Internal darkness, deprivation 
 And destitution of all property, 
 Desiccation of the world of sense, 
 Evacuation of the world of fancy, 
 Inoperancy of the world of spirit 
This, it would seem, would be to choose death-in-life, to give in to certain desires that 
seem transcendent such that we become automatons mired in monotony.  But insofar as 
“this is the one way,” then “the other / is the same.” That is, we may also choose life-in-
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death, the epicurean overflowing of desire, also offering the illusion of transcendence. 
These paths, bound as they are by the notion of time, are those presented by the world, 
which “moves / in appetency, on its metalled ways / of time past and time future.” 
Desire, appetency, is linked to metal, static and unchanging. Opposed to desire is love, 
which is “undesiring / except in the aspect of time.” And it is this “waste sad time / 
stretching before and after” that we must affirm in order to transcend, such that we can 
hear the “hidden laughter  / of children in the foliage.” The illumination thus provided 
by poetic language allows the reflection necessary to understand our own limitations, 
the irrational impulse to prod our feelings of regret or consider how things might have 
been and laugh. Thus aware of the “ridiculousness” with which we are forced to live, we 
can affirm our fragmented experience with the knowledge of its limitations and 
potential. 
 In “East Coker” (1940), however, the poem confronts the limits of poetic 
language, which leaves “one still with the intolerable wrestle / With words and 
meanings.” Such words and meanings must inevitably refer back to history, such as that 
of family lines (to which East Coker, where Eliot’s family once lived, is a reference) and 
the “Mirth of those long since under earth / Nourishing the corn.” The paradoxical 
phrase “in my beginning is my end,” which runs throughout this poem, refers to the 
cyclical nature of this history, the return of the seasons or repetitive patterns of 
experience. Eliot’s speaker is looking for a way to affirm this repetition without 
reproducing it meaninglessly. The “worn-out” poem at the start of the second section 
performs such meaningless repetition, relying on established and tired poetic tropes 
such as metaphor and allusion. This short poem imposes a particular epistemology 
whereby patterns are induced from experience, whereas Eliot’s speaker is attempting to 
 74 
conceive of history as a constellation of the possible and impossible, the real and 
imagined. In this conception, every moment is the culmination of every previous 
moment possible, such that it comprises every possible pattern and, thus, no pattern 
whatsoever. When a pattern cannot be imposed on experience, then, we are left with 
affect, the raw experience of human emotion, which is always present. And to realize 
this requires a sense of humility, an ascetic discipline. 
    You must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy. 
 In order to arrive at what you do not know 
    You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance. 
 In order to possess what you do not possess 
    You must go by the way of dispossession. 
 In order to arrive at what you are not. 
This chant, reminiscent of the final lines of The Waste Land, expresses the humility 
required to attain a sense of the eternal and “arrive at what you are not.” For the goal 
expressed by Eliot’s speaker is both to gain knowledge of how to live a spiritually 
meaningful life and to understand what such a life means. Language, the speaker 
reiterates, while the only tool at our disposal, will only ever allow us an approximation 
of this experience: “For us,” he says, “there is only the trying.” This act of approximation 
is the pursuit of transcending the mortal worlds of time, including the natural world 
(“the evening under starlight”) and the modern, urban world (“the evening under 
lamplight”). That is, it is the striving for affirmation, which is a striving for love, “a 
deeper communion / Through the dark cold and the empty desolation” of the mortal 
worlds we can only ever inhabit. 
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 The speaker returns to this love in the final poem, “Little Gidding” (1942), 
associating it with nationalism, the “love of a country.” This love, “never indifferent,” 
hinges on memory, particularly the history of one’s country. Specifically, the speaker’s 
impetus is to shift the emphasis from remembering, or constructing history, of the men 
who died for the love of their country to the act of dying itself. The speaker makes 
numerous allusions to Yeats, among others, throughout “Little Gidding,” and this 
distinction between the dying and the dead, like the dancer and the dance, is one of the 
most pronounced. While the question is not rhetorical, Eliot’s speaker asks, “Why 
should we celebrate / These dead men more than the dying?” In celebrating by 
remembering the act of dying, we remember an imperfection, a fragmenting of a 
political cause rather than its total representation. This symbol of dying is affirming, as it 
reminds us that “all shall be well and / All manner of thing shall be well,” and it 
therefore promotes love for one’s country. However, it also torments us, as it reminds us 
of our own imperfection, our own mortality, “the intolerable shirt of flame / Which 
human power cannot remove.” 
 The distinction between the dying and the dead has further political 
implications, particularly regarding de Man’s rhetorical reading of the figure of the 
dancer and the dance in Yeats. For Eliot’s speaker, the dying is perceived as a symbol. 
Rather than a symbol of nationalism, it is a symbol of human finitude and mortality, an 
end that is also a beginning. As such, this question allegorizes the poem’s own failed 
symbolism, its own tormented attempt to understand and then to represent the 
unknowable. In its failure, however, the poem foregrounds the political stakes of such a 
pursuit, which Eliot considered “pre-political.” Nationalism, in this conception, can 
therefore only ever be a concept in language. As such, it is subject to the same 
 76 
fragmentation and imperfection that comprises both human experience and attempts to 
represent that experience in poetry. In performing this fragmentation, and its 
affirmation, the poem neither questions nor espouses nationalism; rather, it sees it – and 
all political impulses – as the inevitable product of systems of thought invented by 
human subjects who are themselves mortal and fallible. This could not be more 
antithetical to fascist nationalism, embodied by propaganda, which constructs an ideal 
view of future permanence. 
 The future, no less than the past, are concepts that each of the quartets is highly 
skeptical of. They are necessarily contested, limited, imperfect, and possible, rather than 
determined. And it is failure, specifically, that Eliot’s poems, like “Ozymandias,” 
consider constitutive of any epistemological sense of historical progress with regards to 
futurity. In a letter from 1939 published in New English Weekly, Eliot wrote that 
propagandists “have as their job rather the propagation of existing views, than the 
creation of the valuable views of the future” (in Ricks 269). As Ricks argues, this notion 
that the future can be rendered valuable in the present runs antithetical to Eliot’s 
conception of the present, particularly that elaborated in Four Quartets. For Eliot, the 
present is both sacred (transcendental) and sinful (human); any attempt to impute to the 
past or the future these paradoxical qualities of the present, such as the fascist valorizing 
(or value-izing) of the dead, is to mire oneself even more deeply in fallibility. Rather, by 
insisting that the act of dying is itself symbolic of a positive kind of nationalism (Love 
for one’s country), the text foregrounds the aesthetic, and particularly poetic, nature of 
this nationalism. The act of dying is an eternally present one, insofar as it can never be 
repeated, and as such achieves what Eliot considers to be the goal of poetry, which it can 
never fully attain. That is, the act of dying renders understandable the failure implicit in 
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any human endeavor, the limits of human experience. It therefore symbolizes the 
affirmation with which we must live our lives despite such limitations. Insofar as death 
itself is the symbol, the figure of its rendering it poetry allegorizes the process of 
affirming life in death, a process that “Little Gidding” describes, echoing Dante, as it 
describes encounters with the dead. 
 Poetry, then, would be able to represent the realities of war, so long as it did so 
with an eye to presenting, or making present, the experience of dying, the one definitive 
experience of a mortal, human life. And this, of course, is an impossible task, so the real 
goal of poetry is, in attempting to approximate the experience of war, to dramatize the 
impossibility of such an attempt and, ultimately, to affirm the impossibility with which 
we endeavor to undertake the task. Such an endeavor to affirmingly make present the 
realities of war, Eliot explains two months before the publication of Four Quartets, 
requires temporal distance.  “You cannot understand war – with the kind of 
understanding needed for writing poetry – or any other great experience while you are 
in the midst of it” (in Ricks 270). This is the process that Eliot describes in the fifth 
section of “East Coker.” 
 So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years— 
 Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l’entre deux guerres 
 Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt 
 Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
These poetic beginnings are therefore endings, as they all end in failure. They double 
what they represent: the ending that is the act of dying. However, as Eliot insists 
throughout the quartets, “in my end is my beginning.” And thus, the act of dying is 
what inspires the attempt to capture it in poetry. So while the failure of words to capture 
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the experience of war, the experience of dying, seems here to be something to lament, 
Eliot insists that such failed endings are in fact hopeful beginnings.  
 There is only the fight to recover what has been lost 
 And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions 
 That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss, 
 For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business. 
Here, the “trying” effort, the “fight to recover” endings by rendering them present 
eclipses “the rest,” the act of apprehending time in its entirety; affirming the momentary 
act of dying proves more meaningful than trying to make sense of, ascribe value to, or 
valorize the eternal state of death. Temporal distance gives us the time to recognize and 
affirm the necessity of human failure, the ultimate example of which is the act of failing 
to remain alive, to recognize that because we live, and because we die, neither of these 
states is eternal and we are thus limited in our access of the eternal to the emotionally 
powerful approximations we can only ever experience in the present. 
 It is with this affirmation of failure that Eliot opens a short poem on war poetry 
published the month after he published “Little Gidding.” The very first word of “A Note 
on War Poetry” is the word “Not.” Whether meant to evoke the German word “Not” or 
not, across both languages, this word renders meaning irreducible, as the two meanings 
coexist paradoxically: absence and negation, in English, and urgency and necessity, in 
German.  
 Not the expression of collective emotion 
 Imperfectly reflected in the daily papers. 
If nothing else, these terse lines reject the notion that the poetic figure of dying can act 
like propaganda, which constructs collective emotions by appearing to reaffirm their 
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individuation. If war poetry is to employ the objective correlative, it must do so in a way 
that goes beyond such propaganda and addresses the enduring questions of what it 
means to be human, the “pre-political.” 
 While the poem does not use the words “death” or “dying,” it does present the 
same distinction made between the two in “Little Gidding.” Whereas death serves as a 
metonym for the material masquerading as the eternal and is subject to politicization in 
the daily papers, any literary trope of the transient act of dying is immune to such 
politicization. It symbolizes, in other words, the doubling of failure that occupies the 
speaker of Four Quartets: the ethical failure implicit, as Nabokov would say, in both 
mortality and morality (“the moral sense in humans is the duty / we have to pay on 
mortal sense of beauty”). Both the human and the work of art fail to persist forever in 
the present moment, as both are subject, like Ozymandias, to the onslaught of time. The 
recognition of this failure, however, as Humbert Humbert implies in his pun on “duty,” 
is both a tax and a responsibility, imposed on us from without as well as within. The 
symbol of dying, which symbolizes the failure of representation, both imposes on us, 
and inspires within us, the need to recognize and affirm our own sinful, mortal failings. 
 And it is in this sense that “A Note on War Poetry” engages the concepts of death 
and dying without naming them explicitly. Instead of these terms, Eliot employs the 
“universal,” and the “transient,” of which we should be skeptical of both. Whereas the 
universal, “death,” is a concept easily subjected to political propaganda, the transient, 
the moment of “dying,” cannot simply replace it and thereby be subject to the same 
propaganda. To do this, dying must be understood as a failure and affirmed 
nonetheless. The poem concludes with the following stanza. 
 The enduring is not a substitute for the transient, 
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 Neither one for the other. But the abstract conception 
 Of private experience at its greatest intensity 
 Becoming universal, which we call ‘poetry,’ 
 May be affirmed in verse. 
The war poem, “the abstract conception / of private experience at its greatest intensity,” 
is not the substitution of the transient for the universal, or the universalizing of the 
transient. Rather, it reveals what may arguably be the only universal, that of affirming 
the impossibility of knowing, experiencing, or representing the universal. The war 
poem, which records with great intensity the individual experience of witnessing the act 
of dying again and again, approximates this experience, represents it, and has the 
capacity to acknowledge the failure of representation to render it apprehensible. But, in 
typical Eliotic fashion, verse itself is the site whereby the grounds for affirmation are 
made possible. 
 Where is the point at which the merely individual 
 Explosion breaks 
 
 In the path of an action merely typical 
 To create the universal, originate a symbol 
 Out of the impact… 
Eliot here sees the rawness and emotional immediacy of the war poem as symbolizing 
the universality of the affirmation of failure. Yet this, like language in Four Quartets, is by 
necessity a failure of language, “a meeting / /… of forces beyond control of 
experiment.” For to hone a war poem, to control it like an experiment, to strive towards 
its perfection, is an act of politicizing that seeks to dissimulate the failure that constitutes 
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the act of dying, itself constitutive of the experience of war. We may think back to the 
opening of Four Quartets, when the speaker declares that “human kind / cannot bear 
very much reality.” It is precisely this reality that Eliot desires human kind not only to 
bear, but to affirm. 
 The affirmation of failure (to comprehend or partake) is, in fact, one way to 
conceptualize Eliot’s own self-diagnosis with regards to politics, and fascism in 
particular. There have been a number of studies examining Eliot’s relationship to the 
various tenets of fascism, including his anti-Semitism (Julius), his poetics (North, 
Morrison), his forays into politics and economics in The Criterion (Harding), and his anti-
liberalism (Surette). These critics range in their conclusions, from Julius’s contested 
claim that anti-Semitism serves as a structuring element in Eliot’s work to Surette’s 
insistence that Eliot’s attraction to, or at least indifference towards, fascism was as much 
a product of what he saw as the failures of communism and capitalism, to which fascism 
is opposed. However, as with Stefan George, who Eliot considered more significant for 
German poetry than Rilke, there are only a few sources from which to intimate Eliot’s 
position towards fascism; as his poetry demonstrates, this position is marked by the 
recognition that his attempt to fully comprehend the movement(s) amounted to failure, 
what he calls “humility” in East Coker II. While he does not resist fascism, neither does 
he completely ignore nor embrace it, acknowledging the limits of his understanding 
and, in so doing, articulating an attitude about the movement that – symbolized perhaps 
by his association with Montgomery Belgion – was passively permissive despite its self-
aware modesty. 
 Eliot’s most succinct articulation of his politics occurs in the forward to For 
Lancelot Andrewes, when he writes that his collection of essays is “classicist in literature, 
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royalist in politics, and anglo-catholic in religion” (7). Eliot’s classicism and “royalism,” 
or monarchism, led him to openly defend Charles Maurras, a leading figure in the Action 
Française, for which he has been condemned as having fascist, or at least proto-fascist, 
sympathies. In addition to his admiration of Maurras, and his desire to wed government 
with his concept of the “Anglo-Catholic” Church, Eliot also praised Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, whose call for a conservative revolution married literary classicism, 
cultural conservatism, and monarchist politics. “Eliot’s élitist and imperialist cultural 
politics found a number of fellow travellers among Germany’s leading bourgeois 
humanists—Hofmannsthal, Gundolf, Curtius. What they shared was a mission to 
preserve Europe’s cultural heritage at a time of spiritual aridity, communism, fascism, 
Nazism, and the spectre of war” (Harding 224). When Hofmannsthal died in 1929, Eliot 
published an obituary in his periodical The Criterion, written by the German intellectual 
and regular contributor of the ‘German Chronicle’ section, Max Rychner. In addition to 
Rychner and the George-disciple Gundolf, Robert Curtius was also a regular contributor 
to the journal and “some years later, Curtius weighed Hofmannsthal in the balance with 
George.” Curtius’s humanist writings on Hofmannsthal and George, while “eminently 
bürgerlich,” posited a “humanist model of education inherited from Wilhelm von 
Humboldt as a necessary counterbalance to the cultural nihilism espoused by Hitler’s 
National Socialist movement” (217-218). This is not to say that Eliot was not attracted to 
the ideals of fascism, as his unfinished work Coriolan demonstrates, but rather that his 
interest in fascism only went so far as it embodied his evolving sense of cultural and 
anti-democratic conservatism, national monism, traditional classicism. 
 What Eliot found appealing in Gundolf, George, Curtius, and Hofmannsthal, 
then, was both their monarchic politics, authoritarian but not fascist, as well as their 
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classicist aesthetics. In the work of these men, Eliot found represented the political 
aesthetics of the French politician Charles Maurras, who helped found the pseudo-
fascist movement, Action Française, in Vichy France. Maurras’s political philosophy was 
a rethinking of the counter-Enlightenment critique of Rousseau who, for Maurras unlike 
men such as Joseph de Maistre, saw Rousseau as emblematic of a democratic, Protestant, 
individualist and especially Romantic worldview. De Maistre saw the revolution as a 
divine test, such that “the easy euphoria promised Adam and Eve through knowledge is 
recapitulated in the meretricious appeal of the Enlightenment” (Asher 14). Later in the 
nineteenth century, the once-liberal philosopher Ernest Renan articulated a conservative 
position that, while more secular than de Maistre’s, nonetheless “found Christianity 
necessary.” Renan criticized post-revolution France, which he found too bourgeois and 
materialist, by drawing on the success of Prussia, which he attributed to its remaining 
“quasi-feudal: dedicated to hierarchy, discipline, and loyalty” (17). In this sense, “the 
conservative position was made up of a loosely related series of fears: of the 
revolutionary spirit, liberalism, progress, democracy, Rousseau, capitalism, the 
Enlightenment, foreigners in general, and Jews in particular” (21). Rather than fixate on 
any one of these specific fears as the unifying tenet of conservatism for my project, 
however, I focus on how any of them – as generally agreed upon as signifying a 
conservative position by historians and by the writers in question themselves – receives 
poetic treatment. The “conservative” gesture then pivots on each poet’s affirmation of 
either an indeterminate position towards such political beliefs or the failure of fully 
realizing such beliefs in a material political sense. 
 Inheriting this platform of fears at the turn of the century, Charles Maurras 
approached the conservative critique of Rousseau with a literary sensibility, such that he 
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considered Rousseau to embody a kind of proto-Romanticism. As a friend of T. E. 
Hulme, who wrote the oft-cited polemical essay “Romanticism and Classicism,” Eliot 
was similarly critical of the Romantics, “associat[ing] the denial of the fundamentally 
limited nature of the human condition with Romanticism and the recognition of its 
limited nature with classicism. In this respect they [Hulme, Eliot, and Wyndham Lewis] 
are aping Charles Maurras and the Action française” (Surette 130). The Action française 
was a nationalist and militant right-wing faction, made up primarily of young men, 
which formed in Paris in 1899 and remained present until the end of World War II. As 
one of the most active and outspoken members of the group, Maurras rose to 
prominence, preaching a return to pre-1789 Catholicism and isolationist royalism. And 
in this sense, his position against Rousseau was simultaneously political, religious, and 
literary. In 1913, in fact, the Nouvelle Revue Francaise concisely described the Maurrasien 
position as “classique, catholique, monarchique,” almost the identical phrasing to that 
used by Eliot in his preface to For Lancelot Andrewes in 1928.  
 While Maurras did not attribute to Christianity the same potential as de Maistre, 
he nonetheless viewed Catholicism as the necessary corrective to Protestantism’s 
implicit individualism, which had overtones with his ordered and authoritarian political 
vision. “According to Maurras, the Catholic Church was the brilliant antidote to Jesus’s 
seductive anarchy. It reestablished traditional hierarchy by reinstituting a legion of 
intermediaries, priestly and divine, between the individual and God. And thus things 
remained until the anarchic spirit broke out once again with Luther—and two centuries 
later with his offspring Rousseau, who infiltrated France from Protestant Geneva” 
(Asher 23). For the classicist Maurras, who had “a view of history that recognizes no 
 85 
perceptible rupture between the Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church,” these 
three spheres are inseparable (Asher 26).  
Maurras is never troubled by a problem that, throughout his life, will vex Eliot in 
his defense of this [classical] tradition: can there be a great work of art whose 
political or religious principles are less than correct? For Maurras, supremely 
confident in the permanence of “antiromantic truth,’ the answer is simply no… 
Formal beauty is always a faithful reflection of immutable truth, and as [Ernst] 
Nolte correctly points out, this holds for states and religions every bit as much as 
for works of art. The substance of the truth – order and rank – are equally 
political, artistic, and religious virtues. (27-28) 
 For Maurras, the greatest works of art necessarily pronounce enduring, or eternal, 
political and religious truths.   
 There was considerable ideological overlap in the positions of the l’Action 
ffrançaise and National Socialism, particularly with regards to the violence with which 
they sought to realize their similarly anti-Semitic, extreme nationalist, and authoritarian 
platforms. That is, both National Socialists and l’Action française shared a desire for 
collective discipline and order that they viewed as lost in an age of bourgeois, liberal, 
democratic individualism and materialism. Eliot, too, was opposed to many of 
democracy’s principles, such as universal suffrage, though his attitudes towards 
National Socialism were ambivalent. In any case he seems to have considered l’Action 
Française to be an ultra-conservative, rather than fascist, movement. In his review of a 
number of texts both supporting and critiquing fascism more broadly from 1927, “The 
Literature of Fascism,” he largely dismisses fascism, claiming that whatever there is to 
be admired in the movement can already be “found, in a more digestible form, in the 
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work of Charles Maurras” (in Surette 161). “Eliot’s rejection of fascism, then was not on 
grounds of its anti-democratic and totalitarian character, nor because of its overt 
celebration of violence, but because he found it inferior to the anti-democratic and 
totalitarian doctrines of Charles Maurras and the Action Française” (161).  
The political and historical weight Eliot ascribed to Maurras is foregrounded by a 
commentary Eliot published in The Criterion from November 1927. In the editorial, Eliot 
cites “three events in the last ten years” of monumental enough stature “to compel us to 
consider the problem of Liberty and Authority, both in politics and in the organization 
of speculative thought.” These events are “the Russian revolution (which has also 
directed our attention to the East), the transformation of Italy (which has directed our 
attention to our own forms of government), and the condemnation of the Action 
française by the Vatican” (“A Commentary” 386). In Ernst Nolte’s account, this 
condemnation caused l’Action Française to “undergo a profound change. If royalism, its 
teeth drawn since 1918, prevented it from extending over the entire Right, so the 
condemnation deprived it, if not of its whole body of Catholic followers, at least of a 
coming generation from among young Catholics as well as of a powerful moral 
support” (Nolte 111). Eliot apparently found the event similarly significant, placing it 
alongside the Russian Revolution and the rise of fascism. Specifically, as a result of these 
events, he declares that, “politics has become too serious a matter to be left to 
politicians.” However, as Jason Harding points out, “What the non-specialist ‘man of 
letters’ or the Criterion, a non-technical ‘literary review,’ had to contribute to political 
debate was not always clear. For example, although astute contemporaries realized that 
developments in Italy and Russia were of profound international importance, the 
Vatican condemnation of the French Royalist movement, Action française, was seen as a 
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backwater event by many English observers” (Harding 180). Eliot then defended 
Maurras against the Catholic Leo Ward’s defense of the condemnation, writing that for 
eighteen years Maurras had had “exactly the opposite effect” of “pervert[ing] his 
disciples and students away from Christianity.” “Indeed, Kenneth Asher points out that 
Maurras deeply influenced the Harvard French professor Irving Babbitt, and that 
Babbitt’s hostility to romanticism and fondness for the classic echoed Maurassient 
views. Babbit passed on that attitude to his students, including Eliot” (Surette 162).  
The opacity of Eliot’s religious views here – his embrace of aspects of 
Anglicanism, Catholicism, and Christianity – characterizes his self-definition as “anglo-
catholic in religion.” In 1927 he officially converted to Anglicanism, a turn that marks 
the beginnings an intensification of Eliot’s British nationalism, as well as his most 
intense flirtation with fascism in his unfinished sequence Coriolan, which, as Steven 
Matthews argues, “emerges [in 1932] at a time when the lure of fascism pulled hardest at 
Eliot’s sensibility” (Matthews 44). “In this period,” Matthews argues, “the strength 
offered by belief in totalitarian politics threatens but ultimately does not overturn the 
religious foundations of his apolitical understanding of the nature of the individual in 
society… Coriolan is the dramatization of the complexities underlying Eliot’s feeling for 
the allure of such politics, as well as the grounds for his resistance to them” (46). Like 
Maurras, the poetic sequence assumes continuity from Roman art and politics to 
religion. Eliot, however, challenges the common conception that fascism was a natural 
outgrowth of Catholicism, which he thought “confused religion with politics. If religious 
faith is ignored… then politics destructively takes on its aura” (48). As Matthews, 
Harding, Surette, and, it seems, most Eliot scholars agree today, Eliot’s draw to fascism 
was philosophical insofar as it offered an alternative to liberal democracy founded on 
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authority, tradition, order, and discipline. However, his interest was tempered by a 
desire to maintain the fundamental aspects of democracy, as he says in “The Literature 
of Fascism,” and to limit government intervention in “individual and local liberty,” as 
he says in a commentary from April 1929 (Matthews 49). As Matthews argues, the 
incomplete poem sequence Coriolan thus dramatizes the “complex dialectic that reflects 
the nature of Eliot’s convictions at this unsettled point: ‘Triumphal March’ captures the 
abjection of the crowd or mass before an equally incognizant hero-figure… ‘Difficulties 
of a Statesman’ renders the equivalent, ‘hardly’ self-knowing perspective of the hero 
himself, a weakness that brings on the demands to ‘RESIGN’ at the poem’s end. The 
hinterland of literary and political complexities and complications that surround the 
moment of Coriolan, therefore, seem to enliven… its irresolution…” (57). 
The current consensus, if one can speak of such a thing, seems to be that Eliot 
was drawn to aspects of fascism as a fundamentally inward-looking alternative to 
liberalism, socialism, and communism but that he ultimately dismissed the movement 
for, among other things, its celebration of violence, propagation of herd mentality, and 
claim to supplant religion. In this list, however, one finds a glaring omission, which 
Anthony Julius has striven to foreground, that of Eliot’s anti-Semitism. Julius’s 
sensationalized argument, which has been echoed by the Irish poet Tom Paulin and the 
Oxford professor of poetry James Fenton, begins with the following. “Anti-Semites are 
not the same. Some break Jewish bones, others wound Jewish sensibilities. Eliot falls in 
the second category.” In a somewhat appropriate stroke of irony, Julius goes on in the 
introduction to wound the sensibilities of any reader who could imagine an 
interpretation of one of Eliot’s poems that was not based on recognizing the offense of 
anti-Semitism, even, presumably, if that reading attempted to reconceptualize the 
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insulting passage in question. “Indifference to the offense given by these poems is, 
among other things, a failure of interpretation.” Incredibly, Julius goes even further to 
blanket accuse such interpretations as complicit in the reproduction of exactly the same 
violent act of anti-Semitism. “They insult Jews: to ignore these insults is to misread the 
poems” (Julius 1-2). 
Such readings are precisely those laid out by the British poet and emeritus 
professor Craig Raine in his short essay “In Defence of T. S. Eliot.” In his essay, Raine 
invokes Milan Kundera’s notion of “criminography,” “by which he [Kundera] means the 
desire to arraign artists on exclusively moral grounds, the desire to annihilate rather 
than administer complicated justice, the desire to consider only the faults and ignore the 
virtues and the achievements. Eliot,” Raine makes clear, “knew all about what he called 
‘seductive simplicity’ – ‘the direct and persuasive appeal to intellect and emotions’ that 
is likely to be ‘altogether more plausible than the truth’” (152). I thus share with Raine an 
“instinct… for complication.” It is precisely the impulse towards complication in Eliot’s 
work that, I maintain, allows it to aesthetically critique fascism from within, a critique 
that fascism itself constantly strives to preclude. As the biography of Eliot demonstrates, 
however, the material political indifference of such an aesthetic critique does not free it, 
or its agent, from an ensuing ethical critique.   
To complicate the sweeping charge of malicious anti-Semitism leveled by Julius, 
Raine performs three compelling close readings of passages cited by Julius. The first is of 
the passage in After Strange Gods where Eliot says, “[We must discover]… what 
conditions, within our power to bring about, would foster the society that we desire. 
…reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews 
undesirable” (18-20). It is an incredibly bold gesture to, in the aftermath of the 
 90 
Holocaust, attempt to read this passage as anything other than anti-Semitic. Raine 
contends that while Jews are in fact singled out in the passage, there is no reason to 
necessarily believe that Eliot was skeptical of “large numbers” of members of any free-
thinking race and accepting of small numbers of such individuals. To make the case, 
Raine draws attention to a line quoted in these lectures, that “all those habitual actions, 
habits and customs, from the most significant religious rite to our conventional way of 
greeting a stranger… represent the blood kinship of ‘the same people living in the same 
place’” (on second page in Raine – cite). While Julius does not discuss this quotation, 
Raine insists that it is crucial to understanding Eliot’s cultural prerogative, as it comes 
from the Cyclops episode of Joyce’s Ulysses. It is, in fact, Leopold Bloom’s  
definition of a nation, offered to the bigoted Citizen whose rampant anti-
Semitism wishes to expel the Semite interloper from the Irish nation. Leopold 
Bloom is a free-thinking Jew. And his definition, which is also his defence of his 
right to live in Ireland, is a definition that the allegedly anti-Semitic Eliot is 
happy to share. This insight should give us pause, both specifically and 
generally. By consciously alluding to Leopold Bloom, Eliot effectively includes 
free-thinking Jews in his recipe for a unified culture… the equivalent of the 
Labour Party’s immigration policy. (3) 
In this sense, as Eliot himself said in a letter, he was “arguing the undesirability of ‘free-
thinkers of any race’ in large numbers – and that free-thinking Jews are ‘only a special 
case.’ By this, Eliot means that, given the diaspora, free-thinking Jews are less likely than 
free-thinking Christians to retain the vestiges of their religion… Free-thinking Christians 
in Europe do live, or did live, in a basically Christian culture.” 
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The impulse of Raine’s rereading of Eliot’s anti-Semitism is, in fact, to argue that 
while he engages anti-Semitism in his poetry and prose, often directly, this is generally 
enough to make the case that anti-Semitism is object of concern, rather than its cause. 
For example, Julius says, “describing Marx as a ‘Jewish economist,’ when he was less 
than a Jew and more than an economist, is insulting.” To this Raine cites Eliot’s full 
sentence – “I never expected that Hegel, having been inverted by a Jewish economist for 
his own purposes, should come back again into the favour” – in which Eliot “is relishing 
an irony… Hegel was a noted anti-Semite.” Another example is the oft-cited lines from 
Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar”: 
… On the Rialto once. 
   The rats are underneath the piles. 
The Jew is underneath the lot. 
    Money in furs. The boatman smiles… 
For Raine, “there is anti-Semitism here. But it is not Eliot’s.  
It must be Burbank’s. The two crucial, middle lines are framed, fatally for Julius’s 
argument, by two incomplete phrases… whose truncation, were we to encounter 
it in Ulysses, would instantly indicate interior monologue. They would indicate 
interior monologue anywhere, as a matter of fact, except in Eliot when one reads 
prejudicially. Basically Burbank’s anti-Semitism is a public posture produced by 
a private derangement – Bleistein’s titular cigar, not mentioned in the poem, tells 
us that he has succeeded sexually with Princess Volupine where Burbank has 
failed. 
These examples serve to demonstrate how Eliot was engaged with the problem of anti-
Semitism, which informed the politics of Charles Maurras no less than the fascist 
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movements in Germany and Italy. In reading his work as staging, or thinking through, 
the various perspectives towards anti-Semitism that dominated his age, Eliot is not 
magically acquitted of at times succumbing to the language of anti-Semitism; such 
language is in fact necessary to stage a perspective. And as with Coriolan, it is as 
important to read moments of possible anti-Semitic remarks alongside his call for an 
“organized protest against such injustice,” for example, in the Christian News-Letter from 
1941. 
 Perhaps the most damning piece of evidence that Tom Paulin presents in his 
positive review of Julius’s book is a review of The Yellow Spot: The Outlawing of Half a 
Million Human Beings that appeared in the “Shorter Notices” section of the Criterion from 
1936. The review understates the events that were occurring in Nazi Germany, claiming 
that the book was “an attempt to rouse moral indignation by means of sensationalism” 
(759). As Leon Surette, Harding, Raine, and others evince, the use of this short review to 
indict Eliot and his journal of charges of anti-Semitism and even support for fascism has 
been revealed as spurious, in no small part because Eliot did not write the review at all. 
Rather, the occasional contributor Montgomery Belgion was responsible. “Rather 
scandalously, that erroneous attribution is also found in Ronald Bush, T. S. Eliot: A Study 
in Character and Style (1985), C. K. Stead, Pound, Yeats, Eliot, and the Modernism Movement 
(1986), and Christopher Ricks (who notes that the attribution cannot be certain) T. S. 
Eliot and Prejudice (1988)” (Surette 309). Jason Harding, who has recently presented a 
thorough account of Belgion’s relationship to Criterion, notes that, “Valerie Eliot 
disclosed to readers of the Times Literary Supplement that the review had, in point of fact, 
been written by Montgomery Belgion, although it might have been evident to anyone 
who consulted the index to volume 15 of the Criterion that Belgion had been the 
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author—batch reviews were conventionally signed with initials at the bottom of the last 
entry, in this case ‘M. B.’” (Harding 144). And in response to Julius’s argument since the 
discovery of this fact, that the review nonetheless ‘bore the stamp of [Eliot’s] approval’ 
and thus reveals the journal’s latent anti-Semitism, Harding writes that “this means 
taking a single short book notice, occupying less than half a page, as representative of 
the contents of a periodical whose bound volumes run to over 12,000 pages. Eliot, of 
course, was ultimately responsible for all the contents of his journal, but one is still 
entitled to wonder whether Belgion’s review is at least partly offset by Louis MacNeice’s 
review of a work by a Jewish theologian, R. V. Feldman, described as ‘very valuable as a 
corrective to those who find in the Jews a perfect subject for crude generalization” (154-
155). This stance seems to be corroborated to some extent by a “Commentary” from 
1933, when Eliot said of the economic theories of the anti-Semite Major Douglas, 
“whether he is right or wrong does not matter a fig to my argument for the priority of 
ethics over politics” (in Surette 179). 
The question undertaken here, however, regards if and how Eliot’s position vis-
à-vis fascism in the 1930s, after his conversion to the Anglican Church, manifests in his 
poetry. This was an ultimately indeterminate and shifting position, in no small part 
because the same leaders who seemed utterly dismissive of ethics and religion 
employed aspects of this political vision. Both Hitler and Mussolini were as, if not more, 
anti-liberal and anti-democratic than Eliot. In a problematic “Commentary” from 1938, 
Eliot was critical of the “irresponsible ‘anti-fascist,’ the patron of mass-meetings and 
manifestoes” (in Surette 200).  In this article, he called for a return to an agrarian 
economy, such that, “all classes (so long as we have classes) should be settled in the 
country and dependent on it.” While the Nazis did embrace modern technology, as 
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Jeffrey Herf’s Reactionary Modernism makes clear, Eliot was also aware of their 
celebration of the German peasant, who represented the racially pure Aryan. This does 
not seem to trouble Eliot in the October “Commentary,” in which he actually identifies 
fascism as a possible antidote to the “urbanization of mind.” One reason for this, as Leon 
Surette argues, could have been “Eliot’s failure to see where fascism/Nazism was 
headed.” As I show momentarily, the affirmation of failure comprises the thematic 
backbones of Four Quartets and Coriolan, Eliot’s most overtly ethical and political texts of 
the 1930s and 40s. Eliot was also virulently anti-communist, and fascism could be 
palatable to Eliot on its shared opposition to its dream of a world without class struggle. 
Shortly after his defense of fascism, Kristallnacht occurred in Berlin. While Eliot never 
formally mentioned the horrific events, he did discontinue the Criterion a few months 
thereafter. In his “Last Words” for the journal, he admitted, “how obscure and confused 
my own mind has been.” In addition to stating this, however, he also demonstrated it. 
With the recent events of Kristallnacht certainly in mind, Eliot wrote, “For myself, a right 
political philosophy came more and more to imply a right theology – and right 
economics to depend upon right ethics.” Such right ethics, he goes on to say, are not 
entirely incompatible with a fascist government, just incompatible with the one offered 
“locally” by the British Union of fascism. “[T]he version of fascism, which was offered 
locally… [had] no great intellectual interest – and what is perhaps more important, was 
not sufficiently adaptable to be grafted on to the stock of Toryism, - whereas 
communism flourished because it grew so easily on the Liberal root” (in Surette 203).  
Eliot’s tolerance of fascism, and even of the horrifically violent acts that resulted 
from fascist governments in Italy and Germany, crystallizes in his three lectures from 
March 1939 at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. In these lectures, known as The Idea of 
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a Christian Society, Eliot declares that, “the fundamental objection to fascist doctrine is 
that it is pagan” and “dismissed [objections to oppression and violence and cruelty] on 
the grounds that they ‘are objections to means and not to ends’ (205). In this sense, 
Surette argues, Eliot “insist[ed] that… Europe was faced with a stark choice between 
Christianity, fascism/nazism, and communism… Despite abundant evidence of the 
belligerent, brutal, and oppressive nature of the fascist and Nazi regimes available by 
March of 1939, Eliot still insisted that they were only marginally worse than 
parliamentary, capitalist, humanistic liberal regimes… He seems to prefer 
[fascism/nazism] to liberal democracy, if only it could be purged of its ‘oppression and 
violence and cruelty.’ That preference appears to have been based primarily on a shared 
antipathy for the ‘licence’ and atheism of liberalism. Eliot’s stance represents a striking 
failure of imagination on his part – if not worse” (205-206). In The Idea of a Christian 
Society, this failure to imagine the oppressive brutality of fascism is the result of trying to 
conceive of an alternative to liberalism, namely an agrarian Christian society that 
privileged the role of art. Eliot saw fascism as Europe’s only feasible alternative, but the 
horrors of its reality were necessarily incompatible with a society that Eliot desired to be 
founded on “right ethics.” Thus the comparison was impossible without its own 
immanent failure, a fact that likely contributed to Eliot’s own at times deeply troubling 
indeterminacy and even tolerance before the Holocaust, and outright silence afterwards. 
One aspect of this tolerance was likely Eliot’s attraction to fascism’s implicit 
nationalism, which necessarily rejected urban, international, and liberal 
cosmopolitanism, the “urbanization of the mind.”  
The only motive I can imagine [to evade the issue of the Holocaust] is Eliot’s 
perception that his commitment to a homogeneous Christian culture for Europe 
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would make any expression of outrage at the Holocaust appear hypocritical. It is 
not a judgment I [or I - CL] would have made in his position… [I]t suggests that 
Eliot’s worldview was not coextensive with Anglican Christianity, for Anglicans 
have had no difficulty in condemning the Holocaust. (255) 
It is this national introspection that Joshua Esty argues takes an anthropological form in 
Eliot’s lectures on founding a Christian society from 1939. “But what makes The Idea of a 
Christian Society interesting is not so much its conservative goals as its anthropological 
methods.  
It proposes that English citizens learn to emulate primitive societies ‘upon a 
higher plane’ without ‘sentimentalizing the life of the savage’… Eliot wishes to 
shift attention away from artificial or mimetic forms of primitivism that try to 
borrow back tribal virtues from the colonies. Instead, he proposes a revival based 
on pre-Revolution England, which he idealizes as a permanently exemplary 
organization of church and state, of art and faith, of town and country. (Esty 40-
41) 
Insofar as “art retains vitality only within a bounded culture,” Eliot likely found fascism 
attractive in part because of its practice of isolationism and its (racist homogenizing) 
ideal notion of cultural nationalism. Its “paganism,” however, opposed the Christianity 
upon which for Eliot any enduring society must be founded. 
While composing these lectures, Eliot wrote both “Burnt Norton” and “East 
Coker,” which allegorize – by rendering the poetic dramatization of – the affirmation of 
human finitude and failure, in a way that is not dissimilar from Shelley’s “Ozymandias.” 
Jed Esty presents a similar reading of Eliot’s cultural politics in his post-war Notes 
Towards a Definition of Culture, published six years after the final quartet “Little Gidding” 
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and nine years after Eliot’s lectures on a Christian society. In Notes, Eliot writes in even 
more explicit anthropological terms.  
If colonial ethnography had shown Europe that what Eliot calls ‘living total 
cultures’ existed elsewhere in the world then, Eliot seems to reason, empire’s end 
allows for the possibility of re-creating such a culture in England. In other words, 
Eliot writes both against and after the imperial/Arnoldian legacy, which held 
that England was the spiritually defunct modern center to a set of colorful and 
culturally vital colonies. (42) 
Against the backdrop of Eliot’s draw to fascism and his ensuing critique of “pre-
political” humanism, however, Esty’s argument that Eliot saw the end of empire as 
necessarily positive is too optimistic. While the end of empire did necessitate a turn 
towards one’s own colony, rather than the imperialist expansion and proliferation of 
that colony, Eliot’s poetry reveals such introspection to be an aesthetic and, therefore, 
inadequate process. While Esty’s argument that Four Quartets allegorizes the synthesis of 
“the local and the universal in a manner befitting a major culture in the act of becoming 
minor” is compelling, his resulting claim that “Four Quartets [is] a poetic form adequate 
to the dilemmas that remained imperfectly knotted in the serial and discursive logic of 
Eliot’s criticism” is somewhat misleading. While the poems do strive to depict religious 
experience, for example in the various recurring paradoxes, they in fact allegorize the 
failure, or inadequacy, of art to serve as the site of reconciling post-imperial cultural 
nationalism and Christian ethics. Like fascism, art cannot supplant religion, and its 
attempt to do so is what Eliot finds so disturbing about mass culture. However, in its 
failure, art can dramatize the affirmation (humility) of that necessary failure (sin) with 
which all humans after the Fall must live. In this sense, it can provide us with a sense of 
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the importance of religion, the practice of such affirmation, on which an ethically-sound 
nation must be founded. Unfortunately, Eliot’s silence regarding Kristallnacht and the 
Holocaust stand in ironic contrast to this vision, comprising the one great failure that 
can be neither forgiven nor affirmed and is what therefore renders the entire process of 
Eliotic affirmation suspect.  
It is primarily in the unfinished poetic sequence Coriolan where Eliot 
demonstrates the futility with which art can influence or engage politics, one form of 
poetic or artistic failure that he affirms in Four Quartets. While Coriolan depicts the 
subjectivity of a fascist citizen and a fascist dictator, respectively, it does this by 
interrogating the inadequate political import of poetic language. This is indicated in the 
final line of the poem: “RESIGN RESIGN RESIGN.” There are three things to notice in 
this line. The first is the signification of the word itself, which means to quit voluntarily. 
While it is undetermined whether the leader himself resolves to quit or this call comes 
from somewhere else – perhaps the citizen of the “Triumphal March,” a disembodied 
Zeitgeist, or even Eliot himself - these lines nonetheless foreground finality, the end of 
something. However, the composition of this word is such that to resign is also to “re-
sign,” and in fact there is no clear indication from the poem the word should not be 
meant as a reflection on the potential of poetic language, like fascism, to create 
something new, or give new meaning to existing social relationships. This is, after all, 
the primary aim of fascism, not to mention Ezra Pound’s modernism. But the collapsing 
of these two possibilities into one word does not perform the same paradox that will 
become a familiar trope in the Four Quartets sequence, whereby it transcends human 
comprehension and offers access to the eternal and holy. Rather, in this passage the 
sacrifice of determined meaning mirrors the sacrifices and oblations that occur 
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throughout the poem; rather than transcendence, such sacrifices call forth dust, “dust of 
dust” and a crown of dust, a trace of life rather than its overcoming.34 In this sense, the 
word indicates less of a political statement denouncing fascism and calling for Hitler or 
Mussolini to step down, and instead refers back to a desire for language itself to be able 
to “re-sign” the political, to make it comprehensible on a poetic and therefore “pre-
political” level. 
In this sense, to borrow a line for Four Quartets, in the unfinished poem’s end is 
its beginning, its desperate desire to “re-sign” fascism; in its end, however, is also its 
end, as this re-signing is also a resignation, an admission of failure. On the one hand, the 
repetition of the word implies a desperate urgency to this act, while the repetition of the 
word three times imputes to it a religious quality, namely the inadequate imitation of 
the trinity reflected by fascism, whose leader here is depicted as a bumbling bureaucrat 
and regressive infant. Recalling the modernist impulse and Nietzschean construct of 
creation through destruction, and Gertrude Stein’s “rose is a rose is a rose is a rose” in 
particular, the repetition of the word “RESIGN” both destroys and refashions figurative 
language. Rather than the teleological, terminal, and literal notion of failure that the 
word resignation implies, to end with a “bang,” the intensity of this line recasts failure 
as a “whimpering” away from politics back to the pre-political realm of poetic 
signification. In this sense it is an acknowledgement of poetry’s inadequacy, a doubling 
of the inadequacy of the bureaucracy described in the previous line, “We demand a 
committee, a representative committee, a committee of investigation.” 
These committees of representation and investigation are precisely those regimes 
of interpretation the poem both demands and denies. Take, for example, the opening !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 This may be one way of theorizing the difference between politics and religious ethics: the 
materiality of the former leaves it static, whereas the abstraction of the latter leaves it dynamic. 
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procession of signifiers. “Stone, bronze, stone, steel, stone, oakleaves” From the very 
beginning the poem invites interpretation by deploying the familiar symbols such as 
stone, bronze, and oakleaves stripped of any determinate referent. But these words are 
immediately stripped of any symbolic import at the conclusion of the opening line and 
the one that follows. “Stone, bronze, stone, steel, stone, oakleaves horses’ heels / Over 
the paving. / And the flags. And the trumpets. And so many eagles.” The poem makes 
it immediately clear that we are not dealing with the realm of symbol; the words “stone” 
or “oakleaves” are not smuggling some secret meaning. Rather they, like the flags and 
trumpets and eagles, are literally items in a list. “How many?” the speaker asks, “Count 
them. And such a press of people.” This literalism is most jarring moments later, when 
the speaker asks of another onlooker, “What comes first? Can you see? Tell us.” This 
second voice then responds with a list the precision of which is beyond the scope of 
average human cognition. 
5,800,000 rifles and carbines 
 102,000 machine guns, 
 28,000 trench mortars, 
 53,000 field and heavy guns, 
I cannot tell how many projectiles, mines and fuses, 
13,000 aeroplanes, 
24,000 aeroplane engines, 
 50,000 ammunition waggons, 
now 55,000 army waggons, 
 11,000 field kitchens, 
 1,150 field bakeries. 
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In the space of reading these items off the list, the entire triumphal march has passed 
before the eyes of the onlookers, who still eagerly await the Führer. A voice says, with 
near comical understatement, “What a time that took.” Then the entire march is 
dismissed, as attention is diverted once again towards the Führer. 
 It is in this moment that the poem transitions from a documentary, 
representational register to a poetic, investigative one. Specifically, the speaker 
emphasizes the act of seeing. 
  Look 
 There he is now, look: 
The word “Look,” capitalized, indented, and on its own line, is then followed by a 
description of the Führer. 
 There is no interrogation in his eyes 
The act of seeing is met with an absence of seeing; the poem is concerned with what it 
means to represent such vapidity, emptiness, or what I have called elsewhere, failure. 
And this failure is emphasized by Eliot’s allusion to Four Quartets. 
  Look 
 There he is now, look: 
 There is no interrogation in his eyes 
 Or in the hands, quiet over the horse’s neck, 
 And in the eyes watchful, waiting, perceiving, indifferent. 
 O hidden under the dove’s wing, hidden in the turtle’s breast, 
 Under the palmtree at noon, under the running water 
 At the still point of the turning world. O hidden. 
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The repetition of the word hidden, not to mention its apostrophizing, points to the 
committee, or regime, of interpretation. Like the skeleton key in Eliot’s much earlier 
work The Waste Land, the poem offers the semblance of carrying some secret meaning in 
tow. But the lists of literal objects – from stone and bronze to aeroplanes and field 
kitchens – harbor no secrets. Like the Führer, they are indifferent. 
 This indifference, however, does not actually crystallize in an image that belongs 
to Coriolan at all. While the shape of this clause seems to indicate that it is the 
indifference that lies hidden, we know it to be visible apprehensible by a poetic subject 
who speaks in nothing but lists of everything she sees. Rather, the indifference is hidden 
in an allusion to another text, “Burnt Norton.” On the one hand, the apostrophizing of 
“hidden” makes of it a noun, a dynamic condition of hiding and revealing set in 
intertextual motion. But the syntax also implies that something, namely this indifferent 
affect, is qualified by the adjective hidden. “O hidden... At the still point of the turning 
world.”  
“Burnt Norton” is a poem about hiding. In the first section, “the leaves were full 
of children, / Hidden excitedly, containing laughter.” By the final section, this hidden 
laughter is revealed “Sudden in a shaft of sunlight / Even while the dust moves.” This 
laughter frames, and is thus set against, the passengers of the third section, who most 
closely resemble the Führer of Triumphal March. These tube passengers are also hidden, 
in a sense, “distracted from distraction by distraction.” They are, in other words, hidden 
from each other and themselves, lost in banality amidst the sea of time. Like the Führer, 
these passengers exude an air of indifference as they perceive their existence in terms of 
“time before and time after” rather than “the still point of the turning world.” 
Here is a place of disaffection 
 103 
Time before and time after 
In a dim light… 
Neither plenitude nor vacancy. Only a flicker 
Over the strained time-ridden faces 
Distracted from distraction by distraction 
Filled with fancies and empty of meaning 
Tumid apathy with no concentration 
We are once again in the register of indifference, as the tube is a “place of disaffection” 
and its passengers “empty of meaning,” displaying “tumid apathy with no 
concentration.” The tube, for all its constant movement, is a dreary, vapid, and static 
place; it symbolizes the movement of the world “in appetency, on its metalled ways / Of 
time past and time future” without an ability to hear the transcendent laughter of 
children that remains hidden to its passengers. This laughter, as the bird of the first 
section says, is of “very much reality,” which “human kind / cannot bear.” The tube 
represents this inability, this imposition of the illusion of reality, of being stuck in 
temporality. Eliot, it would seem, is trying to rescue us from this fake reality, what we 
might call the realm of politics, which is breeding indifference and apathy. On the one 
hand, this intertextual and allusive gesture linking Coriolan to “Burnt Norton” is a 
statement for art’s power to overcome the political and engage the pre-political. Coriolan, 
however, is testament to the ultimate failure and inadequacy with which art is met in 
this attempt, embodied perhaps most pointedly by young Cyril, who, firmly rooted in 
time, grows up between the poems. Cyril is a young boy misinterpreting the symbolism 
of the communion wafer in the first poem of Coriolan, “Triumphal March.” In the second 
poem, “Difficulties of a Statesman,” he 
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is appointed telephone operator 
At a salary of one pound ten a week rising by annuel increments of five shillings 
To two pounds ten a week; with a bonus of thirty shillings at Christmas 
And one week’s leave a year. 
 This hidden laughter of children is conspicuously absent from Triumphal March. 
Rather than playing in a garden, or even going to the country, the child in this poem is 
forced to go to church. And rather than the deeply symbolic gesture of laughing, the 
child flatly reports what it believes to be eating – not the body of Christ, which operates 
on a symbolic level, but simply “crumpets.” 
 (And Easter Day, we didn’t get to the country, 
 So we took young Cyril to church. And they rang a bell 
 And he said right out loud, crumpets.) 
The displacement of laughter for crumpets is therefore not only the displacement of 
transcendence for quotidian banality, but it is also the displacement of art for politics. 
Misreading the communion wafer as a crumpet mirrors the collective enchantment of 
the masses by the Führer. The ensuing request for “light”– a device that enables sight, 
perception, and interpretation – is thus not only hopeless, but also self-referential/ironic. 
Like the poem, the Führer, who himself is “artful,” denies the possibility of 
interpretation, supplanting it with the same indifference experienced by the onlookers, 
egos who recite lists of only that which they literally “perceive” before them.  
 The poem concludes where it began, with the onlookers completing the list of 
what they see in front of them, in this case soldiers lining up. The fact that these lines are 
written in French does not just reinforce the material flatness, the literalness, of the 
poem’s images, or their fundamental indecipherability, but also serves as an allusion to 
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the Action Française leader Charles Maurras. “[B]ut it seems a failure of realization in the 
poem itself that the appropriate tone only becomes apparent when we are aware of the 
source, a passage from Charles Maurras’s L’Avenir de l’Intelligence in which a writer is 
ironically presented as talking excitedly about a procession in honour of some mediocre 
writer. The story is received incredulously: ‘Et les soldats faisaient la haie? – Ils la 
faisaient’” (Scofield 184).  
This reference not only emphasizes the leader’s mediocrity, but also his attempts 
at artistry, as the soldiers in Maurras’s text line up to celebrate a writer. For Stefan 
George, the trope of the writer as leader allegorizes the complicity of the poetic, by 
performing indifference, in the establishment of political indeterminacy. Eliot, however, 
works primarily by way of the symbol. The utter symbolic emptiness of the images in 
“Triumphal March” thus serves the poem’s unifying symbol of inadequacy. As an 
inversion of George’s trope, the figure of the leader as writer expresses poetic, and thus 
human, failure. Such failure specifically (re)produces the inadequacy of fascist politics, 
namely as they are embodied by Shakespeare’s Coriolanus. Such politics breed the air of 
indifference captured by the passengers in the tube, allegorizing the very human 
conditions that, Eliot affirms, the failure of poetry actually overcomes. For in failing, 
poetry nonetheless exposes such indifference and thus challenges Nolte’s concept of the 
fascist “resistance to transcendence.” 
This is precisely the fact of Coriolanus in Shakespeare’s play, who finds his 
identity as a ruler captured by the symbol of the eagle. Coriolanus makes this 
comparison twice during the play. The first instance occurs during Act III, when he 
makes his authoritarian and anti-democratic claim for meritocratic or, in the case of 
Eliot’s poem, more plainly fascist leadership. 
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Thus we debase 
The nature of our seats and make the rabble 
Call our cares fears; which will in time 
Break ope the locks o’ the senate and bring in 
The crows to peck the eagles. 
In this metaphor, Coriolanus refers to the masses, which Brutius and Sicinius have 
organized to challenge his leadership, as “crows.” He himself, however, is one of the 
eagles, those divinely (or privately) selected to lead without the burden of a popular 
vote. In the final scene of the play, in a reference to his ability to persuade the Volscians 
to attack Rome, he employs the same metaphor. “[L]ike an eagle in a dove-cote, I / 
Flutter'd your Volscians in Corioli.” The eagle thus symbolizes the potency of 
Coriolanus’s leadership, both his courage and charisma. In the final scenes of the play, 
however, Coriolanus is not only convinced to agree to a peace treaty with the Romans, 
but he is also murdered for this treaty, which Aufidius, leader of the Volscians, 
considers betrayal. 
 The eagle thus yields to, and is in fact undone by, the doves and crows that his 
analogy discredits. This is quite the same fate as the leader of “Triumphal March,” 
whose coterie is decorated with “so many eagles” and whose ultimate demise is his own 
indifference, a failure symbolized formally by the poem itself. This failure is also alluded 
to intertextually, as Coriolanus is mentioned in Part V of The Waste Land in conjunction 
with the key of interpretation, the temptation of which the poem presents, but the access 
to which its fragmentation always fails to provide. 
 Dayadhvam: I have heard the key 
 Turn in the door once and turn once only 
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 We think of the key, each in his prison 
 Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison 
 Only at nightfall, aethereal rumours 
 Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus 
The key to the prison of the poem recalls the committee of investigation at the end of 
“Difficulties of a Statesman,” a committee perhaps to investigate that which is hidden, 
“o hidden,” throughout the poem. The key does not free one from the prison of meaning 
but rather confirms that prison, such that the only way to make sense of the world is to 
acknowledge and affirm our inability to make sense of the world. This impossible 
epistemology is the prison that has broken Coriolanus and led to his demise. Knowing 
the world through peace or knowing the world through war are both paths that lead to 
the undoing of Coriolanus, whether by frantic crow or docile dove. 
 These “aethereal rumours” at nightfall, Eliot’s invocation of poetry itself, are the 
only means through which Coriolanus can be recuperated. If the walls of the prison, like 
the committee of investigation, represent the limits of human knowledge, then it is only 
that which exists in the divine ether, beyond the realm of human experience, that can 
reveal glimpses of such limits and even make such experience tolerable. This is the task, 
for example, of Four Quartets. These glimpses, however, are rumors, they are the 
inference of experience rather than experience itself, and thus can only operate in poetic 
language. The affirmation of human failure made possible by such language, the revival 
of a broken Coriolanus, however, always ends in failure; it can only work “for a 
moment.”  
 In this sense, Eliot’s unfinished poetic sequence about fascism is really a 
reiteration of themes that he had begun developing in The Waste Land and continued 
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developing through Four Quartets and beyond: that which seduces us and tempts us 
with the illusion of permanence, from the London tube to fascism, can only ever help us 
acknowledge and affirm our own impermanence. It is this tension that continues in 
“Difficulties of a Statesman,” which opens with a reference to Isaiah 40, verse 6. “And 
what shall I cry? All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the 
field.” This metaphor is put specifically into the context of faith two verses later. “The 
grass witherith, the flower fadeth: but the word of our God shall stand forever.” In the 
final verse of this chapter, the eagle symbolizes this devoted follower of God. “But those 
that wait upon the LORD shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as 
eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; and they shall walk, and not faint.” Like 
Coriolanus, who compares himself to an eagle and is momentarily revived in The Waste 
Land, the faithful followers of God will have their strength “renewed” and “mount up 
with wings as eagles.” Coriolan the statesman of Eliot’s poem recognizes that he too is 
mortal, that his flesh is like the grass that will wither and the flowers that will fade. 
Towards the end of the poem, in fact, Coriolan presents images of dying flowers. “There 
the cyclamen spreads its wings, there the clematis droops over the lintel.” The 
uncommon nature of these flowers, as symbols of mortality, means they are somewhat 
obscured, or “hidden,” in the text.  
Whereas “Triumphal March” is structured around the hiding of the “secret” of 
human mortality, “Difficulties of a Statesman” is structured around the attempt to 
reveal that secret. 
May we not be  
O hidden 
Hidden in the stillness of noon, in the silent croaking night.”  
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While the names of the flowers obscure the reference, the whole point of “Difficulties of 
a Statesman” is to investigate. The investigation of fascism, which Eliot ultimately 
deemed a failure, thus becomes a model of investigating human finitude, which Eliot 
also deemed a failure, a working backward from the political to the pre-political.  
The primary trope of investigation in “Difficulties of a Statesman” is that of the 
committee. Coriolan’s desperate compulsion throughout the poem to instate more and 
more bureaucracy, more and more committees, represents his attempt to artificially, and 
politically, overcome the limits imposed on us by finitude. One need only think of the 
films of Leni Riefenstahl, as the camera slowly pans out over a mass rally, the 
incalculable number of participants reminiscent of Kant’s mathematical sublime. There 
is a compulsive insistence to form committees such that the word “committee” or 
“commission” is repeated fourteen times in a poem of fifty-four lines, a rate of once 
every four lines. There is really an absurd quality to this repetition such that at one 
point, “A committee has been appointed to nominate a commission.” This repetition 
speaks to the way in which the poem strives formally to achieve the same sensation of 
awe that was the aim of films like Triumph of the Will. This transcendent awe, or moment 
out of time, which Eliot strove to represent in Four Quartets, formally mirrors the 
immortality that was thematically immanent in fascist propaganda. Just as death on the 
battlefield sustains the continued life of one’s people (or race), so too does the poem’s 
repetition strive desperately to sustain the continued life of the poem. The repetition is a 
kind of poetic death, however, as evidenced by the final repetition of the word 
“RESIGN,” which concludes not just the poem, but the entire sequence in medias res. 
While these committees reflect the absurdity of fascist ambition on the one hand, 
they also function internally to the poem as a means of insisting on the inadequacy of 
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poetry to capture the indifference ultimately proliferated by that ambition. The 
penultimate line of the poem answers Coriolan’s question, itself repeated five times 
throughout the poem, of “what shall I cry?”  
O mother 
What shall I cry? 
We demand a committee, a representative committee, a committee of 
investigation  
These are the two committees demanded by the poem in its final lines: a committee of 
representation and a committee of investigation. These are, of course, not only political 
categories but also refer to the sphere of aesthetics, concerned as it is both with 
representation and interpretation. That is, these regimes refer ultimately to a search for 
meaning and how it is constructed. Coriolan “demands” to know the answer to this 
question by creating his own aesthetic and critical regimes. His demand for these 
committees is one last attempt to aestheticize politics, to make the political into an 
aesthetic category that works by enchantment, the construction of illusions and appeal 
to the emotions. 
 Coriolan is a tenacious poem. Despite operating within the limits of high 
modernist poetic form, most notably the use of free, unrhymed, and unstructured 
stanzas, it does not aspire to the high modernist impulse to change the world through 
poetry. In fact, it aspires much more boldly to the inverse of this, to show with the 
humility he espouses in Four Quartets the quasi-Adornian position that poetry is 
fundamentally unable to do this. And the promises and threats espoused by fascism is 
what makes Auden’s position that “poetry makes nothing happen” crystallize in a 
specifically “modern” way. That is, Coriolan, as the working through of the relationship 
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between modernist poetry and fascist politics, reveals the mutual inadequacy of each to 
the other and each – so long as the poetry and politics are thought together – to the 
world. As Eliot began embracing Christian thought and writing more explicitly religious 
poetry, it becomes increasingly clearer that the stakes of poetry’s influence on mankind 
lie in its ability to render possible an experience with the transcendent divine, an 
experience that (while possibly somewhat anachronous in terms of Eliot’s biography) 
fascism insufficiently attempts to supplant with the facile and fallacious avenues to 
immortality that it offers, from the mass rally to the endless string of committees and 
commissions signifying nothing.35 
 In terms of the poetry itself, there can be nothing quite so humble as writing a 
poem that at times does nothing more than list items in a parade or state the specifics of 
someone’s salary. In these moments, there is absolutely no trademark Eliotic inflection, 
no careful understatement or deftly deployed tetrameter. There is, quite literally, 
nothing more than flat description. Such flatness, particularly at this moment in his 
career, is rather anomalous for Eliot. There seems to be something irreconcilable in his 
perception of lyric poetry and fascist politics, such that the representation of the latter 
requires the sacrifice of the possibilities of the former. It is such sacrifice that he pursues 
for the rest of his career, and it is possible that his fascination with fascism provided a 
platform for Eliot to begin developing the notion that lyric poetry, always a failure, 
imitates human finitude and thus provides the most adequate platform for thinking 
through what it means to be human through its immanent inadequacy to answer that 
question. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 As Weber understood, one prominent feature of political modernity more broadly is 
administrated life. Under fascism such bureaucracy, like the ideological promise of immortality, 
is an illusion, as bureaucracy is always subject to the word of the Führer. In these poems, Eliot 
seems critical not only of this illusory bureaucracy, but also the extremeness with which he sees 
fascism insisting on its necessity. 
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 Eliot does not feel that lyric poetry cannot depict fascist subjectivity, but rather 
that in this depiction it runs up against the limits of poetic language. The most striking 
example of this limit occurs in the conclusion to “Difficulties of a Statesman.”  
 I a tired head among these heads 
 Necks strong to bear them 
 Noses strong to break the wind 
The poetic efficacy of this first line, “I a tired head among these heads,” harkens back to 
an understated Prufrockian aesthetic of impersonality. But this impersonality, such a 
powerful trope for Eliot in his early work, immediately gives way to what we might call 
Coriolan’s indifference. The following lines have no subtle inflection and are nothing 
more than the repetition of fascist platitudes and polemics. They parrot the idealization 
of masculinity. The metonymy of “head among these heads” is transformed 
immediately, and even violently, into literal images: necks, which hold the heads, and 
noses, against which the wind blows. The metaphorical import of “tired” becomes the 
literal obsession with youth and physical strength. 
 This is the general movement of Coriolan. From the vapidity of political 
platitudes to the depth of poetic enchantment, the poem stages the oscillation between 
the two, the incompatibility and irresolution of poetry and politics. To be political, it 
seems to say, is to be not poetic, and to be poetic is to be not political. This may be, in 
fact, the all-important sacrifice that occurs at the end of “Triumphal March.” 
 Now they go up to the temple. Then the sacrifice. 
 Now come the virgins bearing urns, urns containing 
 Dust 
 Dust 
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 Dust of dust, and now 
 Stone, bronze, stone, steel, stone, oakleaves, horses’ heels 
 Over the paving. 
Coriolan recalls this sacrifice at the end of “Difficulties of a Statesman.” 
 May we not be some time, almost now, together, 
 If the mactations, immolations, oblations, impetrations, 
 Are now observed 
 May we not be 
There is no object of sacrifice and, in the sense of Girard, it would appear as though the 
sacrifice provides a way of establishing peace between the poetic and the political. That 
is, while we do not know what is sacrifice, we know that the outcome of this sacrifice is 
the proliferation of the absence of meaning. As an allusion to “from ashes to ashes,” 
human mortality, or what he calls “Adam’s curse” in Four Quartets, the repetition of dust 
serves to recall the failure constitutive of human nature.  But this failure, in both 
references, is linked with an absence. In “Triumphal March,” the insistence of the 
progression of empty signifiers, “stone, bronze, stone, steel, stone,” reminds us that in 
our end is our beginning; these words still lack symbolic import. And in “Difficulties of 
a Statesman,” observance of the various signifiers for sacrifice – mactation, immolation, 
oblation – reveal death and finitude, Adam’s curse, the absence of being. In Girard’s 
sense, then, meaning itself is the surrogate victim that ensures the peaceful coexistence – 
rather than mimetic violence – between poetry and politics. But to lose meaning is to 
lose poetry, and this is a loss that Eliot cannot bear. It is for this reason that he – and not 
Coriolan – insists so powerfully at the end of “Difficulties of a Statesman,” “RESIGN 
RESIGN RESIGN.” This demand counters Coriolan’s demand for meaning through the 
 114 
establishment of a “committee of investigation.” Eliot’s demand is – and here is his 
brilliance at work – at once literal and metaphorical. The poem does not end in 
irresolution, but rather with the firm commitment to cease trying to depict or engage 
politics in his poetry. That is, Coriolan, as metonymy for political engagement, resigns 
his presence at the same time as Eliot invokes the call for a re-signing of political 
aesthetics that concern the affirmation of human finitude in religious, rather than 
political, ways. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“IN EINES GEDICHTET WERDEN”: THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION, 
LITERATURE, AND THE NONPOLITICAL  
 
T. S. Eliot’s Coriolan thus stages the inadequacy of fascism to overcome human 
finitude, the failure of which its ideology necessarily rejects. Like George, Eliot’s poetry 
opens fascism to an aesthetic critique, laying bare formal contradictions and 
impossibilities often elided in the political or ethical logic by which it justified its 
formation. Such a deployment of the poem, however, was not implicitly conservative. In 
Germany, the “conservative revolution,” as it has come to be called, was not overtly 
concerned with the political goal of dramatizing in poetry the impossibility of fascism. 
On the contrary, for these writers, the notion of a unified German Volksgemeinschaft was 
not necessarily distinct from the rebirth of classical German letters. While many 
conservatives opposed the NSDAP, still others found resonance in their message of the 
Volk, tied inextricably as it was to German language and literature. For many of these 
conservatives, failure was not a poetic subject, though it was borne from and ultimately 
became a political reality.  
 “But what is a conservative revolution? Is not the very idea self-contradictory? It 
is, indeed, that contradiction that explains the failure of the enterprise. It implies a resort 
to the wrong means” (vi). Hermann Rauschning wrote these words in the preface to his 
1941 book Die konservative Revolution, his attempt – published both in German and 
English – to explain the appeal and subsequent failures of the conservative revolution. 
By allying with the revolutionary NSDAP, Rauschning writes, members of the 
conservative revolution found that “Nazism usurp[ed] these ideas in order to misapply 
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them to the single purpose of maintaining its power” (198).36 This was perceived as a 
great betrayal by many conservative revolutionaries, most notably perhaps Franz von 
Papen’s speechwriter Edgar Julius Jung, who was murdered in the Night of the Long 
Knives. However, as Rauschning implies, due to escalating tensions between the parties 
and the growing support for National Socialism, entering that movement “was the only 
possible means of guiding the movement from within and gaining influence over it… It 
was the obvious and the only thing to do. It may have been a mistake, but it was no 
guilty partnership in Hitler’s machinations.” In fact, as Rauschning continues, more than 
anything else he regrets establishing “the ideas of the need for inducing the masses to 
turn away from politics, and thus duping them, [which] were mistaken and misleading” 
(196). By dampening the conservative push against Hitler, Rauschning identifies 
conservatives’ complicity through political inactivity, an inactivity present in the way 
many conservative revolutionaries theorize the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics and that manifests historically, I argue in the following chapter, in the popularity 
of apolitical entertainment literature. 
 The goal of this chapter is to establish the role that literature played specifically 
in the conservative revolutionaries’ contradictory “need for inducing the masses to turn 
away from politics,” a need that rendered them disjointed and not unified in their 
mission to undermine the NSDAP from within. As Keith Bullivant argues, “Die 
konservative Revolution stellt in mancher Hinsicht die Kulmination des unpolitischen 
deutschen Idealismus dar, der ein integraler Bestandteil des geistigen Lebens !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 “Shall I give you a catalogue of all the things we wanted to achieve with the aid of Nazism? 
Tradition instead of radicalism, continuity instead of a rationally worked-out fresh start. 
Evolution instead of revolution. A form resulting from growth instead of a manufactured 
apparatus. Self-government instead of bureaucratism. Decentralization instead of centralization. 
Variety instead of uniformity. Personal initiative instead of tutelage. The individual instead of the 
collective. Property instead of independence on incomes drawn from the state. A Christian basis 
instead of that of the ‘enlightenment’ of rationalism” (Rauschning 197) 
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Deutschlands im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert war und den wir in unserm 
Zusammenhang als den Ausdruck der politischen Ohnmacht des gebildeten Bürgertums 
auffassen müssen. Die Vergeistigung und Literarisierung von an sich politischen 
Angelegenheiten, die gegen Kriegsende 1918 in Thomas Manns Betrachtungen eines 
Unpolitischen exemplarisch zum Ausdruck kommen, setzen sich bei ihm sowie in den 
Schriften der Konservativrevolutionären fort” (Bullivant 45). By theorizing political 
revolution in literary terms – rather than poetically allegorizing such revolution – 
conservative revolutionaries participated in turning the people away from politics, even 
tacitly giving such nonpolitical activity moral credibility. They implicated literature and 
the bourgeois project of Bildung in the active effort to found a new, if undetermined, 
social order founded on conservative – namely anti-modern – principles. 
In addition to annihilating political resistance and fostering enthusiastic political 
participation, National Socialism also produced and circulated a considerable amount of 
nonpolitical entertainment literature and film. One effective tool for coordinating 
political indifference, however unconsciously it may have been compared to political 
propaganda, was the dissemination of completely nonpolitical literature. In Chapter V, I 
will examine how National Socialists, particularly former conservatives, strove actively 
to reclaim political significance for ostensibly nonpolitical, especially neo-classical and 
neo-idealist, literature. In what follows here I examine a) how the contradictions of the 
conservative revolution helped to shape its failure, b) the subsequent recourse to 
literature as a means of overcoming that failure, and c) the Nazi appropriation of such 
overcoming as programmatic of a particularly anti-modern ideology of the Volk, what 
Ernst Nolte terms the “resistance to transcendence.”  
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Failure was precisely the backdrop against which the bizarre political hybrid that 
was National Socialism rose to relative prominence, winning a parliamentary majority of 
52% by forming a coalition with the national conservative Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
(DNVP). “Like all historical failures,” writes E. J. Feuchtwanger, 
that of Weimar was the product not only of the republic’s weaknesses and of the 
misjudgments of republican politicians, but of the strength and success of the 
republic’s opponents. The anti-republican, anti-democratic, anti-parliamentary, 
anti-Semitic, anti-liberal stream was very broad and diverse in Germany after 
1918. Many sectional groups, artisans, shopkeepers, white-collar employees, 
peasants, landowners, house owners, heavy industry, the Mittelstand generally, 
fashioned for themselves ideologies that were loosely related to each other and to 
anti-republicanis. (323) 
The DNVP, whose immediate ancestor was the Conservative Party, formed after the 
November Revolution of 1918. It was comprised of several conservative factions, 
including virulent anti-Semites (Jews were banned from joining the party from its 
inception), industrialists, monarchists, and rural landowners. Generally speaking, the 
party was split between extreme nationalists and moderate conservatives, those 
vehemently opposed to the liberal principles of the Weimar Republic and those who 
encouraged the party to work with the Republic. This divide manifested especially 
lucidly in the context of debate in 1924 surrounding the Dawes Plan, an American plan 
to address the disasters of hyperinflation that occurred in 1923 by ending the Allied 
occupation of the Ruhr. While moderates wanted to adopt the plan in an effort to 
appease foreign interests, there was particularly strong opposition among the more 
extreme nationalist factions within the Reichstag, including many members of the 
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DNVP, which, with 106 seats, had the most seats: six more than the SPD and three times 
as many as the NSDAP. Recorded as one of the most dramatic votes of its time, the 
DNVP split the votes for and against the Dawes plan, allowing adoption to pass by 20 
votes.  
The total number of delegates who had deposited ballots was 441, making 294 
votes necessary for the passage. The moment the results were read—314 
affirmative votes—the assembly burst into disorder. Communists and National 
Socialists brayed insults at the DNVP; mocking cries arose from the Social 
Democrats. Only the German National People’s Party [DNVP] sat mute. Of its 
100 delegates present, 48 had voted for adoption. (Grathwol 52)  
The extreme nationalist and anti-Dawesian Alfred Hugenberg, who went on to lead the 
party to form a coalition with the NSDAP almost a decade later, supposedly called for 
those who voted for the plan to be expelled from the party. 
 Nonetheless, “the DNVP’s abysmal failure in its contest with the government 
over the Dawes plan was somewhat obscured by its success in the December elections” 
later that year, and “the party still hoped to exert an effective nationalist influence from 
within the government” (57). To do so, they adopted a “new, moderate position, which 
represented the majority opinion of the politically engaged Nationalists, [and] 
characterized DNVP policy from 1926 through the summer of 1928… Between 1925 and 
1928—to be sure, not without exceptions and opposition—the normal pattern of the 
DNVP’s behavior was that of an increasing acceptance of the realities of the post-1918 
international system” (206). As it edged towards the center, the party also remained 
closely allied with the agricultural sector, which had helped pressure a number of 
members of the DNVP to ratify the Dawes plan (48-49). This alliance began to break 
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down in 1928, when the Christlich-nationale Bauern-und Landvolkpartei (CNBL) was 
formed. While similar in message and ideology to the DNVP, the CNBL placed greater 
emphasis on the small farmer and, in taking away crucial rural votes from the DNVP, 
helped contribute to the decline of the party at the end of the decade. As E. J. 
Feuchtwanger writes, “[n]ot only had the DNVP never succeeded in become a broad-
based conservative party, it was now [in 1927] also losing its standing as representative 
of the agricultural interest” (Feuchtwanger 193). Concurrent to the waning of the DNVP 
as a result of similar parties such as the CNBL, resulting in a lack of consensus among 
conservatives, Hitler began distinguishing the NSDAP as a movement rooted in 
revolutionary populism, economic corporatism, anti-republican (Schmittian) 
nationalism, and cultural (völkisch) conservatism, a platform that became increasingly 
popular. These are just a few examples that led to the DNVP’s disastrous showing at the 
polls in 1928, when they won only 14% of the vote. It was at this time that the extremist 
Alfred Hugenberg was elected chairman. 
 Despite the popularity of the NSDAP and waning support for the DNVP, 
conservatives remained a thorn in Hitler’s side. In addition to conservative politicians 
and activists, “[a] problem for which Hitler found no entirely satisfactory solution at this 
stage [1925-1927] was the relationship between the party and the right-wing 
paramilitaries” (197). One of the most notable of such paramilitaries was that of the 
veterans’ organization Stahlhelm, which was closely allied with the DNVP and 
“comprised all the stereotypical demands and opinions of the nationalist right [non-
recognition of Versailles; readoption of the black, red and white; expansionism; 
authoritarianism; anti-Marxism; agrarianism; relative isolationism]… permeated with 
the front-line ideology of struggle, discipline and solidarity” (198-9). Theodor 
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Duesterberg, who was the Stahlhelm’s leader at the time of Hitler’s appointment, 
“refused a position in Hitler’s cabinet [and] claimed that the new chancellor would soon 
be running his underpants through the chancellery garden to avoid arrest” (Kitchen 60). 
The Stahlhelm had adopted this mindset in October 1926, when they “had finally ruled 
out any thoughts of a coup to overthrow the Republic and had determined upon a 
course characterized as ‘Into the State,’ that is, a policy of trying to change the state from 
the inside (Woods 75). 
 Because of the coalition formed in 1931 and general acquiescence of the DNVP to 
the NSDAP at the turn of the decade, Hermann Beck argues that the dominant 
contention in German and American scholarship was that relationship between the 
NSDAP and the DNVP in particular was generally positive. Challenging this 
perspective, Beck maintains that the nationalists’ helplessness to prevent the 
increasingly autocratic activities of the NSDAP was mitigated by a much more tenuous 
and even mutually aggressive relationship between the two groups. He explains that, 
in earlier interpretations, two elements of the seizure of power were consistently 
underrated: the random, uncontrolled violence that attended the Machtergreifung 
on all levels; and the social revolutionary thrust of Nazis that was directed 
primarily against what the Nazis considered to be the suffocating lifestyle and 
values of the German Bürgertum (Beck 213) 
Unlike arguments in favor of an ideological continuity from the conservative 
revolutionaries to the Nazis in the form of a hatred of bourgeois values, Beck 
emphasizes that the Nazis actually associated such values with the DNVP specifically, 
which were denigrated in the Horst-Wessel-Lied as “die Reaktion.” 
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 Contrary to “Marxist interpretations” that rejected what Stanley Payne calls “the 
significance of any distinction between the core fascist groups and forces of right 
authoritarianism,” Beck argues that “neither the Machtübergabe to Hitler nor the tactical 
alliance between the DNVP and NSDAP should be allowed to obscure the confrontation 
between the Nazi party and conservative forces in German society during the Nazi 
seizure of power, manifested in countless violent Nazi attacks with their accompanying 
social revolutionary overtones and rhetoric” (214-15). Furthermore, the Nazis had 
“instrumental reasons” for cooperating with the “traditional elites,” namely that after 
the revolution ended in July 1933 “Hitler needed the experience and expertise of the 
traditional elites to help run the complex machinery of state.” The old conservative 
guard, whose support was plummeting and yet who held out hope of having some 
slight degree of influence on the new regime, had no choice but to acquiesce to the 
leadership of the Nazis. “Thus, cooperation between the traditional elites and the 
NSDAP should not be analyzed as if it were an alliance of equals. To treat it as such is to 
be oblivious to the social revolutionary overtones of the Nazi movement during the 
decisive months of the winter and spring 1933” (215).  
 On the one hand, there are shades of ideological difference between these 
“traditional elites” committed to preserving certain social structures (namely those of 
class, to which the Nazis were vehemently opposed); the conservative revolutionaries, 
who acknowledged class conflict but were more concerned ideologically with the anti-
individualist and anti-democratic transformation of the German spirit and practically 
with the antiparliamentarian enactment of an authoritarian government; and the 
National Socialists, who were above all concerned with enacting a radical social and 
political reform that promised equal opportunity for the lower classes and was based 
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ultimately on a perverted sense of biological racism. This is not to say that members of 
the DNVP and the conservative revolution were not also anti-Semitic. The DNVP was 
actually the last bastion of upholding the Rechtsstaat, to which Jews had traditionally 
been able to appeal in order “to seek restitution for wrongs committed against them… 
After January 1933, the only political force in any position to uphold the Rechtsstaat 
tradition in the face of nazi transgressions, including the potential power to counter anti-
Semitic attacks, was Hitler’s alliance partner, the conservative German National People’s 
Party (DNVP)” (Beck 612).  
As Beck goes on to show, however, within the DNVP there was a range of 
degrees of anti-Semitism such that “on an individual level, there was some protest, 
empathy and occasionally also willingness to help.” Nonetheless, in line with my 
general argument that the intellectualizing or aestheticizing of political ideals rendered 
conservatives and conservative revolutionaries complicit in the rise, but not the practice, 
of National Socialism, Beck also highlights the problematic indifference or passivity 
ubiquitous among conservative nationalists.  
By not intervening to stop nazi violence and discrimination they implicitly 
sanctioned them; by not standing up to an all-pervasive culture of fear they 
allowed anti-semitic attacks to go unpunished. Other casualties were the much-
vaunted Prussian bureaucratic tradition, and, in the end, those very principles in 
which conservatives took pride (though no longer embodied) such as decency, 
the rule of law and the maintenance of civic order. Through their alliance with 
the Nazis, they themselves had helped to create an environment that doomed the 
very world order they professed to uphold. (640) 
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 The violence directed by the National Socialists toward national conservatives 
and conservative revolutionaries served in part to mitigate, foster, and encourage 
political passivity by discouraging and punishing dissent. When conservatives did not 
accede to Nazi reforms, they were often threatened and, in a particularly notable 
instance for this discussion of the conservative revolution, murdered. One of the most 
important conservative leaders responsible for Hitler’s rise to power was Franz von 
Papen, “a Catholic conservative from Westphalia who served as chancellor from June 1 
to December 3, 1932, and then as Hitler’s vice-chancellor from January 30, 1933 to July 
30, 1934 (Jones 273). Larry Eugene Jones describes Papen as “an opportunist without 
much in the way of a moral center,… an agent of Germany’s industrial elite, or… as a 
person with unabashed sympathy for the fascist experiments in Italy, Spain, and 
Austria.” Jones proceeds in his article to emphasize that his “core values were rooted in 
the conservative Catholic milieu of Rhenish-Westphalian aristocracy” (273). As Georg 
Denzler has recently shown, Papen played a considerable role in the Reichskonkordat of 
1933, whereby the Vatican agreed that bishops would swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler’s 
regime in exchange for financial support for Catholic schools and the promise that the 
Church would be able to oversee administering sacraments and the naming of pastors 
and bishops. Writing for the liberal Jesuit magazine America in 2003, Robert Krieg notes 
that while the relationship between Hitler and the Church was not entirely amicable, 
such discontent was often kept secret from the general German Catholic public. While 
there was considerable dismay over the Konkordat, particularly concerning whether 
Hitler would honor it, “Pious XI, Pious XII, and the German bishops avoided public 
disagreements with the Third Reich, choosing instead to voice their protests in 
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confidential messages and behind closed doors. As a result, German Catholics were 
puzzled by the silence of church officials amid Nazi injustices” (Krieg 17). 
 Such silence, or public propitiation, was also characteristic of Franz von Papen, 
arguably the most influential Catholic politician at the time. In the months leading up to 
Papen’s acceptance of the vice-chancellorship under Hitler, his relationship with the 
Center party had become strained. “[T]he deep and ultimately irreconcilable breach that 
developed in Papen’s relations with the Center in the summer and fall of 1932 left him 
without a reliable political base at the precise moment when he began to negotiate with 
Hitler and the National Socialists as to the terms under which they might join the 
national government. This, in turn, contributed in no small measure to the erratic course 
of action that Papen pursued in the critical months from June 1932 to January 1933” 
(Jones 193).  
These critical months were precipitated by Papen’s brief stint as chancellor, 
during which time his relationship with Ludwig Kaas led to “an immediate hardening 
of lines between the Center Party and the Papen government” (211). After being forced 
to resign and replaced by the more moderate Kurt Schleicher, Papen, along with the 
DNVP leader Hugenberg, played a major role in convincing Paul Hindenburg to elect 
Hitler as the new chancellor. In Hitler’s cabinet, however, Papen remained relatively 
ineffectual. “Papen’s deep-seated antipathy toward party politics—an antipathy 
intensified by his break with the Center in the summer of 1932—only contributed to his 
utter ineffectiveness as a member of the Hitler cabinet in the critical months following 
Hitler’s installation as chancellor” (216). The general failure of the Right either to 
manipulate Hitler from within or to pressure him from without predates the more active 
role that Papen played in the beginning of 1933. As Larry Eugene Jones has recently 
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argued, conservatives had been deeply divided at least since the Harzburg rally of 
October 1931. “Not only was there a deep and ultimately irreconcilable antagonism 
between those on the moderate Right who hoped to bring about a conservative 
regeneration of the German state on the basis of the existing system of government and 
the elements around Hugenberg and Hitler that were opposed to any form of 
collaboration with the hated ‘Weimar system,’ he writes, 
but even within the ranks of those who sought the overthrow of Germany’s 
republican government there was virtually no agreement whatsoever as to what 
should take its place once that had been accomplished. The events at Harzburg 
revealed a bitter split within the ranks of the German Right that was to resurface 
in an even more virulent form at the time of the 1932 presidential elections and 
that was to persist right up to and after the establishment of the Third Reich. 
(Jones 490-491) 
Papen’s speechwriter Edgar Julius Jung was one of the leading political figures of 
the conservative revolution. Two years after trying unsuccessfully to start the 
Volkskonservative Vereinigung (VKV), a conservative party to the left of the DNVP, in 
1931, Jung became the unofficial secretary of Papen while he was serving as vice-
chancellor. In this capacity, Jung penned many of the speeches that Papen delivered 
between February 1933 and June 1934 and, according again to Larry Eugene Jones, was 
“the driving intellectual force in the Papan vice chancery to transform the Nazi 
revolution into what he and his associates called a ‘conservative revolution” (Jones 143). 
In a speech from February 1933, as Jones documents, “Papen exclaimed that it was now 
time ‘to arouse all the forces of the conservative revolution’ so that ‘the three great 
pillars of the national movement’ – the Nazi party, the Stahlhelm, and the Christian-
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conservative forces on the German Right – could be spiritually fused into a phalanx 
capable of opening the state up to the cooperation of those who for the last fifteen years 
had struggled for a better future” (161).  
Jung, however, was hostile to National Socialism, which he believed “was simply 
another manifestation of the liberal, individualistic, and secular tradition that had 
emerged from the French Revolution” (163). Rather, he believed that “the course which 
the dialectic of history has assigned to these revolutionary currents [National Socialism 
and fascism], however, leads past the present to the overcoming of the masses, the 
creation of a new hierarchy, the transcendence of nationalism, the establishment of an 
indestructible völkisch foundation from which the völkisch struggle can take form” (in 
Jones 167). From his position within the Hitler cabinet, Jung strove actively to organize 
and mobilize conservative revolutionary opposition to the NSDAP. As Jones argues, 
“Jung and his confederates were able to mount a challenge to the NSDAP’s political 
hegemony that actually came much closer to toppling the Nazi regime than the ease 
with which Hitler succeeded in disposing of his opponents in the Röhm purge in the 
summer of 1934 might suggest” (143).  
Such influence culminated in the speech that motivated Hitler to pursue the 
Röhm putsch. Written by Jung, the speech was given by Vice-Chancellor von Papen at 
Marburg University on 17 June 1934. It strongly expressed conservative opposition to 
Hitler, drawing “a firm line between conservative authoritarianism and ‘the unnatural 
totalitarian aspirations of National Socialism” (Kitchen 228). Although Jung was killed 
in the “Night of the Long Knives” on June 30, 1934, his ideas had been exceptionally 
formative for the conservative revolutionary movement, which, in having failed to 
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infiltrate the NSDAP, began in 1934 either to dissolve into its ranks adopting its ideology 
or fade from political view, a transition I discuss in the following chapter. 
 The failure of conservatives to infiltrate the NSDAP and transform it from 
within, ironically or not, recapitulates the general sense of failure that was salient in the 
illiberal consciousness of Weimar conservatives. One of the most influential intellectuals, 
Oswald Spengler, for example, famously described the west as being in a state of 
“decline” in his monumental tome Der Untergang des Abendlandes.37 In this text, Spengler 
develops a vitalist conception of history as a kind of organism, a system made up of 
“mächtige Gruppen morphologischer Verwandtschaften” among the arts, sciences, 
politics, religion, mythology, economics, and so on (Spengler 66).  
Ich sah die Gegenwart – den sich nähernden Weltkrieg – in einem ganz andern 
Licht. Das war nicht mehr eine einmalige Konstellation zufälliger, von 
nationalem Stimmungen, persönlichen Einwirkungen und wirtschaftlichen 
Tendenzen abhängiger Tatsachen, denen der Historiker durch irgendein 
kausales Schema politscher oder sozialer Natur den Anschein der Einheit und 
materiellen Notwendigkeit aufprägt; das war der Typus eines historischen Aktes, 
der innerhalb eines großen historischen Organismus von genau abgrenzbarem 
Umfange eine biographisch seit Jahrhundertend vorbestimmten Platz hat. (67)  
The past, he writes, is “ein periodisch klar gegliedeter, zielvoll gerichteter Oragnismus 
von Jahrhunderten oder Jahrtausenden” (12). In Spengler’s conception of history, each 
culture moves individually through periods of ascent and decline, transitioning over 
time from the early stage of “Kultur” to the late stage of “Zivilisation.”  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 He “is generally regarded as one of the most influential political writers in Germany after 1918, 
a view supported not least by the very popularity of his major work, Der Untergang des 
Abendlandes, which went through forty-seven editions in four years” (Woods 127). 
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Ich sehe statt des monotone Bildes einer linienförmigen Weltgeschichte, das man 
nur aufrecht erhält, wenn man vor der überwiegenden Zahl der Tatsachen das 
Auge schließt, das Phänomen einer Vielzahl mächtiger Kulturen, die mit 
urweltlicher Kraft aus dem Schöße einer mütterlichen Landschaft, an die jede 
von ihnen im ganzen Verlauf ihres Daseins streng gebunden ist, aufblühen, von 
denen jede ihrem Stoff, dem Menschentum, ihre eigne Form aufprägt, von denen 
jede ihre eigne Idee, ihre eignen Leidenschaften, ihr eignes Leben, Wollen, 
Fühlen, ihren eignen Tod hat. (29) 
For Spengler, “all events are determined, indeed predetermined, by the organic 
structure of a culture.” In this sense, “we see the emergence of two of the key elements 
of conservative revolutionary thinking – vitalism and activism” (Woods 133). Spengler 
thus draws an association between vitalism and a “nonlinear model of progress,” a non-
Hegelian construct that theorizes numerous, localized, cyclical histories rather than a 
master narrative of dialectical historical progress common across all cultures. In this 
sense, he was a “Lebensphilosoph, der sich in einer Auseinandersetzung mit seinen 
Kritikern rühmte, sich auf die Seite des Lebens und nicht auf die des Denkens gestellt zu 
haben. Er hielt in der Tat nichts vom analytischen Denken, sondern schrieb sein Werk 
aus einem ‘Tieferlebnis’ heraus, das er selbst als schwer erfaßbar bezeichnete” 
(Sontheimer 47). Concerned with vitality and affect rather than reason and intellect, 
Spengler’s highly influential book articulated a broader trend among many 
conservatives towards the Volksidee, the notion of a Germany unified by blood rather 
than politics, more like Spengler’s notion of “culture” than “civilization,” and opposed 
to what it perceived as rational, urban, intellectual decadence. It also, however, speaks to 
the contradictions among the conservative revolutionaries many of whom, as I will 
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discuss momentarily, were concerned more with reason and intellect than with vitality 
and affect. 
Bound up in Spengler’s belief that the decline of the west meant its movement 
into the stage of civilization was his antiparliamentarianism, part of a more general 
critique of Weimar democracy leveled by a number of conservatives. “Spengler war es 
auch, der die Politik des parlamentarischen Staates zynisch als Geschäftemacherei 
hinstellte. Für ihn war die parlamentarische Republik von Weimar gar keine Staatsform, 
sondern eine Firma, für ihn regierte in diesem System der Handel den Staat und nicht, 
wie es sich seiner Auffassung nach gehört hätte, der Staat den Handel” (Sontheimer 
148). Specifically, in a pamphlet published in 1919, Spengler proposed an alternative to 
parliamentary democracy that he termed Prussian socialism. Unlike Marxism, which 
was bound up in the materialism of class conflict, Spengler sought to unite what he 
considered to be the “Prussian,” or meritocratic, qualities of discipline and self-sacrifice 
with the anti-elitist socialist principle of community (Volksgemeinschaft).  
Preußischer Staatsgedanke vornehmlich als Idee der Zucht und des Dienstes 
gefaßt, germanische Gefolgschaftstreue als Vorbild für die im Staat und seinem 
Führer geeinte Volksgemeinschaft, eine äußerste Geringschätzung der 
politischen Fähigkeiten des Volkes, eine Verachtung aller konstitutionellen Ideen 
und eine damit einhergehende Überberwertung der Macht der einzelnen 
Persönlichkeit, die Glorifizierung der Kräfte des Instinktes, des Blutes und der 
Rasse, das ist die Summe der Spenglerischen Staatsidee. (198)  
This German state, Spengler insists, should not be modeled after England’s 
parliamentary democracy, as this would lead to chaos and powerlessness. Insofar as he 
believes government to be unique to each individual culture, only such Prussian 
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socialism, a uniquely German state, can possibly thrive in Germany. As Spengler wrote, 
“jede Kultur und jedes einzelne Volk einer Kultur führt seine Geschäfte und erfüllt sein 
Schicksal in Formen, die mit ihm geboren und die dem Wesen nach unabänderlich sind” 
(in Sontheimer 197). 
Spengler thus situates Weimar Germany in the context of failure, or “decline,” a 
condition brought on by the unnatural liberalism and democratization of the German 
State. Conceptualizing a response to this failure, his work sketches the basis for a 
conservative revolutionary ethos that, in its broadest and most general sense, began 
taking hold in literary and intellectual circles in the 1920s. “Indem die konservative 
Revolution das 19. Jahrhundert in Frage stellte, wurde auch der damit verbundene 
Fortschrittssglaube dementiert. Die lineare Geschichtsauffassung wurde durch eine 
zyklische ersetzt und das Revolutionäre wurde nicht durch die vernunftsmäßige 
Steuerung der menschlichen Gesellschaft sondern in dem Ergebnis einer neuen 
Gliederung des Vorhandenen und des früher Gewesenen gesehen” (Bullivant 33).  
While the conservative Swiss historian Armin Mohler has traced the term 
“conservative revolution” back to the March Revolutions of 1848, many critics attribute 
Thomas Mann with first using it in a more critical sense, first with regards to Theodor 
Fontane in 1910 and then again with regards to Nietzsche in 1921 in the introduction to 
the Russian Anthology, which was written between January 3 and January 12, 1921. 
Mann’s argument in this introduction both recalls the conservative impulse of Reflections 
of a Nonpolitical Man, from 1919, and forecasts the argument he makes in “Goethe und 
Tolstoi,” outlined in a lecture from later in 1921 and then published in its complete form 
in 1925. There is some irony to this fact, if we are to believe Mohler’s account of the 
“Conservative Revolution,” as both Reflections and “Goethe und Tolstoi” are markedly 
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Hegelian in their methodology. As Walter Morris writes in the introduction to his 
translation of Reflections from 1988, “Mann even began to think of Reflections as not so 
much the end of an epoch as a continual ironical tension pointing in a Hegelian sense 
toward the future.” Drawing on a letter that Mann received from the future Nazi Alfred 
Baeumler in 1920, Morris writes, “Baeumler said that for many years Germany had 
strayed from the reality of history and the power of logical thought as represented by 
Hegel. Spengler, for instance, was far from Leibnitz and Hegel, but Thomas Mann in his 
Reflections was a historical thinker. Spengler was a metaphysician, an eastern mystic, a 
translator of Schopenhauerian will into history; his work represented an end, while 
Thomas Mann’s was a beginning” (x-xi). 
Likewise, “Goethe und Tolstoi” saw Mann reflect on the synthesis of historical 
forces embodied by the fundamentally conservative “Russian soul.” As Clayton Koelb 
writes, “here the connection between the ‘Russian soul,’ which refers especially to 
Tolstoy, and the notion of a new vision of humanity based on a synthesis of opposites is 
explicitly made for the first time – a crucial step toward the grand conception of 
mediation set forth in ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’” (58). Like Spengler, with whom Barbara 
Beßlich has shown Mann was certainly engaging during this period after the war, Mann 
is concerned with the future of Germany specifically.38 “The 1925 ending reiterates in 
greater detail the notion propounded at the end of the lecture that Germany, the 
geographic middle point between France and Russia, should be the cultural and political 
middle as well. That middle turns out to be the home to the same conservative values 
Mann had been preaching all along, for it is the home of German nationalism and artistic 
self-centeredness” (66-67). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Beßlich, Barbara. Faszination des Verfalls: Thomas Mann und Oswald Spengler. Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2002. 
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For Mann, as he reiterates in the closing pages of the Prologue to Reflections, ideal 
progress is the literary aesthetic opposition of “Germany’s progress from music to 
politics” (24). But if literature is itself implicitly democratic and therefore political, Mann 
asks, “could it be my authorship, then, that, for my part, has caused me to further 
Germany’s ‘progress’ – while I was fighting it conservatively?” How one answers this 
question bears directly on the extent to which one believes Mann’s early conservatism to 
have been constructive of a revolutionary conservative ethos that sought conservative 
political reformation through an aesthetic revitalization of the German spirit. On one 
side of this debate would be an argument such as that made by Joe Paul Kroll. 
“Reflections, because it was a profoundly anti-revolutionary work, could not serve as the 
manifesto for a counter-revolution, and already contains the seeds of Mann’s later 
distrust of reaction disguised as revolution. The Conservative Revolution was a radical 
movement, whereas Mann’s view of life and politics were deeply ironic” (Kroll 226).  
Kroll’s account is a more extreme version of what might be characterized as the 
“apologist” argument, forwarded by a number of critics who maintain that there was a 
distinct shift in Mann’s politics from the conservatism of Reflections to his outspoken 
criticism of National Socialism later in his life. Keith Bullivant groups among such critics 
Peter Gay, T. J. Reed in his standard work Thomas Mann: The Uses of Tradition, Kurt 
Sontheimer (“perhaps Mann’s most eloquent apologist”), Hans Mayer, and Roy Pascal. 
Bullivant argues, however, against what Mayer calls Mann’s literary unity but ‘clear 
political discontinuity.’ (Bullivant 25). Kroll’s reliance on Mann’s use of irony, in fact, 
speaks to Keith Bullivant’s central claim: that Mann’s understanding of politics never 
severed it from the aesthetic sphere, “an aestheticization and despecification of the social 
institution he was claiming to recommend to the public… The republic is translated into 
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a purely conceptual entity, one of various near-synonyms for Mann’s ideal of 
‘Humanität’. As Golo Mann has said, his support for the republic was ‘literature, not 
reality’” (29-30).  
This reconciliation between the republic and German Romanticism, Bullivant 
argues, is what Mann means by the “middle way” such that his “political conversion 
had little or nothing to do with socialism ‘pur sang’ but everything to do with the 
defence of bourgeois culture” (34). In this sense, Kroll’s observation that Mann’s 
conservatism “stemmed from a general loathing of ideology, and a defence of an 
aesthetic realm immune from political judgments” serves to align Mann even more 
closely with a revolutionary conservative ethos (Kroll 229). As Bullivant argues,  
T. J. Reed implies that Mann… succeeded in distinguishing between art and 
politics in other than aesthetic terms, whereas… this was not so. The result is the 
setting up of a constant ideal which, though completely admirable in itself, was 
presented in such a way that there either appeared to be in many utterances an 
implicit criticism of the institution Mann was claiming to support, or that this 
ideal is seen as existing in an almost autonomous aesthetic sphere outside or 
above that of politics. (36) 
Mann, of course, is not grouped among the “conservative revolutionaries,” and it 
is not my claim here to do so. Most notably, this movement evolved over the course of 
the 1920s away from the defense of bourgeois culture out of which it sprung and to 
which Mann – even once virulently opposed to the Nazis – remained loyal. In 1937 
Mann wrote, “Conservative Revolution. What have stupidity, rebelliousness and 
malevolence, what has well-read brutality made of this term which was once spoken by 
intellectuals and artists!” (in Woods 113). Mann is alluding here to the numerous 
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“conservative revolutionaries” who went on to support the NSDAP. However, much 
like Stefan Breuer’s notion of “aesthetic fundamentalism” discussed at length in Chapter 
II, Mann’s preoccupation with “intellectuals and artists,” his notion of the conservative 
revolution as an autonomous, aestheticized ideal, does well to anticipate and theorize 
the many contradictions ultimately internal to the “movement.” From Herf’s notion of 
“reactionary modernism” to what Roger Woods identifies as the “conservative 
dilemma,” the paradoxes of a movement that addressed the decline of western 
civilization by calling for the reinstatement of a particular phase of western culture (to 
use Spengler’s binary) poses a number of theoretical and methodological problems. 
Furthermore, it can be difficult to differentiate the position of members of the 
Conservative Revolution from other revolutionaries similarly opposed to the Weimar 
Republic.  
Die neue, radikale Rechte ruhte somit auf den gleichen 
kulturellweltanschaulichen Voraussetzungen wie die neue, radikale Linke. In 
beiden Fällen sollte ein fundamentaler Bruch mit der bürgerlichen Welt, mit der 
parlamentarish-individualistischen ‘Plutokratie’, vollzogen werden, der nicht 
‘zurück’ nach traditionellen Verhältnissen, sondern radikal nach ‘vorn’ 
drängte… Das Verhältnis von Konservativer Revolution und linksradikaler 
Revolution ist daher nicht als eines von Revolution und Konterrevolution 
mißzuverstehen. (Sieferle 14) 
In this sense, as the positing of a contradictory and impossible ideal, I maintain that the 
conservative revolution was political only insofar as it was aesthetic, and in this way 
provides a framework for speaking to the complicity of the “nonpolitical” while also 
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distinguishing the revolutionary conservative position from the national socialist 
position. I therefore follow Martin Travers’s argument that, 
The Modernists broke with the dominant aesthetic of nineteenth century Realism 
in order to produce a literature which, through its philosophical skepticism and 
irony (Mann)… would transcend the unreflective commitment to materiality that 
these writers saw inscribed into the Realist aesthetic. In the final analysis, the 
Modernists saw the loss of received wisdom and convention… as a means by 
which a new sense of totality might be reconstructed through ‘the 
aestheticization of all perceptual or cognitive issues.’ The same imperative of 
transfiguration and transcendence also informed the literature of the 
Conservative Revolution. (Travers 8) 
This reconstruction of “a new sense of totality” and “imperative of transfiguration and 
transcendence” required conservatives to theorize a new kind of community that was 
cognizant of and emergent from the social and political landscape after World War I, 
which saw the homecoming of the front soldier, the prevalence of socialist ideas that 
sought to expose and criticize class struggle and conflict, and the growing ubiquity of 
new technologies. 
The writer most famous for theorizing how the conservative notion of a 
Volksgemeinschaft could stem from such a landscape is Ernst Jünger, who conceived of 
war and violence as an aesthetic, and inner, experience, most notably in In Stahlgewittern 
(1920) and Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (1922). In Das Dilemma des Konservatismus in 
Deutschland from 1971, Martin “Greiffenhagen thus writes that Ernst Jünger, a leading 
representative of that branch of the Conservative Revolution known as new nationalism 
and a major interpreter of the First World War, has an aesthetic understanding of war, 
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seeing it as a myth and not as the suffering and dying of countless people, and in this 
Greiffenhagen contrasts Jünger with Remarque” (Woods 78). This embrace of militarism 
and particularly self-sacrifice, as opposed to the pacifism of Remarque, is another 
characteristic attributed to conservative revolutionaries such as Jünger.  
His aestheticizing of the front soldier, of the experience of war, was not, 
however, a nonpolitical statement. “Dieser [neuer] Nationalismus hatte einen 
unmittelbaren Ausgangspunkt im Erlebnis des Stellungskrieges und setzte die Ideologie 
dieses Erlebnisses um in ein politisches Programm für die Nation” (Sontheimer 123). 
Speaking of his war diary In Stahlgewittern, J. P. Stern writes that, “[a]s in all dystopias, 
acknowledged or otherwise, the technology as well as the psychic values that are 
praised here are in the service of a conservative ideology” (Stern 194). Specifically, this 
conservative “new nationalism” that has been associated with Jünger was a means of 
distinguishing the revolutionary conservative movement from the restorationism of 
Wilhelmine era conservatives. “[O]ther new nationalists mock traditional conservatism 
for its restorationist outlook and for failing to come to terms with such key features of 
the present as technology, the city and the proletariat… [T]he distaste for the 
Wilhelmine era is a constant theme for the Conservative Revolutionaries, and it is a 
characteristic which distinguishes them from the nationalists organized in the 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei [DNVP]” (Woods 61). Indeed in the search for a 
Volksgemeinschaft based on the Frontgemeinschaft of World War I, new nationalists 
perceived the immanent threat that the “Frontgemeinschaft could disintegrate along 
traditional class lines,” which is partly to explain why “the two new nationalist goals 
which seem to be emerging from the uncertainty over the future are communism and 
nationalism” (Woods 61). “Es fragte sich dann allerdings, wer ‘Subjekt’ dieser 
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revolutionären Transformation sein sollte. Die wichtigsten Kandidaten waren 
‘Proletariat’ und ‘Nation’, zwei inhaltlich stark divergente, formell aber eng verwandte 
Konzepte” (Sieferle 144). 
Jünger captured this notion of overcoming the difference between concerns of 
the right (Nation) and the left (Proletariat) in his 1932 text Der Arbeiter. “For, as the 
leader of the revolutionary nationalists, Ernst Jünger, repeatedly argued, and most 
notably in his epic theoretical defense of this movement, Der Arbeiter, the Conservative 
Revolution stood beyond and above traditional ideological demarcations; in its all-
embracing energies, the extremes of Left and Right would meet, fused into a single 
movement of the popular will whose goal would be the destruction not only of 
parliamentary politics, but of all the institutions of the modern ‘bourgeois’ state” 
(Travers 3). Unlike someone like Mann, who remained invested in preserving bourgeois 
culture, Jünger represented a type of conservative revolutionary who associated 
bourgeois values such as individualism with an anti-modern outlook he saw as futile 
and naïve, even corrupt and soulless. “[Kulturkritische] Gedanken könnten sich ohne 
weiteres auch bei Ludwig Klages oder anderen konservativen Zivilisationskritikern 
finden, deren Position Jünger in den zwanziger Jahren doch durch heroische Akzeptanz 
der Moderne überwinden wollte” (Sieferle 162-163). Thus when Jünger, in 
acknowledging the realities of modernity and “following in Spengler’s footsteps, 
describes the coming of ‘the Worker’ or ‘the Technocrat’, he too couples his utopia with 
a recommendation for the speedy dispatch of bürgerlich individualism, socialist 
progressivism and the like” (Stern 78). 
In the period of the late-1920s and 1930s, Jünger’s utopia becomes bound up in 
the issue of modern technology. “The most obvious casualty in World War I was the 
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concept of the autonomous subject -- itself, as Junger insists, a creation of the liberal age 
whose value system and ideology were simply swept away by the dynamics of the 
machine age. Only those in harmony with technology, a new type of worker, can survive 
in the future” (Kaes 111). Insofar as this individual exists in a state of “total 
mobilization,” Jünger’s theory of the “worker” derives quite directly from his early 
emphasis that the experience of war awakens aspects of subjectivity that “bourgeois 
security habitually suppresses” (106). In a state of total mobilization, every “movement 
is functionalized for the good of the state” (112). The hard, laboring, masculine 
individual is rendered like technology, which operates on the principles of discipline 
and order, whose every function is to bolster the state into a singular, what Spengler 
would call organic, unit. Like technology, the individual works, he is a “worker.” “For 
Jünger, war was thus no longer just armed combat but a gigantic process of labor” (113). 
As Jünger explains, this extends to periods of peace as well as of war. “[I]n war and 
peace, [total mobilization] expresses the secret and inexorable claim to which our life in 
the age of masses and machines subjects us” (Wolin translation of Totale Mobilmachung 
127). Rolf Pieter Sieferle has argued that Jünger ultimately recognizes that the 
increasingly maximized potential of technology will lead to a one-dimensional 
“systematic” or “administrated” world. “Jünger kann daher als einer der ersten gelten, 
die eine Gedankenbewegung vom revolutionären Aktivismus zu einer subjektlosen 
Posthistoire vollzogen, die im Zeichen einer dämonischen Perfektion der Technik steht” 
(Sieferle 162). 
Jünger’s thought, no less than Spengler’s, is motivated by a will towards both 
power and deindividuation, two concepts that the conservative revolutionaries inherited 
from the vitalist, or “life-philosopher,” Friedrich Nietzsche. Donna Jones traces this 
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influence in her recent genealogy of twentieth-century vitalism, drawing on the 
Nietzschean constructs (often discussed in the context of the Apolline and Dionysian) of 
creation and destruction.  
In this articulation of the life principle, vitalist thought incorporates the machine, 
subsuming and elevating it to the status of an ideal conduit for the life force; 
technology alone is capable of providing the fullest expression of the Will in all 
of its creative and destructive capacity. The work of Ernst Jünger best illustrates 
the ability of life philosophies to construct a mythos of a life-serving technology, 
technology that extends an unmittelbarlich (unmediated) experience, which 
functions as the material externalization of identity and the ‘Will.’ (Jones 120)  
Assuming a close affinity between Jünger’s writing and fascist ideology, she continues 
by saying that “[f]ascist thought must stage and restage the sacrifice of the body at the 
altar of the machine as empty insensate conduit for the Will.” 
In his recent book on sacrifice and Nazi myth, David Pan focuses specifically on 
how the fascist conceptions of violent sacrifice (of the body) hinge on the anti-
Enlightenment insistence on the subordination of the individual body to the community.  
[T]he Nazi philosopher Alfred Baeumler thereby develops an idea of reality that 
J. P. Stern identifies as pervasive among European modernist writers after 
Nietzsche and that consists of a discernment of a ‘true’ reality grounded in 
violence that exists behind a superficial, ordinary reality… For [Baeumler], 
violence itself produces a truer kind of reality that can serve as the basis of 
culture. This move away from the aesthetics of sacrifice and toward its 
materiality ends up denying the importance of considering the specific structure 
of sacrifice that a ritual would affirm. (Pan 7)  
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For Pan, therefore, Baeumler’s violent and materialist conception of sacrifice opposes 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic and mimetic conception of sacrifice. For Nietzsche, myth and ritual 
act “as a mediator between subjective experience and communal experience in the 
sacred,” which is not the case for Baeumler, who “claims that the sacred can only exist as 
an outgrowth of cult rituals” (60). In this sense, “Baeumler does not see any connection 
between form and ecstatic moments in the subject because these moments remain 
confined to a passive inner process that does not refer to anything outside itself. This 
view opposes Nietzsche’s idea that it is precisely such an inner process that gives rise to 
form as the recapitulation of contradictions that extend from the experience of the 
subject into the ‘heart of the world’” (ibid.). Nietzsche’s aesthetic understanding of form 
as an internal process emanating from the subject is foundational for my understanding 
of the conservative revolution, particularly as it echoes Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s 
definition of the movement that I will discuss momentarily. Important to note here, 
however, is Pan’s reading of the difference between the materialist emphasis on the 
immediacy of cultic violence and the more idealistic emphasis on an aestheticized 
subjectivity. 
Ernst Jünger was aware of this divide between the “intellectual” nationalists and 
the “practical” National Socialists but saw the latter, increasingly successful movement, 
as needing the theory and ideas provided by nationalists like himself.  
[Jünger] refers to those who criticize the nationalists for their ‘predominately 
literary activities,’ and means by this their inaction. Jünger acknowledges this 
feature of nationalism and contrasts it with National Socialism which is 
concerned with practical political organization, but he totally rejects the 
conclusion that the two movements are therefore quite separate. (Woods 116) 
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Arguably the strongest commonality between the two movements was their shared 
disdain for the bourgeoisie, a line of thought that, broadly speaking, speaks to the 
credence that conservative revolutionary thought gave to the National Socialist 
ideologies of sacrifice and opportunity regardless of class. One nationalist group that 
emphasized this disdain was the Stahlhelm, which “published a journal, Die Standarte, in 
which conservative nationalist intellectuals like Ernst Jünger adumbrated [a] front-line 
ideology” (Feuchtwanger 199). Jünger’s “new nationalist,” or revolutionary nationalist, 
writing of the 1920s and 1930s represented an attempt to theorize an ideal, total, 
deindividuated community with a shared experience (of the front soldier) not stifled by 
decadent, bourgeois humanism that resonated with – and could at times be difficult to 
differentiate from – the National Socialist metaphysics of pure presence.  
Die Front, die [Jünger] zu befestigen sucht und der er mit dem ‘Arbeiter’ ein 
neues Sinnbild geben will, wird geschildert als eine Front, die mit allen Mitteln 
zur Fortsetzung des Krieges entschlossen ist. Sie will den Angriff, die totale 
Mobilmachung der Nation, bis der Typus des Arbeiters in seiner Totalität 
erscheint. Der Gegenbild zum Arbeiter ist der Bürger, der nie zur Gestalt werden 
kann und daher von der Zeit zerfressen wird. (Sontheimer 106)  
As Jünger himself wrote in the third essay of the trilogy comprised of “Totale 
Mobilmachung” (1930) and “Der Arbeiter” (1932), the treatement of pain privides an 
exemplary lens through which to distinguish between the liberal bourgeois citizen of the 
past and the irrational worker of the future. Whereas the bourgeois citizen desires 
security and comfort, the diminishment of pain, the worker, in emulating the cold gaze 
of the camera, will integrate pain so fully into his subjectivity that he will be able to look 
upon himself with a “second consciousness.” Unlike “modern sensitivity,” which 
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considers the body “the main force and essential core of life,” the sensibility of the 
detached and disciplined worker will consider the body to be an “outpost,” integrated 
so fully into those new forms of destruction enabled by technology (17). “The idea 
behind this peculiar organic construction drives the logic of the technical world a small 
step forward by transforming man in an unprecedented way into one of its component 
parts” (18). 
Jünger’s theory “was part of what became known as the conservative revolution, 
an anti-enlightenment, anti-rational, anti-liberal intellectual fashion that traced its 
ancestry to Nietzsche. It was partly a generational symptom, from among the roots of 
these attitudes was also the anti-bourgeois youth protest movement of Wilhelmine 
Germany” (Feuchtwanger 199). Such youth protests were, of course, central to 
supporting the National Socialist revolution. Regarding the notion of Nietzsche as a 
philosophical forerunner to these movements, Donna Jones, following Horkheimer’s 
“sympathetic critique” but also channeling Lukács’s “dogmatic reaction,” writes that, 
“Nietzsche is easily read (and I am very sympathetic to these readings) as an apologist 
for crude biologistic ‘thinking,’ an advocate for the destruction of the idea of the 
possibility of true human progress, and an enthusiast for wanton cruelty” (61). Jones, 
operating primarily within a postcolonial context, is ready to reproduce the logic found 
on the cover of Der Spiegel magazine from 1981 with a caption that read “Täter Hitler 
Denker Nietzsche.” While my own reading of Nietzsche differs considerably from 
Jones’s, the point is well made and a propos of discussions of fascism, precisely because 
of its misinterpretation and misapprehension of Nietzsche.  
Regarding the “polysemous” – to borrow from Jones – nature of conservative 
revolutionary discourse, it is important to recognize the various influences that 
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Nietzsche had on, in addition to someone like Alfred Rosenberg, Spengler, Mann, 
Jünger, and most conservatives, revolutionary and otherwise. As Kurt Sontheimer 
observed in 1962, with a long footnote on Nietzsche’s influence on National Socialism’s 
violent biologism, “Man konnte im Gefolge von Nietzsche und Spengler zu einer 
Verherrlichung des puren Vitalismus und der Gewalt gelangen und die Macht der 
gesunden Instinkte, das Recht des Stärkeren und die nordische Rasse als Inbegriff 
herrischen und heroischen Menschentums preisen, aber die Verwendung der Kategorie 
des Lebens ließ auch bescheidenere, humanere Folgerungen zu, die zuweilen einen stark 
romantischen Zug annahmen” (58). For many conservative revolutionaries, however, 
driven by “vitalism and activism” (Woods), there emerged time and again recourse to 
an aesthetic comprehension whereby the political failures of material activism and 
embodied vitalism were transmuted into literary experience. This comprehension was 
especially salient among literary writers such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Max 
Kommerell. 
In his recent essay “From Secret Germany to Nazi Germany: The Politics of Art 
before and after 1933,” Robert Norton argues that these ideas had a direct influence on 
the ideology and practice of National Socialism, drawing heavily from Hofmannsthal’s 
1927 speech “Das Schrifttum als Geistiger Raum der Nation.” Norton claims that “it was 
owing in no small measure to the extraordinary prestige, even veneration, that [Stefan] 
George enjoyed among his German contemporaries that it was possible for Hitler to 
benefit from the conflation of aesthetic and political authority George represented in the 
public mind and for Hitler’s form of rule to enjoy the legitimacy it did” (Norton 279). In 
his recent essay “The George Circle and National Socialism,” Peter Hoffmann makes a 
similar claim by drawing on George Circle disciple Max Kommerell’s 1928 work of 
 145 
literary criticism, Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik.39 Hoffmann’s reading 
emphasizes Kommerell’s use of the term “völkisch,” claiming it “denoted war, 
domination, and exclusion” (Hoffmann 290).  
There are, as Norton and Hoffmann show, a number of observable parallels 
between National Socialist and conservative political aesthetics. These include but are 
not limited to a) the impulse towards some kind of collective revolutionary ethos 
denouncing the evils of modernity; b) the fundamentally aesthetic nature of this 
revolutionary ethos (reminiscent of Benjamin’s “aestheticization of politics”); and c) this 
aesthetic nature’s form, constitutively violent and/or authoritarian (in the sense of being 
organized around privileged, what Kommerell describes as “name-giving,” poets). 
These broad observations, however, run the risk of eliding differences between specific 
accounts of this relationship that reveal how complicity can be both active and positive 
as well as passive and negative. While it would be impossible to empirically challenge 
the argument that elements of works by conservative revolutionaries contributed in 
some way to the success of National Socialism, and while there is a general, observable 
continuity between the conservative and Nazi emphasis on the importance of literary 
aesthetics for reactionary socio-political change, there are significant if subtle differences 
in how Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874-1929), Max Kommerell (1902-1944), national and 
Christian conservative writers in the early 1930s, and dedicated Nazi fascists in the mid-
1930s conceptualized the relationship between literary aesthetics and politics. Most 
importantly, conservatives sought to address the political failure they experienced by 
eliminating it from their conception of spiritual overcoming, which necessarily entailed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 “ [The most prominent examples of the views of George’s disciples] reveal affinities between 
the ideas of the George Circle and völkisch nationalism; between George’s claim to political 
leadership and the Führer principle; and they point up shared assumptions regarding racial 
discrimination” (Hoffmann 287). See also Norton, Secret Germany, 671-674. 
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the process of representation. Many Nazis, however, sought to re-politicize and 
therefore reject this desire for transcendence, re-inscribing it in a metaphysics of pure 
materiality and presence. 
In a speech from March 21, 1935, Hans Friedrich Blunck, a conservative writer 
who was serving as president of the Reichsschrifttumskammer, said that,  
der Dichter weiss schmerzlich, dass er damit an persönlichem Behagen, an 
Lebensfreude des kleinen Daseins und an betrachtlichen Stunden lyrischer 
Deutung der Welt verliert. Er weiss aber auch, dass sein Volk ihn braucht, er 
steht und ist bereit, sein Geschick anders als in der Zeit eines übersteigerten 
Einzelwillens zu seinem eignen zu machen und die Volksgemeinschaft aller, 
auch der Schaffenden, zu bejahen, gläubig zu läutern und zu erfüllen. (“Vortrag 
über die Reichsschrifttumskammer”) 
It is, of course, impossible to generalize “Nazi ideology” from the position of one person. 
However, if we consider Blunck’s argument to be representative of a position not at 
odds with the mission of the regime, and we consider the conception of the political role 
of poetry to derive in part from a particular way of thinking, then we can also speak of 
considerable shades of difference between conservative arguments and National 
Socialism. Despite the general attack on “materialism” put forward by his party, Blunck 
conceives of the literary in a materially political sense, impelling writers to abandon the 
subjectively lyrical in the service of strengthening the secular state and affirming its 
racist/racial(izing) ideology. This conception of the relationship between literature and 
politics is markedly different from those of Hofmannsthal and Kommerell, however, 
who conceive of political transformation as an inevitable, albeit necessarily positive, 
outcome of precisely that lyrical refinement and subjective experience that Blunck calls 
 147 
on writers to sacrifice. Whereas Blunck demands the suppression of lyrical subjectivity 
for concrete political ends, conservatives such as Hofmannsthal and Kommerell sought 
what Martin Travers, borrowing a term from Klaus Landfried, has called, “an ethos 
[that] might best be described as ‘the politics of the apolitical,’ a transcendence of reality 
that paradoxically, at the same time, allowed, under certain historical circumstances, for 
its greatest penetration” (Travers 11). 
On the one hand, these ideas, especially the significance of language for moving 
the collective spirit, do prove foundational for conservative writers and literary critics in 
1932 and 1933, such as Hans Brandenburg and Josef Magnus Wehner, who eventually 
joined the Nazi party. There are, however, even among these conservative writers, 
shades of difference. While Hofmannsthal and Kommerell consider the development of 
a new collective ethos to be an aesthetic project experienced internally by the individual 
engagement with language, Brandenburg and Wehner imply the urgency with which 
poets must work to inspire and enact material social and political reform at the expense 
of aesthetic autonomy. While Hofmannsthal upholds this tension between the völkisch 
expression of collectivity and the lyrical expression of individuality, Hans Friedrich 
Blunck intones its collapse, insisting that the latter must be directly served, and even 
effected by, the former. There is thus an observable continuity from Hofmannsthal to 
Blunck regarding the shared expression of the social relevance of poetic language. In the 
case of these five writers, however, such continuity is marked by various reorientations 
towards the question of lyrical experience. Though this autonomous experience is of 
primary importance for Hofmannsthal, it becomes further assimilated to and 
instrumentalized for the ultimately racialized and nationalist conception of the Volk. 
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In this sense, unlike the recent emphasis on affinities with National Socialism, it 
is necessary to draw on what Stefan Breuer names the consensus among arguments by 
those in the George Circle, “aesthetic fundamentalism.” These writers, he says, did 
consider such aesthetic fundamentalism as “Impulse für eine Neugestaltung des Ganzen 
schlechthin,” an impulse derived from Stefan George’s belief that art and the artist were 
imbued with the inherent power to spiritually and culturally remake and reorder the 
world (Breuer 8). He also insists, however, that this program of aesthetic 
fundamentalism, as the name implies, was not the explicit articulation of a particular 
political mission, ideology, or party allegiance, nor was it a call for direct (violent) 
political activity.40  Instead, practitioners of aesthetic fundamentalism argue that God, 
not in fact dead, has been transmuted into poetry that has the power to redeem all of 
German culture if only its gospel can be dispersed, internalized, and understood. 
Whereas in this case the poet holds the eternally spiritual and the momentarily political 
in tension, in Blunck’s speech the two are collapsed into one eternal people of which the 
poet, himself a part of that Volk, has a privileged understanding and over which he has 
considerable sway.41  
An example of this tension is Hofmannsthal’s application of the literary notions 
of form and formal overcoming to the individual and his or her participation in a social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 “Ich will nicht behaupten, daß es gar keine Berührungspunkte oder sogar Übergänge von 
[Neonationalisten, die schon um der Durchsetzung ihrer Expansionspolitik willen auf die volle 
Ausnutzung aller Hilfsmittel der modernen Zivilisation angewiesen waren] zum ästhetischen 
Fundamentalismus gab. Aber eine Begriffsbildung, die nicht imstande ist, die Differenz zwischen 
einem Hofmannsthal und einem Moeller van den Bruck erkennbar zu machen, verdient den 
Namen nicht” (Breuer 5). Arthur Moeller van den Bruck was a nationalist writer whose books 
were influential for architects of the NSDAP.  
 
41 Nina Berman has made a similar argument both conceding Hofmannsthal’s paternalistic 
conservatism but also insisting on its distinction from Wilhelmine and National Socialist 
ideologies. See Berman, “Hofmannsthal’s Political Vision” 206. 
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and spiritual order outside of literature.42 Imputing to the abstract notion of form the 
ability to overcome the horrors of the modern world, he calls for what Breuer names that 
world’s active “Reformation” via the internal transformation of the individual, inspired 
and mediated by the written word.43 It is with this notion of individual transformation 
in mind that Hofmannsthal develops the idea of a conservative revolution whose “Ziel 
ist Form, eine neue deutsche Wirklichkeit, an der die ganze Nation teilnehmen könne” 
(“Das Schrifttum” 41). 
A broad spectrum of writers have been associated with the Conservative 
Revolution as a historical literary movement, from Stefan George and Hofmannsthal to 
Hans Grimm and Adolf Bartels, all of whom critics emphasize were dissatisfied with the 
rapid social and political changes that swept across Germany following World War I, 
changes many experienced as the same crisis of modernity against which the Nazis 
reacted. However, there is no scholarly consensus on whether writers emblematic of the 
Conservative Revolution prefigured National Socialist ideology. Robert Norton, for 
example, argues that, “in the decades leading up to 1933 and during the twelve years 
that followed there was a concerted effort first to envision and then to enact the so-called 
‘conservative revolution’ described by Hofmannsthal” (Norton 271). Martin Travers, on 
the other hand, claims that,  
the hesitancies, inconsistences, and mutations of direction that they revealed in 
their work, their half-hearted commitment to practical policy, their, at times, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 “Während der Fundamentalismus à la… Hofmannsthal der bestehenden Ordnung entweder 
nichts entgegensetzen hatte oder ihr sogar unterstützend entgegenkam, stand derjenige Georges 
und seiner Jünger zu ihr in unschlichtbarer Spannung” (Breuer 225-226).  
 
43 “Hofmannsthal’s Austrian idea is the ideal of cultural and linguistic translation, and this is 
central to the importance of language in his mature view. For him the role of Austrians (and of 
Germans more broadly) was to carry other cultures across to the rest of Europe, to mediate, to 
translate” (Luft 10).  
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knowingly utopian projections for the future, and their own idiosyncratic type of 
ethical individualism, prevented the writers of the Conservative Revolution, 
however broadly or narrowly we define that movement, from ever belonging to 
National Socialism pur sang.” (Travers 10) 
Regardless, Hofmannsthal’s speech does not consciously or directly intimate support for 
any political regime or program. In Norton’s words, rather than “enacting” the 
Conservative Revolution, it is primarily concerned with “envisioning” that revolution. 
By thinking how poetic language inspires and makes possible social reformation, 
Hofmannsthal does not characterize such reformation in terms of a political coup but 
rather an abstract spiritual realignment at the national level, the inevitable result of the 
revival of German literary classicism.44  
This revolution was not a call for specific, material changes or an endorsement of 
a specific political movement, although the speech does contain nationalist overtones, 
and despite the fact that many conservatives went on to support National Socialism.45 
Rather than a social transformation rooted in the concept of the “nation,” Hofmannsthal 
desires “produktive Anarchie,” “das [geweckte, geschärfte,] geistige Gewissen der 
Nation[, was] unser schattenhaftes Dasein immer wieder ans Ewige bindet” (“Das 
Schrifttum” 30). Hofmannsthal’s understanding of nationalism, therefore, is less about 
German racial supremacy and more about the individual search for national identity. 
“‘Konservative Revolution’ ist deshalb eine Chiffre für nationale Selbstfindung, für die !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 This is not to say that the call for this realignment did not make possible the conditions for the 
Nazi rise to power, as Norton argues, but rather, as Breuer insists, that the political action the 
Nazis took was not detailed, either implicitly or explicitly, in either man’s work. 
 
45 Stefan Breuer argues that the speech actually represents “Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber 
politischen Formen” (Breuer 148). Travers also writes, “What [Hofmannsthal] was describing was 
not a clearly recognizable revolution, marked out by defined temporal and political parameters, 
with an agreed agenda, leaders and a unified political base” (Travers 2). 
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Schaffung einer Identität, die ihrerseits nichts Endgültiges ist, sondern durch 
übernationale Beziehungen teils begrenzt, teils bereichert wird…Hofmannsthals Herz 
gehörte wohl der Monarchie, doch war die Frage der Nationsbildung in seinen Augen 
unabhängig von der gerade existierenden Staatsform” (Breuer 221). 
By “nation,” then, Hofmannsthal means a community bound together by 
language, and by extension literature, rather than race.46 Hofmannsthal refers to this 
spiritually- and linguistically-connected community as an abstract “form,” a unity 
between language, spirit, and people. “Die Münchner Rede ist zweifelsfrei die 
hymnischste Huldigung Hofmannsthals an die französische Kultur, die er als 
unübertreffbares Modell der Einheit zwischen einer Literatur und einer Gesellschaft 
darstellt.”47 Literature then, as something constituted by language, represented or in fact 
was the spirit (or “spiritual space”) of the community. The unique individual’s 
experience with language will incite or motivate this transformation from within, a 
response to the “emotional imperative” of undoing modern society. Such conflicted 
individuals ranged from the Nietzschean philistine (“the searching”) to the “Wächter 
der Tradition, der konservative Ästhet, gleichsam ein benediktinischer Mönch, der über 
die Schriften der Nation wacht und dabei seine persönliche Originalität dem Kult des 
Erbes opfert” (Le Rider 277). Whereas the Nazi fascist Blunck, eight years later, impels 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 One could also speak here of Isaiah Berlin’s notion of a “Counter-Enlightenment” that 
disparaged rationality and reason as the primary means of understanding the world. For its 
relationship to fascism, see Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism 
from Nietzsche to Postmodernism 1-27, and for a critique of Wolin’s argument, see Norton, “The 
Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment” 635-658. 
 
47 With regards to Moeller van de Bruck’s 1923 novel The Third Reich, Le Rider also says that, 
“Hofmannsthals militante Frankophilie, verbunden mit seiner vehementen Anprangerung der 
kulturellen Krise der deutschsprachigen Länder, macht diese Rede nahezu unvereinbar mit 
einem Moeller van den Bruck” (Le Rider 273-274).  
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German writers to sacrifice the lyrical meaning to the cult of the Volk, Hofmannsthal 
insists that such sacrifice be made for literary tradition. 
The subsequent process of individual transformation, which will remake rather 
than abstractly replace the German nation, is a mystical one; it is rooted in 
Hofmannsthal’s famous Lord Chandos Brief, in which the author experiences his 
notorious crisis of language. In the letter, the fictional Lord Chandos (often read as a 
stand-in for Hofmannsthal himself) discusses his sudden inability to think or speak of 
things with language. Displacing language is a powerful and overwhelming feeling that 
Chandos describes as “ein ungeheures Anteilnehmen, ein Hinüberfließen in jene 
Geschöpfe oder ein Fühlen, daß ein Fluidum des Lebens und Todes, des Traumes und 
Wachens für einen Augenblick in sie hinübergeflossen ist” (468). This sudden unity 
cannot be expressed in language and leads Chandos to a loss of artistic creativity, trust 
in himself, and faith in abstract, conceptual language. Rather, Chandos privileges the 
experience of things in themselves as a transcendent moment of synthesis and unity 
with the world that cannot be mediated by language. 
Later in his life, however, Hofmannsthal fervently returns to language as the 
source of abstract and conceptual national unity, synthesis, and community, his stated 
goal of the conservative revolution.48 The spiritual drive and force is alive in the 
language that binds community together and is described quite similarly to the ineffable 
“Hinüberfliessen in jene Geschöpfe.” “Dies Suchen und Treiben und Drängen ist überall 
da, es manifestiert sich in jedem Wort höhere geistiger Rede, das zwischen uns hin und 
her geht” (“Das Schrifttum” 32). These men, who are able to tap into this spiritual drive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 “Wo aber ist dann die Nation zu finden? Einzig in den hohen Sprachdenkmälern und in den 
Volksdialekten… in beiden zusammen ist die Nation… Die poetische Sprache der Deutschen 
vermag in eine sehr erhabene Region aufzusteigen” (“Wert und Ehre” 435).  
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and answer his call, will also undergo a crisis, now positive, in which they doubt the 
efficacy and ability of language.  
Zuzeiten wieder wird er die Herablassung des Sprechens verschmähen, wird er 
durch Krisen einer Sprachbezweiflung durchgehen, die ihre furchtbaren Spuren 
bis in die flackernden Züge seines Gesichtes zurücklassen wird, und wieder 
zuzeiten sich emporschwingen zu einer Ahnung der heilenden Funktion der 
Sprache, zur Erschauung verwirklichbarer Maßgestalten.” (33) 
But this crisis will lead them to discover the healing power of language and thereby 
develop a new language, and their literature, made of this language, will become greater 
than itself: dramas will become myths, novels will reveal cosmic secrets and become 
Märchen. 
This process requires the experience of an internal crisis, the internalization of 
polarizing forces, which is then overcome by the spirit and elevated to spiritual unity. 
“Alle Zweiteilungen, in die der Geist das Leben polarisiert hatte, sind im Geiste zu 
überwinden und in geistige Einheit überzuführen; alles im äußeren Zerklüftete muß 
hineingerissen werden ins eigene Innere und dort in eines gedichtet werden, damit außen 
Einheit werde, denn nur dem in sich Ganzen wird die Welt zur Einheit” (40, italics 
added). The process of becoming “whole oneself” is attributed here to a poetic process: 
“dort in eines gedichtet werden.” The world can only become unified to those who are 
whole in themselves. It is this poetic process of reconciliation and overcoming, and of 
transforming these processes into language, that leads these men to “break through” 
into the “highest community.”49 These “Suchenden” who undergo this transformative 
process are not unlike Ernst Jünger’s heroic and self-sacrificing worker-warrior, whom J. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 “Hier bricht dieses einsame, auf sich gestellte Ich des titanisch Suchenden durch zur höchsten 
Gemeinschaft… Hier werden diese Einzelnen zu Verbundenen, diese verstreuten wertlosen 
Individuen zum Kern der Nation” (“Das Schrifttum” 40).  
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P. Stern describes in the context of Nietzsche and Spengler. “[T]his Spenglerian 
representative of the modern age embodies all the forces latent in the contemporary 
world. Bearing ‘totality’ (‘das Ganze’) within himself, he offers a total challenge to the 
world. The supreme value by which he must direct his life is intensity of effort beyond 
good and evil – this is his Faustian heritage. Discovering his identity as that heroic 
persona, modern man discovers his purpose and destiny. It is this discovery which 
makes the worker-warrior capable of that sacrifice whose most significant expression is 
written in blood. Translated from ‘metaphysical’ into plain historical terms: the war is 
lost – the war will be continued by other means. This is the continuity of war and peace 
which became the centerpiece of Hitler’s ideological programme, and which the German 
electorate enabled him to translate into practical politics” (Stern, DP 195). 
Stern frames his notion of the “dear purchase,” the theme of “moral 
strenuousness and self-sacrifice” for something just out of reach that he believes defines 
German modernism, around Rilke,  
his earlier images of angelic strength, of the smile of the Saltimbanques, his 
notion of world-creating inwardness… and all these images of Rilke’s mature 
poetry become both expressions and norms, both repository and source of the 
feelings and perceptions of an age. What colours the mature Rilke’s poetic 
oeuvre is the present of this supreme effort which, for him, lies in the exploration 
of feeling, in the inward assimilation of the outward world, for only by way of 
such an inward conquest is salvation – for him, ‘reality itself’ – to be achieved. 
(29) 
In this sense Hofmannsthal’s “Suchenden” can be thought of as making a similar 
purchase such that their spiritual overcoming will inevitably be externalized, resulting 
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in the restructuring, reordering, and reformation – in short, the healing rather than 
supplanting of – German society.50  
The process of overcoming has been transferred to the site of the “poetizing” 
individual – that is, the individual in language and, therefore, a spiritual community. “In 
his eyes, the poet dare not claim leadership, because that would mean isolation; instead, 
the artist is the one who engages and gives form to the historical experience of his group 
– not the creator of its future” (Arens 200). In this sense, the writer incites the nation, or 
spiritual community of individuals, to change by articulating, rather than commanding, 
collective experience.51 Such aesthetic overcoming is not committed to any social 
reformation, which instead emerges naturally from it. In this sense, the conservative 
revolution is less a political imperative and more an aesthetic imperative: to return 
classicism, like the French have done with their own literary traditions, to Germany’s 
literary landscape. 
Hofmannsthal claims that the writer, through articulating a budding collective 
experience of social change, inspires the individual transformation that can accelerate 
social transformation. Rather than ascribing a materially political directive to the writer, 
however, he speaks of the “mutual comprehension” of art and politics, thereby 
preserving a sense of distinction between the two and resisting a purely political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 “Indem die Suchenden alle Dualismen in sich hineinreißen und kraft ihrer Gewalt über die 
Sprache ‘in eines’ denken; indem sie diese im Innern gewonnene Einheit wieder nach außen 
tragen, heilen sie die Welt, führen sie sie wieder zur Einheit zurück, sich selbst dabei opfernd. So 
vollbringen sie in und für diese Welt, was die Märtyrer und Erlöser früherer Zeiten nur für ein 
Reich jenseits derselben zu leisten beanspruchten: Einheit, Synthesis, Gemeinschaft – die ‘Bildung 
einer wahren Nation‘” (Breuer 148).  
 
51 “Significantly, [Hofmannsthal] also begins to reverse the image of the poet-genius that has been 
cherished by the Bildungsbürgertum in the wake of German Classicism. In this vision, the poet 
cannot create or lead the nation, but must rather embody and articulate what the nation already 
is on the basis of its history and experience. The nation, not the poet, is the agent of national 
formation or change” (Arens 191).  
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conception of the writer. He describes the “highest goal” in such terms. “[D]aß der Geist 
Leben wird und Leben Geist, mit anderen Worten: zu der politischen Erfassung des 
Geistigen und der geistigen des Politischen, zur Bildung einer wahren Nation” (Breuer 
40). What Breuer calls the “Reformation” sought by Hofmannsthal concerns the 
organization of individuals who, by undergoing a subjective experience with language, 
are then united by that language, which houses the mystical spirit of their community. 
Unlike Blunck, who collapses the political and the spiritual in the concept of the Volk, for 
Hofmannsthal this impulse, to refer once again to George’s own statement in his letter to 
Bernhard Rust, is one that proceeds from the premise that, “die gesetze des geistigen 
und des politischen sind gewiss sehr verschieden” (225-226).52 This is not to say, 
however, that Hofmannsthal’s insistence on the primacy of aesthetic experience as a 
catalyst, intended or otherwise, for socio-political reformation cannot also be seen 
broadly to prefigure the Nazi attempt to transform politics into an aesthetic experience; 
it does not, however, reflect the desire for the collapse of these two spheres but rather 
their mutual “Erfassung.” 
Unlike Hofmannsthal, who died several years before the Nazi takeover of the 
German Parliament, Max Kommerell lived to witness the rise of fascism in Germany. In 
the 1920s, as a member of the George Circle, he was especially beloved by George 
despite instigating a number of quarrels with other members of the Circle. In part as a 
result of these altercations, but also because he sought independence from what George 
was then calling his “state,” Kommerell left the George Circle in 1930, not long after 
finishing his doctorate in Germanistik.53 While generally professing a disinterest in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 If anything, Breuer argues, George’s call for a new social order was distinct from that of 
Hofmannsthal. See Breuer, Aesthetischer Fundamentalismus 225-226. 
 
53 See Norton, Secret Germany 706-712. 
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politics, he did make several mostly positive assessments of National Socialism, calling 
them “brave kids” in a letter to Andreas Heusler from 1932 and saying of the first 
volume of Mein Kampf, “borniert, bäurisch ungeschlacht, aber in den Instinkten vielfach 
gesund und richtig” (Jens 26-27). In 1933, Kommerell briefly held the position of 
“Dozentenführer” before losing it in the same year. He became a full Professor of 
German Philology in Frankfurt in 1938 and joined the NSDAP in 1939. Although his 
1942 play The Prisoners was banned in 1943, he remained a prominent German academic 
in Marburg until his death in 1944.  
Like Hofmannsthal’s speech, Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik is 
concerned abstractly with the relationship between the revival of literary tradition and 
the improvement of the German spirit. In the preface, Kommerell immediately qualifies 
that the writer should be considered an influential model rather than a political leader. 
“Wenn der Verfasser sein Buch ,,Der Dichter als Führer’’ nennt, so ist er gewillt, die 
Dichter darin auftreten zu lassen als Vorbilder einer Gemeinschaft als wirkende 
Personen.” The book, he explains, is meant as a contribution to literary criticism and 
history. “[Der Verfasser] hofft aber, vieles, selbst das hinlänglich Durchforschte, in neuer 
Beleuchtung zu zeigen und so auch der Literaturgeschichte zu dienen.” Kommerell 
ascribes a fundamentally literary, rather than political, directive to the poet. He 
describes a poetics of effect whereby the writer is indirectly able to have a social impact 
(or effect some social change) precisely because he is a “Vorbild,” a precursor or model, 
of a spiritually-improved society. Like Hofmannsthal, he is not concerned with the 
materially political, like parties or protests, but rather emphasizes those aesthetic 
qualities that, when recognized in spiritually rich literary texts, will effect an abstract 
spiritual realignment. 
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He goes on in the preface, for example, to explain that by “Führer” he means a 
person whose work can initiate a spiritual movement. “[D]ann sind [Jean Paul und 
Hölderlin] mitbedingt durch das Erlebnis Weimars, so sehr sie selbst wieder eine neue 
Geisterbewegung einleiten.” In the final chapter, Kommerell focuses on Hölderlin 
specifically, who he says is not concerned with the educated individual, or even the 
individual at all. “Seine Sehnsucht ist nicht der gebildete Mensch, sondern das erweckte 
Volk” (Kommerell 466). This awoken Volk, unlike the awoken Volk of the Hitler youth 
marching song “Germany awake!,” however, is the embodiment of the spiritual unity 
that “plays out” in the space of the poet’s language. “[D]ie Einheit von Geist und Tat, 
der dichterischen Stimme mit der lauschenden Gemeinde, des Helden mit dem Volke – 
Mächte, durch deren Tausch alles augenblickliche Geschehen im Raum der Sage spielt” 
(466). The poet, therefore, as an arbiter of language, creates a space in which the people 
can access and realize their spiritual unity; Kommerell renders these “momentary 
occurrences” as moments of aesthetic overcoming made possible by poetic language. 
The writer-leaders of the Volk, while different from the humanists Goethe and 
Schiller, nonetheless have the same intensity and impact. As he says in the preface, they 
are “sinnbildliche, stellvertretende Figuren”: “sinnbildlich” insofar as they allegorize 
and catalyze social renewal, and “stellvertretend,” insofar as they are secondary to the 
poetry itself. Kommerell therefore calls attention to another level of mediation, for he is 
not claiming that the writer has a direct (political, cultural, social) influence. As the word 
“Vorbild” implies, the writer is a “pre-” or “prior-image.” Insofar as he is the one who 
puts pen to paper, he is the image that comes before, or leads, the literary image. And 
yet, Kommerell explains in the final chapter of his book, this image is itself not identical 
to the society that the writer is able to transform. “Von den Geheimbildern mit denen 
 159 
Hölderlin das erwartete Ereignis andeutet, ist soviel auslegbar: das Bild als Sprache ist 
das Kleinod das dem Volke durch seinen Dichter wird.” (481). That is, Kommerell 
conceives of the poet as the “pre-image” to the “image as language,” the poetic text. This 
text, conceived by and mediated through the poet as an artisan of language, is the 
“treasure,” the desired reality, that the Volk in turn is inspired to become through its 
engagement with that literature. Kommerell’s argument seems closer to Hans Friedrich 
Blunck’s, insofar as it emphasizes the collective rather than individual nature of the Volk, 
and yet there is still an important distinction. Whereas Kommerell claims that the Volk 
becomes its poetic representation, Blunck states the opposite, that language gives way 
to, yields to, or affirms the eternal will of the Volk. 
Kommerell’s book therefore does not claim that the writer should become the 
political leader, but rather that he, as a creator of the poetry that will mobilize in the 
masses the German spirit and will, allegorizes the social renewal and transformation 
that the political leader can then directly enact. As Stefan Breuer explains, citing the 
final, ominous paragraph of the book,  
der Dichter sollte den politischen Führer nicht ersetzen, wohl aber vorbereiten. 
Er sollte die deutsche Seele einstimmen auf den ‘Weltwillen’, der sich durch ihn 
offenbarte; er sollte ihr die Gnade ihrer kommenden ‘zweiten Hohzeit’ 
nahebringen und sie bereitmachen für jenes morgen, ‘wo die Jugend des neuen 
Vaterlandes fühlt in glühender Einung und im Klirren der vordem allzu tief 
vergrabenen Waffen.’” (Breuer 225)54  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 The full quote reads: “dem Volk…werden seine namengebenden Dichter die Gnaden der 
zweiten Hohzeit fassen helfen… ein inner ernstes Morgen, wo die Jugend die Geburt des neuen 
Vaterlandes fühlt in glühender Einung und im Klirren der vordem allzu tief vergrabenen 
Waffen” (Kommerell 483).  
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While this argument ascribes to the writer a serious and significant social role, it 
nonetheless does not claim that the writer is or should be involved with politics 
directly.55 Rather than lead the revolution, the writer plays another more mystical and 
prophetic role. He leads both the leader and his followers to, and prepares them for, 
cultural rebirth. In this context, it seems misleading to read the “deeply-buried 
weapons” only literally, as they are the instruments of a revolution that Kommerell 
insists begins with the exhuming of an understanding of Hölderlin’s poetry that has 
been “buried,” or forgotten, in German literary history. The word “clamor” can just as 
well emphasize the sound of the literary armament, the “all-too-deeply-buried 
weapons” of classical, spiritual, and folkish poetic language. And it is through the poet 
himself that the will of the world is sounded, or reveals itself, manifesting in the poetry 
he makes accessible to, and by which he arms and mobilizes, the leader no less than the 
masses.  
The arguments by Hofmannsthal and Kommerell neither preemptively articulate 
the orientation towards lyric poetry by Blunck, who believed the lyrical should be 
sacrificed to the new ethos of the Volk, nor do they reflect the position of practitioners of 
inner emigration, who strove to make encrypted critiques of the regime, an alternative 
(poetic) world towards which to aspire, publicly available. Instead, they reflect a 
conservative bourgeois consciousness, which persisted into the 1940s, and,  
did not see the NSDAP’s ambitious cultural programs as tyrannical measures; 
[its representatives] viewed them as a long-overdue purification process through 
which the truly important works of the German cultural tradition would regain 
their rightful place of honor. It would be wrong to characterize this viewpoint as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 “Der Dichter als Führer: In dieser Parole manifestierte sich nicht so sehr der Anspruch des 
George-Kreises auf direkte politische Herrschaft, wohl aber auf eine Sendung, die darauf 
hinauslief, den Führer zu führen” (Breuer 225). 
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either Nazi fascist or as an expression of inner emigration.  Underlying it was a 
nationalistic-conservative attitude based on these bourgeois and anti-democratic 
circles’ belief that members of this class had been trying to assert in their own 
self-interest since the late eighteenth century. (Hermand 144) 
This is why, as Ralf Schnell argues, it is not sufficient to reduce as fascist, because of 
“affinities with National Socialism,” the work of writers such as Stefan George.56 Broadly 
speaking, neither Kommerell’s nor Hofmannsthal’s argument recapitulates fascist 
arguments about literature and censorship avant la lettre. There is no indication in either 
text that the paths to spiritual transformation necessitated that certain writers be purged 
from writers’ groups or academic institutions or have their work censored or burned, or 
that the purification of German letters meant the purification of the Aryan “race.” 
However, while these texts do not explicitly demand such political activity, they 
nonetheless seem open to it so long as it results from a change in the national 
consciousness towards literary tradition. In this sense, it is more productive to speak of 
the general affinities between national-conservatives and National Socialists in an effort 
to a) demonstrate the broad appeal that the party courted and sustained, b) resist the 
notion that National Socialists were the same type of actively-political person and all 
vehemently believed the same thing, and c) examine the possible dangers implicit in, 
and historical complicity of, the national-conservative position that was, at least in these 
instances, embodied indifference to the drastic measures resulting from political 
reorganization, no less than the reorganization itself, following their political failure to 
infiltrate the NSDAP. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 “Die Balladenliteratur um die Jahrhundertwende und die Literatur der Jugendbewegung, Teile 
des literarischen Expressionismus, die um 1920 entstehende Kriegsliteratur, schließlich die 
Zivilisationskritik bis hin zu Thomas Manns Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen und zum George-
Kreis: Präludieren nicht auch sie dem Nationalsozialismus in einem Maß, das es erlaubt, von 
Affinitäten zu sprechen? Man wird diese Frage vollends dann bejahen müssen…” (Schnell 115).  
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One hallmark quality of the conservative revolution was its insistence on a non-
partisan depoliticizing of the masses. Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Max Kommerell 
stress the fundamentally literary-aesthetic nature of the individual transformations that 
will radiate into the broader German community. Jünger’s notion of the “worker” has 
little to do with liberating the proletariat but rather concerns a literary, Dionysian utopia 
whereby “the hyperbolic expansion of collective powers and the enthralled rapture of 
individual service to titanic projects radiate a fascinating attraction over many people” 
(Bullock 470). Expressing firm disdain for the impulses of Marxist class struggle, “Edgar 
Jung looks back as far as the Middle Ages for his economic model and sees in this period 
an economy which was not governed by bargaining over wages but one which imposed 
a rigid system on all concerned” (Woods 68). In this sense, Jung’s statement in a letter 
from 1929 that “the goal of my entire political life has been the creation of a 
dictatorship” (in LE Jones 148) ultimately amounts to his claim that the “aim of the 
national revolution must be the depoliticization of the masses and their exclusion from 
the leadership of the state… [it] must lead to an antidemocratic principle of governance 
or it is lost” (in LE Jones 164).  
This depoliticization occurred coincidentally with the failure of conservatives to 
form a unified opposition to Hitler. Fritz Stern goes so far as to say that the defining 
feature of Imperial Germany after 1878 was “illiberalism” and “that German society, far 
from keeping down the illiberal impulse, fostered it and formed it into a habitual 
response” (Stern xviii). Furthermore, as Margaret Anderson argues, the institution of 
universal manhood suffrage in Imperial Germany created an atmosphere in which 
Germans could practice democracy. “More generally,” she writes, “we shall see 
Germans rapidly transforming a segmentary, authoritarian, and communal culture that 
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professed to abhor partisanship of any kind into a nationalized, participatory, public 
culture, one in which partisan loyalties organized expectations and structured much of 
public life” (20). Conservative power gradually declined such that, “the fact that by 1912 
the Conservatives felt it necessary to make their support for ‘an unweakened Kaiser-
power’ their election them shows us how far the balance had tipped in favor of 
parliament (420). For Stern, the sheer fact that Germany had never had a successful 
revolution, in fact that “revolutions came from above,” has long-ranging implications for 
the rise and success of conservative, neo-conservative, and fascist movements in 
between the wars. Such movements were a response to failure. “An illiberal regime had 
been established in Germany under the best of circumstances—and failed. A liberal 
regime was established in 1918 under the worst of circumstances—and failed” (xxvii). 
One might add to this the conservative revolution, which, in trying to overtake National 
Socialism from within, also failed. 
In this sense, the conservative revolution did not actively fashion itself as 
complicit in the rise and success of National Socialism; quite the contrary, as a 
movement of the masses, many tenets of NS ideology were antithetical to the class-based 
aristocratic sensibilities of self-identified conservative revolutionaries. Their ideology of 
depoliticization, whether active and intentional or the necessary condition for spiritual 
and intellectual transformation, does, however, reflect one significant result of the 
National Socialist impulse towards disenfranchisement under the guise of 
empowerment. That is, the ultimate failure of conservative opposition is not the only 
means of understanding the relationship between the conservative revolution and the 
success of National Socialism. While Nazi terror worked against the conservative push 
for public influence, Nazis were also opportunistically able to benefit, however 
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unconsciously, from the conservative move, following their political failures, to imagine 
political revolution literarily. Through both close and distant reading methods, I will 
argue in Chapter V that the work of conservative writers embodies this desire in such a 
way that makes possible the argument for the unintentional complicity of the 
conservative revolutionary movement in the success of National Socialism to which 
many were so vehemently opposed. 
Drawing on the affective and psychological conditions that contributed to the 
rise of fascism, J. P. Stern writes, “Hitler exemplified the projective quality of modern 
politics. For decades all manner of resentments had pervaded Germany’s political 
culture. Hitler, suffering these resentments himself and sensing them in others, 
demonstrated how politics could serve as an escape from boredom, from failure, from 
self” (xxxix-xl). One could say the same for literature. The seeming interchangeability 
here between these terms, politics and literature, will be the focus of the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE OPPORTUNISM OF FASCIST LITERARY AESTHETICS AND CULTURAL 
POLICY 
“Every true work of art has, what one might call malevolently a manipulative element 
about itself. But it makes all the difference whether this manipulative element remains a 
means of realizing the essence of the work, or whether it is put into the service of 
molding public opinion.” 
-Theodor Adorno, “What National Socialism Has Done to the Arts,” 194557 
 
 
While witnessing the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Hannah Arendt was struck by 
Eichmann’s distortion of Kant’s categorical imperative. “What [Eichmann] failed to 
point out in court was that in this ‘period of crimes legalized by the state,’ as he himself 
now called it, he had not simply dismissed the Kantian formula as no longer applicable, 
he had distorted it to read: Act as if the principle of your actions were the same as that of 
the legislator or of the law of the land—or, in Hans Frank’s formulation of ‘the 
categorical imperative of the Third Reich,’ which Eichmann might have known: ‘Act in 
such a way that the Führer, if he knew your action, would approve it” (Arendt 136). 
Arendt’s argument that Eichmann was unable to think is based in part on this seemingly 
willful misreading of Kant whereby the individual (fascist) agent legislates morality 
through the anticipation of laws made universal by the decree of the Führer. While 
Stanley Milgram cited “the banality of evil” in his studies on obedience, Arendt insists 
that the moral failings of those involved in the Holocaust were a necessary part of their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 This epigraph immediately raises the question of whether I consider the Nazi poems examined 
in this chapter to be “true” works of art. To this question, I will simply say here that they were 
considered true works of art by those writing and publishing them, and likely by many of those 
reading them as well. In this sense they endeavor toward the status of art. This dissertation 
argues, broadly, that there are aesthetic means of disambiguation between fascist and 
conservative, “proto-fascist” poetry. In this sense, I do in fact consider these poems to be poems, 
and therefore art. This is in fact central to the argument outlined here. I do not, however, consider 
them to be worthy of recognition or praise; if by “true” is meant “good,” then I would most 
certainly reject such an assignment. 
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compliance, specifically because those actions occurred and must be judged in the 
political sphere. “[T]here still remains the fact that you have carried out, and therefore 
actively supported, a policy of mass murder. For politics is not like the nursery; in 
politics obedience and support are the same” (279).58 This chapter will consider the 
imperatives of obedience and support as they manifest in the aesthetic sphere, 
particularly its role in the process of total mobilization and the proliferation of an 
inability to think (empathically) from the perspective of another, what I have been 
referring to throughout my dissertation as indifference. 
The previous chapters posit that the conservative use of poetry to think through 
the political viability and ethical imperatives of fascism affords the possibilities of both 
complicity and resistance through poetry’s unique relationship with the emotion of 
indifference or disinterest, what Arendt calls “obedience and support,” as opposed to 
the emotion of empathy. The lyric contains the conditions whereby both the irrational 
fascist goal of such indifference and the anti-fascist imperative to embrace 
indeterminacy (Arendt’s call to think) can be rhetorically dramatized per de Man’s 
understanding of allegory. Primarily by surveying contributions to the conservative-
turned-Nazi literary journal Die Neue Literatur (formerly Die Schöne Literatur), this 
chapter will explicitly consider the first of these conditions, namely, the question of what 
makes a poem fascist. Following Jan-Pieter Barbian’s argument in his recent and 
thorough account of literary politics under National Socialism, I will argue that the 
difference between a fascist and non-fascist poem has nothing to do with an overt 
declaration of politics and everything to do with the role literary aesthetics play in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Invoking Kantian logic, she continues by saying that, “just as you supported and carried out a 
policy of not wanting to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of 
other nations… we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to 
want to share the earth with you.” 
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political goal of total mobilization. This resonates with Adorno’s warning, cited in the 
epigraph to this chapter, concerning the status of art after National Socialism. Adorno 
writes that all art manipulates; over engaged art “in the service of molding public 
opinion” he privileges autonomous art, that whose “manipulative element remains a 
means of realizing the essence of the work.” In this chapter, I will consider a de Manian 
alternative to this dichotomoy that nonetheless draws on Adorno’s presupposition of 
manipulation. Whereas the NS poem manipulates teleologically, the conservative poem 
manipulates intentionally, in the de Manian sense of indeterminately. By this, I mean 
that the NS lyric need not be politically engaged to nonetheless produce political 
manipulation, in this case the reproduction of the effects of entertainment literature, 
namely unempathic disinterest. Whereas many conservative revolutionaries’ efforts to 
theorize revolution in literary-aesthetic terms border on reproducing this same rejection 
of failure, the indeterminacy of the conservative lyric opens itself to empathic readings 
through its manipulation of language and simultaneous presentation of multiple 
perspectives, its ability to be read against itself. 
By disavowing the possibility of indeterminacy – in other words, by performing 
certainty – the fascist lyric is one that, within the socio-historical context of fascist 
movements such as National Socialism, rejects the differentiation of lyric modes. It also 
rejects that which Paul de Man claims makes a poem modern: incomprehensibility, “the 
more [the poet] is compulsively misinterpreted and oversimplified and made to say the 
opposite of what he actually said” (de Man, “Lyric and Modernity” 186). Specifically, de 
Man argues that, “the cause of the specifically modern kind of obscurity… resides… in a 
loss of the representational function of poetry that goes parallel with the loss of a sense 
of selfhood” (172). If the modern lyric is thus marked by loss or absence, by 
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“Entrealisierung” and “Entpersönlichung,” then the seeming truism that the fascist lyric 
is anti-modern can be grounded on its being marked by the destruction of 
representation and selfhood, or pure presence itself. It irrationally “coordinates” (in the 
sense of Gleichschaltung) lyrical subgenres, like the ballad and the ode, as well as theories 
of the lyric, invoking at once Culler’s apostrophic “you” and Abrams’s illuminating “I,” 
in a mode that is utterly transparent and immediate. In this sense, to combat the violence 
performed against the genre of lyric, Virginia Jackson’s project of reading the historical 
process of “lyricization” helps to illuminate the way in which fascism coopts the lyric, or 
rather, how the lyric becomes subject to the expanding program of cooption integral to 
fascist politics. Specifically, by forswearing the mutability and multiplicity of language, 
its capacity for representation, the fascist poem undoes lyric incomprehensibility and 
(re)produces the conditions of the possibility of the proliferation of fascist ideology. In 
other words, it destroys the possibility of Arendtian thinking and makes of its message 
of support the utterly comprehensible imperative to obey. 
To begin, it bears emphasizing that while until recently critics have emphasized 
the prominence of visual art, film, and architecture both in the Nazi propaganda 
machine and as the objects of censorship, there was a large market for books in Germany 
even throughout the Second World War. While many of these books were concerned 
primarily with völkish, nationalist, and national socialist themes such as heroism and 
sacrifice, there were also large markets for adventure and crime thrillers as well as for 
“high” foreign literature by authors such as Hemingway, Yeats, Joyce, Proust, 
Dostoevsky, and others. In his book Reading under Hitler, Christian Adam has come to 
similar conclusions, showing that books on topics such as funny war stories and the 
birth of organic chemistry had print runs on par with, if not exceeding, those of the 
 169 
immensely popular, anti-Semitic Myth of the Twentieth Century, which outlined much of 
nazism’s “intellectual” groundwork. 
Recent research by Jan-Pieter Barbian suggests that the Nazi fascist desire for 
total control was in part facilitated by its manipulation of reading practices. Besides the 
negative influence of book burnings and increasingly harsh censorship laws, however, 
the National Socialists also tried to positively influence what people were reading, and 
by 1941 memberships in book clubs rose considerably to 173,912 members in the 
Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), facilitated in part by the forced participation as a result of 
the program of Gleichschaltung. These memberships were both a means to circulate 
works by national socialist and national-conservative authors, many of whom were 
placed alongside writers like Rilke or Goethe in collections and anthologies. However, 
such books were not the only ones sold (Barbian 413).  
Jedes Mitglied musste pro Jahr mindestens acht Bücher kaufen. 1938 wurden 
75% und 1940 immerhin noch 50% der Buchproduktion der Hanseatischen 
Verlagsanstalt über diese Buchgemeinschaft vertrieben, insgesamt in jedem Jahr 
mehr als eine Million Exemplare. Dabei verbreitete das DAF-Unternehmen seit 
1935 keineswegs nur die nationalsozialistische Belletristik… sondern vor allem 
Bücher nationalkonservativer Autoren… und selbst Romane von Werner 
Bergengruen und Ernst Jünger, die als Regimekritik gelesen werden konnten. 
(469) 
In fact, as research by Tobias Schneider shows, of forty titles with printings between 
300,000 and 920,000 copies, “sind zwar zwölf vertreten, die dem offiziell verordneten 
literarischen Kanon zugerechnet werden können…. Eine Detailanalyse für die 
Zeiträume 1933 bis 1935, 1936 bis 1938 und 1939 bis 1945 ergibt jedoch eine deutlich 
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abfallende Absatzkurve für diese systemkonforme Literatur und einen kontinuierlichen 
Anstieg der Unterhaltungstitel, wobei Heinrich Spoerl mit insgesamt fünf Bestsellern, 
darunter sein 1934 im Droste Verlag erschienener Roman Die Feuerzangenbowle, zum 
meistverkauften und wohl auch meistgelesenen Autor der NS-Diktatur avancierte” 
(473). The point here is that few if any critics have associated the work of Hermann 
Spoerl with national socialism; his name is absent from the indexes of major texts on 
fascist literature, including Loewy’s Literatur unterm Hakenkreuz (1969), Ketelsen’s 
Literatur und Drittes Reich (1992), and Schnell’s Dichtung in finsteren Zeiten (1998).  
 The argument that Barbian makes here speaks to the arguments being made by 
the recognized conservative and National Socialist “literati” of the 1930s. The party, in 
fact, tried to make this very argument, that there were social implications from reading 
that coincided with various missions of the party, in this case the fostering of a law-
abiding (a suspect term in light of Eichmann’s self-defense) German youth. “Das 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt wollte sogar einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Lektüre 
von Abenteuer- oder Kriminalromanen und der Neigung von Jugendlichen zu Straftaten 
erkennen” (471). Barbian’s argument, on the other hand, is that reading patterns derived 
from book sales indicate a similar social function with a much more dangerous outcome: 
complacency, a withdrawal from and even willing ignorance of social realities. “Wer aus 
der Realität des deprimierenden Kriegsalltags fliehen wollte oder im Luftschutzkeller 
die Angriffe überstehen musste, griff allerdings bestimmt nicht zu schwerfälligen Blut-
und-Boden- oder zu Kriegsromanen und schon gar nicht zu Propagandaschriften, 
sondern suchte in der Literatur ‘Unterhaltung, Ablenkung und Distanz’” (473). 
It is important to keep in mind that the war years of the late 1930s and early 
1940s were a considerably different period in Germany than ten years prior during the 
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ascension of the national socialists. However, the trends in book sales during the latter 
part of the decade do speak to the type of literature that was being produced by those 
preaching of the “formend” role of literature and the writer in building a new Germany. 
For while many conservative writers were eventually forced to either flee the country or 
conform to more explicitly political writing, most of them did not start their careers with 
– or at least their careers were not defined entirely by – war mongering, anti-Semitism, 
or overt nationalism. This, however, as Ketelsen argues, does not mean their writing was 
not political.  
Weinhebers Odenproduktion und ihre Rezeption verweisen einmal mehr darauf, 
den Begriff von politischer Lyrik nicht zu eng zu fassen und die politische 
Qualität nicht allein im Inhalt der Texte zu suchen… Literarische 
Verhaltungsweisen wie Reproduktivität, ‘dichterischer Gestus’ und 
Traditionalität werden im außerliterarischen Kontext zu politischen 
Handlungen, zum Bewahren, Rechtfertigen und Verteidigen. Solcherart rücken 
Weinhebers und [Herybert] Menzels Gedichte – jedes auf seine Weise – neben 
die lautstarke Produktion der ‘jungen Mannschaft.’ (312) 
Ketelsen’s expansion of the notion of political lyric beyond the content of the text 
can be read in the context of an at times mythical discourse on poetics that, rather than 
emphasizing political content, focused instead on the relationship between writer, text, 
and reader. One striking iteration of this relationship is the notion of the writer as leader, 
a concept with roots in the romantic notion of genius that conservative-turned-Nazi 
writers increasingly compound with the racialized ideology of Volk in the 1930s. 
Conservative revolutionaries like Hofmannsthal theorize this idea such that, unlike the 
prophetic/vatic power ascribed to the poet by George, the poet articulates collective 
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experience so that the nation, or spiritual community, can be incited to change. 
“Significantly, [Hofmannsthal] also begins to reverse the image of the poet-genius that 
has been cherished by the Bildungsbürgertum in the wake of German Classicism. In this 
vision, the poet cannot create or lead the nation, but must rather embody and articulate 
what the nation already is on the basis of its history and experience. The nation, not the 
poet, is the agent of national formation or change” (Arens 191). In the work of George, 
the “political poet” is a public prophet emergent in language (and restricted to an 
aesthetic space) who prophesies or “creates” the nation; for Hofmannsthal, he is an 
arbiter of language whose inner, private transformation will radiate into the community, 
thereby effecting that transformation on a national level. This tension between public 
and private, leading and embodying, persists in critical reflections on the role of writing 
into the 1930s, and the notion of the writer as leader of the racialized Volk in particular 
becomes more overt with the rise of National Socialism, with the important distinction 
that the fascist writer was to destroy either aesthetic (George) or metaphysical/spiritual 
(Hofmannsthal) mediation.59  
The notion of the writer as a political leader derives in part from the concept of 
“radiation” as the mediating principle between writer and Volk, one that conservative 
critics were employing before Hofmannsthal’s 1928 speech. In 1924, for example, Hans 
Brandenburg articulated the anti-expressionist argument that the writer is a product of 
his age, rather than a subjective reflection of it. In an open debate about the socialist and 
expressionist Johannes Becher’s new book of poems, Hymnen, he argued with the poet 
and critic Paul Reiser about the role of the modern poet. Reiser’s initial review of the 
book argues that the “Unvollkommenheit” of Becher’s art is a result of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 For more on the public and private in the work of George and Hofmannsthal, see Adorno, “The 
George-Hofmannsthal Correspondence, 1891-1906” 213-226. 
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“Unvollkommenheit” of the age that the poetry reflects; modern artists are excused from 
modern art’s misgivings because they are a product of the historical epoch in which they 
live. Brandenburg, however, could not disagree more. He cannot excuse Becher’s poetry, 
claiming that poets are the heart of their historical epoch, which is situated in and 
indebted to a long historical tradition.  
[D]er Dichter ist nicht so sehr ein Spiegel als vielmehr das Herz seiner Zeit und 
sein Gedicht eine Form und Ausstrahlung von ihr, welche ihre 
Oberflächenerscheinungen, das sogenannte ,Zeitgemäße’, überdauert… [W]enn 
ich einen Vers und eine Prosa schreibe, die nicht Schrei und Gestammel des 
Augenblicks ist, sondern mit unseren alten Meistern wetteifert, so bin ich 
natürlich ein viel kühnerer, radikalerer, modernerer Dichter als Johannes R. 
Becher.” (Brandenburg 145, italics added) 
Expressionist poetry is more an affront to than a mirror of modernity, which 
Brandenburg sees as an extension of older poetic traditions. The poem, in Brandenburg’s 
argument as in Hofmannsthal’s, embodies what the “age” is already determined to be, a 
line of thinking that will ultimately work in the service of propaganda, which employs 
registers of purification and cleansing. 
This notion that the poet is the heart of his age and the poem a “form and 
emanation” of it was echoed by Will Vesper in 1924, who published a short article 
comparing works of art to modern technological advancements such as the telephone. In 
the essay, “Strahlenergie der Kunst,” he argues that works of art are radioactive, that 
they have their own particular energy. “[I]ch meine nicht jene äußerliche, der Spannung 
der Handlung, der Diktion usw, sondern ein inneres geheimes Fluidum, auf dem die 
Wirkung aller Kunstwerke auf die Hörer oder Seher beruht. Kunstgenuß ist Reaktion 
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auf diese aktive Substanz.” (2). In Vesper’s analogy, these viewers or listeners are the 
“receivers” of signals, or the mysterious inner fluid, of the work of art. Each work of art 
has a “Hauptschwingung,” or main effect, and, depending on the strength and richness 
of the artist, can have a varying number of “Nebentönen,” or minor tones. Vesper, 
however, places a heavy emphasis on the artist, whom he refers to as the “Sender” with 
his own wavelength that can be picked up by a variable number of “receivers.” For an 
especially strong Sender, Vesper uses the example of Schiller, who he says sends out so 
many waves that it could take centuries before “eines Tages die ausgeruhten Wellen, 
wie ausgeruhte Akkumulatoren, mit neuer überraschender Kraft wirken [werden]” (3).  
Amazingly, Vesper’s argument here borders on an anticipation of Walter 
Benjamin’s discussion of a work of art’s afterlife, of the flares that the artwork emits to 
be rediscovered through interpretation by later generations. For Vesper, however, the 
work of art is subordinate to its creator, whose own particular abilities and sensibilities 
will determine who is moved by it. In both the case of Vesper and of Brandenburg, the 
poet – always the classical, German poet – is seen as a product of his historical period 
whose work serves as a transmitter of those values onto particular historical subjects. As 
with Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos Letter, Vesper describes a “Fluidum” in a text that 
implies the internal unity that the “Wirkung” on the listener or reader is based (quite the 
opposite, then, of Benjamin’s claim in the translator essay that no work of literature is 
intended for a reader and no symphony for a listener). Rather than an anticipation of 
Hofmannsthal’s speech, Brandenburg and Vesper represent a different but related 
strand of determinist thought that was based on a text’s effect (Wirkung) on the 
individual and its emergence from the historical, rather than the inverse, its emergence 
from the individual and effect on history.  
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Hofmannsthal’s speech moves George’s poetic mantra out of the poetic realm 
and into an embodied space, taking emphasis off the poet and directing it onto the 
chosen individuals, “die Suchenden.” Other conservative critics – many of whom would 
eventually become allies of the National Socialists – were pushing the ideal towards 
community further, even before the speech, literalizing George’s Poet-Führer while 
espousing a rhetoric of “effect,” that transcendent literature would both affect and effect 
subjects and thereby effect, or create, a new Reich. The doubling of Wirkung, both of the 
individual and the community, is, like this distinction, ultimately collapsed into one 
category, namely, that of Hegelian Vollendung, the resolution of historical forces in the 
new German state.60 That is, the movement is from a personal experience of overcoming 
to a public one.  
One primary aspect of this “effect” of Dichtung was to connect individual 
readers through texts to the timeless and eternal, qualities ascribed to the German Volk 
and the German soul, an idea championed by Hofmannsthal in regards to the nation as a 
community united by language. Ralf Schnell argues that the disintegration of the 
distinction between art and politics in a community of readers was captured in fact by 
Hans Grimm’s bucolic concept of the “Weihefeier.” “Der Glaube an die Trennbarkeit 
von Kunst und Politik entlarvt sich durch die beabsichtige wechselseitige Erhöhung 
beider Bereiche selbst als Lüge. Grimms Konzept einer dichterischen Weihefeier erweist 
sich als Betrug an der erhofften gläubigen Gemeinde der Leser” (Schnell 81). In an essay 
on the writer Heinz Steguweit from 1932, Lothar Schreyer describes the “task” of 
literature (Dichtung) to be making public the experience of the inexplicable, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Andrew Hewitt has made a similar argument with regards to the avant-garde. “As the moment 
of ‘full unfolding’ [whereby the conditions of possibility of a specific historically constituted 
discourse become simultaneously present and possible], the avant-garde, no less than fascism, 
could think itself as both the completion and the liquidation of historical sequentiality” (7). 
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“Unendlichkeit des Lebens,” and by making public, throwing us into that eternity. It is 
this process of making public that will double for the individual, whose private fate will 
be made impersonal and given fateful meaning. 
So ist man versucht zu sagen, daß die Dichtung das Erlebnis nicht verdichtet, 
sondern weitet in das nicht mehr Faßbare hinaus. Wie der Mensch in einer 
Gestalt der Natur, etwa in der Betrachtung einer Blume, die Unendlichkeit des 
Lebens zu erleben vermag, so erlebt der Dichter in der Gestaltung eines Erlebens 
die Unendlichkeit des Lebens und zeugt in seinem Schaffen diese Schwingungen, 
die uns in die Unendlichkeit des Lebens hineinschwingen. So wird persönliches 
Schicksal unpersönlich, und das persönliche Schicksal erhält erst dadurch 
allgemeinen Wert, also schicksalhaft Bedeutung. Solche schicksalhafte 
Bedeutung soll die Dichtung haben, wenn sie ihre Aufgabe erfüllen will. Manche 
Dichtung unserer Zeit dient dieser Aufgabe. Einer der liebenswertesten Dichter, 
dem es gegeben ist, dieser Aufgabe gewachsen zu sein, ist Heinz Steguweit. 
(Schreyer 154, italics added) 
That is, literature – as it was for George and Hofmannsthal – is a means to achieve 
transcendence. However, Schreyer’s argument for how literature can attain this 
transcendence is unlike George’s, whose poets are bound by and constituted by the 
union of the aesthetic and the linguistic (the poetic), and also unlike Hofmannsthal, who 
argues that external dualities, “im äußeren Zerklüftete,” must be poetized (“gedichtet”) 
in individuals, from which radiates and is “formed” a new united community. Rather 
than “Einheit” to describe community or Volk, Schreyer speaks of “Unendlichkeit,” the 
eternity or state of being eternal that is a quality of life. The writer experiences this 
“Unendlichkeit des Lebens” in the “Gestaltung” of his experience, and he then shows in 
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his writing these movements (“Schwingungen”) that bring others into 
(“hineinschwingen”) this “Unendlichkeit des Lebens”. 
For Schreyer, literature “weitet in das nicht mehr Faßbare hinaus,” it must 
expand into the ineffable and the inexplicable, what he calls the immeasurable. That is, 
the measurable qualities of an aesthetic work do not represent its true value; this value is 
its ability to reveal the immeasurable, the infinite, through the aesthetic. Furthermore, 
this immeasurable quality of art is actually a quality of life, and art’s value is marked by 
its ability to lead us back to that eternal life. “Der Wert der Dichtung nämlich, ob es sich 
um ein Kunstwerk handelt oder nicht, ist also kein ästhetischer. Das Ästhetische, der 
formale Bestand des Werkes, ist meßbar. Die Kunst aber ist durchaus unermeßlich, wie 
das Leben, das sie kündet. In meßbarem Gefäß das Unermeßliche darbringen, ist das 
Geheimnis der Kunst.” [The word “kündet” here is important to note, as it is the same 
word that George uses to describe the poet: a Künder, or prophet.] Not only does art 
shape life, but it foretells it, it collapses the boundary between what it is and what life is, 
as both are subsumed under the mystical category of “Unendlichkeit” or the 
”Unermeßliche”. Furthermore, the verb Schreyer uses to describe art’s task, 
“darbringen,” is a neologism that connotes the idea of an ancient ritual and means 
something like to offer or to present (more literally to bring out). That art then presents 
(“darbringen”) the immeasurable connotes in the language itself this timeless and 
mystical power that art is supposed to reveal and affirm as inherent in life.  
 This says a great deal about the relationship between aesthetics and politics and 
Walter Benjamin’s famous claim that fascism is the aestheticization of politics, or the 
turning of the political experience into an aesthetic one. For that does seem to be what 
Schreyer is advocating; that art itself contributes to a politically-committed and 
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ideologically-motivated action of submitting/subsuming one’s individual identity 
to/under a collective one known as National Socialism. But that is not all art does. Art 
also represents and reflects this process. It is itself this process. That is, poetry does not 
just tell one what to do, but it models and thereby enacts this process in the moment of 
reading. It brings the reader somewhere while representing both that bringing and that 
somewhere. That is why the tension that George maintains among the aesthetic realm 
inhabited by the poet, the aesthetically-constituted prophesied future, and the real 
Germany outside that – in short, the tension between the secret and the real Germany – 
is resolved in the 1930s by the idea that the writer actually was a leader of the people. Of 
course, the Nazi irrationality and ideology of Gleichschaltung complicates this seemingly 
simple resolution, which results in another vein of theorizing in which the poet is a 
leader insofar as he is not a leader, that he leads back to Germanic roots, back to what 
real Germans already are – farmers, etc. And this, seemingly unpolitical, act is the most 
political act of all. 
One manifestation of the specifically literary goal of proliferating and harnessing 
apolitical indifference occurs in the speech by Hans Friedrich Blunck from March 21, 
1935, cited in the previous chapter. 
Bewusst, nennen Sie es selbstbewusst, hat sich das Schrifttum der Gegenwart, 
hat sich das kämpfende Schrifttum, wie es sich um die Wartburg sammelte, wie 
es in den Kräften einer neuen Jugend aufwächst, verbündet und will mitten im 
Volksleben stehen. Es hat die Pflicht zu dieser Neuordnung erkannt, sie ist aber 
auch sein Recht. Der Dichter weiss schmerzlich, dass er damit an persönlichem 
Behagen, an Lebensfreude des kleinen Daseins und an betrachtlichen Stunden 
lyrischer Deutung der Welt verliert. Er weiss aber auch, dass sein Volk ihn 
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braucht, er steht und ist bereit, sein Geschick anders als in der Zeit eines 
übersteigerten Einzelwillens zu seinem eignen zu machen und die 
Volksgemeinschaft aller, auch der Schaffenden, zu bejahen, gläubig zu läutern 
und zu erfüllen.  
If we take Blunck’s argument to represent a position not at odds with Nazi ideology, 
and we consider the conception of the political role of poetry to derive in part from a 
particular way of thinking, then we can also speak of considerable shades of difference 
between the arguments about radiation made by conservatives and those arguments 
about sacrifice made by National Socialists. Despite the general attack on “materialism” 
put forward by his party, Blunck conceives of the literary in a materially political sense, 
impelling writers to sacrifice the subjectively lyrical in the service of strengthening the 
secular state and affirming its racist/racial(izing) ideology. This conception of the 
relationship between literature and politics is markedly different from those of 
Hofmannsthal and Kommerell, however, who conceive of political transformation as an 
inevitable, albeit necessarily positive, outcome of precisely that lyrical refinement and 
subjective experience that Blunck calls on writers to sacrifice. Whereas Blunck demands 
the suppression of lyrical subjectivity for concrete political ends, conservatives such as 
Hofmannsthal and Kommerell sought what Martin Travers, borrowing a term from 
Klaus Landfried, has called, “an ethos [that] might best be described as ‘the politics of 
the apolitical,’ a transcendence of reality that paradoxically, at the same time, allowed, 
under certain historical circumstances, for its greatest penetration” (Travers 11).  
This term attempts to reconcile both Ernst Nolte’s argument that fascism is the 
“resistance to transcendence,” or modernity, and Jeffrey Herf’s argument that fascism 
represented a kind of “reactionary modernism.” That is, the paradox that Landfried and 
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Travers identify is one that, broadly speaking, concerns the Nazi fascist embrace, at 
times, of the very ideas they purported to reject. Like Herf, I contend that this paradox 
can be traced from conservative revolutionary literary aesthetics to Nazi literary 
aesthetics, but that there is in fact an important distinction between the two. While 
Hofmannsthal and Kommerell consider the development of a new collective ethos to be 
an aesthetic project experienced internally by the individual engagement with language, 
Brandenburg and Wehner imply the urgency with which poets must work to inspire 
and enact material social and political reform at the expense of aesthetic autonomy. 
While Hofmannsthal upholds this tension between the völkisch expression of collectivity 
and the lyrical expression of individuality, Hans Friedrich Blunck intones its collapse, 
insisting that the latter must be directly served, and even effected by, the former. In this 
formulation, and the poetry that ensued, the thematization of transcendence is really a 
thematization of the materialism Nazi ideology rejected. Though an autonomous 
transcendent experience is of primary importance for Hofmannsthal, such autonomy 
becomes further assimilated to and instrumentalized for the ultimately racialized and 
nationalist conception of the Volk. 
Several articles from Die Neue Literatur on the evolving role of the writer in 
society help to sketch this regression, articles that anticipate the instrumentalization of 
literature and its collapse into political will as described in Blunck’s speech. In 1930, for 
example, the critic Hasso Härlen published a laudatory review of Grundlagen der neuen 
Gesellschaft, a newly published volume of theoretical writings by the neo-classical and 
conservative German writer Paul Ernst. Titled “Der Dichter als Führer,” the review 
argues that political action, namely that of the “Staatsmann,” must stem from sources 
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“jenseits des Vernünftigen.”61 Free from the limits of scientific inquiry and discourse, the 
creative writer alone is able to lead the leader, and thus the nation, towards a new 
political ethic by creating, and thereby preparing the nation for, this ethic.62  
While Härlen conceives of the writer in more explicitly political terms – he says, 
“in einem hohen Sinne ist deshalb gerade der klassische Dichter ein politischer Dichter” 
– he nonetheless insists that the writer must actively create a sense of the possibilities, or 
“images,” of a different, spiritually richer, world.  
[Paul Ernsts Dichtung] gibt neue Bilder und Möglichkeiten des Menschentums, 
und sie scheint berufen, aus der Hölle der Formlosigkeit und der toten Formen 
herauszuführen… Der Mangel des Gefühls für die Dichtung ist Ausdruck eines 
allgemeineren Mangels: wir leben in einer Zeit der falschen Gefühle und des 
falschen Denkens. Durch die Schöpfung neuer Gefühle überwindet der Dichter 
die Welt der falschen Gefühle. (Härlen 334)  
Like Hofmannsthal, Härlen emphasizes the need for a new social formation; like 
Kommerell, he conceives of poetic language as the means to social transformation. 
However, rather than inspiring transformation through modeling the possibilities 
enabled by it, Härlen claims that the poet directly implants this motivation to transform 
in the people. He creates a new ethic in us rather than for us. “[H]eute kann nur noch 
der Dichter uns sagen, was wir tun sollen, indem er in uns eine neue Gesinnung schafft. 
Etwas Neues,” Härlen concludes, “kann aber nur kommen, wenn eine neue Gesinnung 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 This argument can be compared with the Reich Production Director of Radio Eugen 
Hadamovsky’s 1936 description of catching a glimpse of Adolf Hitler’s hands during a speech. 
See Hadamovsky, “Die Hände des Führers” 747.  
 
62 “Der Dichter [schafft] Empfindungen, [drückt] nicht etwa nur [aus]. Dadurch bereichert er das 
Leben der Menschheit und wird zur wichtigen Triebkraft ihrer Entwicklung. Er ruft eine neue 
Gesinnung hervor und bereitet so den Boden für neue Formen der Gesellschaft” (Härlen 334).  
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aufkommt, aus der es entspringt. Hier wiederum stehen wir vor dem Beruf des 
Dichters” (338).  
The conservative revolutionary Wilhelm Stapel expresses a similar sentiment 
regarding the role of the Dichter in the establishment of the abstract notions of “order” 
and “form” in a speech from June 1931 during the “Deutsche Dichtertagung” at Schloss 
Osterstein. The speech, which was reprinted in Vesper’s Die Neue Literatur, distinguishes 
between Literatur, which Stapel argues is propagandistic and overtly political, and 
Dichtung, which is itself in danger of being corrupted. In warning against popularity and 
success, he establishes three stages, or Stufen, that a text can achieve: success (Erfolg), 
effect (Wirkung), and fame/glory (Ruhm). Success, which Stapel equates with 
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, is grounded in the material. The emerging 
Nazi party loathed Remarque’s pacifist critique of World War I, and the accusation of 
materialism was a common critique waged against the author.63 According to Stapel, 
only four thousand people out of millions read Hölderlin, whose genius eclipses the 
opportunistic Remarque. And while Wirkung is something “seelisch,” it is not enough 
for a text to affect someone – it must also achieve a state of glory that is a truly 
metaphysical, or transcendent, stage of literary production: “Der Sinne aller echten 
Dichtung ist allein der Ruhm” (416). This transcendent omnipresence, however, must 
ultimately serve the very materialist ends of which Stapel is critical. 
The burden of establishing order is a public endeavor ultimately in the service of 
authority, which does not limit freedom but makes it possible through the institution of 
both moral and political order by an authority. This is not unlike Eichmann’s distortion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Hans Reiser, in an anti-intellectual review from 1929, complains that a professor like Remarque 
profited by writing about others’ experiences in the war and even proposes the author give his 
profits to those soldiers who served in the war and didn’t go on to write books and capitalize off 
of their experiences (555). 
 183 
of Kant. Stapel continues by insisting that German writers must win the natural 
“Rangordnung” of Dichtung and stabilize the “real authority” through a “pure 
separation” from literature like Remarque’s, elsewhere referred to as “Asphaltliteratur,” 
a blanket term for anything that challenged party orthodoxy.  
Aber all diese Bemühungen sind nicht das Wichtigste. Worauf es ankommt, ist, 
daß wir die natürliche Rangordnung der Dichtung gewinnen und die echte 
Autorität stabilieren. Es gilt Grenzen zu ziehen und Abstände zu wahren. Wir 
haben nicht eine Gruppe oder eine Richtung ,durchzudrücken’, sondern wir 
haben eine Ordnung zu finden. Unsere Bemühungen liegen nicht in der 
Richtung auf größeren Betrieb, sondern auf reinliche Scheidung. Vor allem 
müssen wir wissen, daß es heut und immer nichts Wichtigeres für die Dichtung 
gibt als Rang und Autorität. (416) 
Not unlike Paul Ernst’s “anderer Führer” in the “Vorhalle von Gottes Tempel,” Stapel’s 
notion of a transcendent authority is rooted precisely in the desire to transform material 
reality, distinguish it from modern technocracy, and therefore reject the possibilities of 
both mediation and representation. 
This call for “effect,” “glory,” “authority,” “form,” and “order” occurred against 
an increasingly partisan political backdrop that saw the escalation of censorship 
measures and the founding of a government department openly committed entirely to 
propaganda. Desirable literature was defined negatively, as the opposite of Im Westen 
nichts Neues.64 As the National Socialists took control of the government, they began to 
strictly monitor and control language. The Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und 
Propaganda (RMVP) overseen by Joseph Goebbels was focused above all on controlling !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Of course, the justification is in terms of form, but the actual distinctions are often in terms of 
content. War diaries were immensely popular, as Christian Adam’s research demonstrates, 
though pacifist war diaries were obviously not. 
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rhetoric, the underlying purpose of which was ultimately to silence detractors, create 
scapegoat enemies of the state, and garner and bolster support for the National Socialist 
platform and agenda. It also focused on amplifying aspects of the party ideology that 
conservatives found appealing, such as anti-Semitism, traditionalism, and 
authoritarianism more generally. Such rhetoric notoriously devolved into dichotomies 
that championed whatever it was the Nazis stood for and denigrated everything else. 
Perhaps the most examined of these dichotomies is that of timeless, Germanic, 
spiritually enriched Kultur and the Western, spiritually bankrupt, democratic and 
cosmopolitan Zivilisation, a dichotomy that Jeffrey Herf thoroughly complicates in his 
book Reactionary Modernism. Another dichotomy that arose alongside that of 
Kultur/Zivilisation was that of Literatur/Dichtung. The word Literatur was generally 
associated with the concept of Zivilisation and the evils of the bourgeois West. The 
preferred alternatives to this term for those on the right were the terms Dichtung and 
Schrifttum, which were made into pseudo-mythical and mystical terms and can be found 
in the vitriolic rhetoric that accompanied the attempted purge of such “evil” influences 
as Jews, Socialists, gays, and “Bolsheviks.” This debate, which also played out in 
conversations regarding censorship, also shaped theories of writing and the writer that 
resolve ultimately in the significance of order, manipulation, and effect mediated by the 
library. 
In 1930, three years prior to the book burnings, in an editorial from the 
conservative journal Die schöne Literatur, an unnamed contributor (presumably the 
editor and future Nazi Will Vesper) anticipates what eventually becomes a much 
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sharper divide between Literatur and Dichtung in party rhetoric.65 The opinion piece, 
though not as vitriolic as essays that appear in later years, has this to say about Thomas 
Mann in response to his winning the Nobel Prize for literature:  
Natürlich hätten wir auch heute andere Dichter mit einem umfassenden 
Lebenswerk aufzuzeigen. Wir nennen vor allem Paul Ernst, Wilhelm Schäfer, 
Ricarda Huch, Hermann Stehr. Aber alle vier haben offenbar, und z.T. 
naturnotwendig, noch nicht die europäische, ja noch nicht einmal die deutsche 
Geltung, die Thomas Mann errang. Wenn wir wollen, daß die Bedeutung dieser 
Dichter von Europa und der Welt erkannt wird, müssen wir dafür sorgen, daß 
sie erst einmal in Deutschland die Stellung einnehmen, die sie verdienen. Erst 
dann können wir verlangen, daß auch das Ausland sie wahrnimmt. Immer aber 
wird der urbane, zeitgemäße, allen leicht zugängliche und offene Geist schneller 
erkannt werden, als der eigenwilligere, schwerere, verschlossenere, tiefere und 
charaktervollere. (60) 
While the author of these lines is arguably content to see a German win such a 
prestigious award, it is telling to look at how this award is thought of: as something 
cosmopolitan, worldly, and bourgeois, stereotyped again and again as vapid and weak. 
It also follows that an established and celebrated writer would be in a position to win 
the award. But this celebrated writer is “der bedeutendste Vertreter des bürgerlichen 
liberalen Schrifttums von gestern, das – wie das gewöhnlich geht – heute seine großen 
Erfolge einheimst, für die es gestern gearbeitet und gestritten.” Thomas Mann, unlike 
Paul Ernst, Hermann Stehr, and other writers eventually embraced by the National 
Socialists, represents an older generation: the liberal bourgeoisie of yesterday. And !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 For more on how Nazi writers characterized Dichtung, see Wulf, Literatur und Dichtung im 
Dritten Reich 317-323. 
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because of the association of these qualities with the threatening spread of “modern 
values” throughout Europe, it follows for the author of this editorial that the Nobel Prize 
would be awarded to an “urbane, zeitgemäße, allen leicht zugängliche und offene Geist” 
such as Mann.  
The language here also reinforces a dichotomy between “Schriftsteller” and 
“Dichter.” “Wir begrüßen es, daß wieder einmal einem deutschen Schriftsteller von Rang 
zuteil wurde. Gewiß wüßten wir deutsche Dichter von wesenhafterer Bedeutung zu 
nennen…” (italics added). To quote from an editorial in response to Mann from a year 
earlier in the same journal: “Unsere Augen sehen die Treuen im Lande; es sind die 
großen Stillen: Spitteler und Rilke unter den Toten; Hermann Stehr und Hans Carossa 
unter den Lebenden… um nur diese zu nennen.” These “living Dichter” were 
considered to be somehow more essentially German. The repetition of the comparative 
“-er” in the final description from the article about Mann’s Nobel Prize implies this 
hierarchical dualism; the “lebendige Dichter” wrote literature with a “wesenhafterer 
Bedeutung” and were “eigenwilligere, schwerere, verschlossenere, tiefere und 
charaktervollere.” That is, not only were their works more profound, but they were 
themselves better people, more “iron-willed” with “better characters.” In 1933, the 
president of the RSK and Deutsche Akademie der Dichtung (DAD) Hanns Johst wrote, 
“Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Werfel, Kellermann, Fulda, Döblin, Unruh, usw. sind 
liberale-reaktionäre Schriftsteller, die mit dem deutschen Begriff Dichtung in amtlicher 
Eignung keineswegs mehr in Berührung zu kommen haben” (in Wulf 17). 
 In the final issue of Die schöne Literatur in 1930, before the name change, there is a 
brief explanation of the change presumably written by the editor Will Vesper. He says 
on behalf of the journal: “Wie bisher werden wir in erster Linie mit allen Kräften für ein 
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freies, reinliches und wesenhaftes deutsches Schrifttum kämpfen, dafür daß es die 
Stellung bekommt, die ihm im Leben des Volkes gebührt und die Wirkung, von der die 
Beseelung und Rettung der Nation abhängt.” The journal is therefore positioned to fight 
for a desirable literature, one that is “free, pure, and essential,” relatively empty 
qualifiers that do more to imply something undesirable, unfree, impure, and inessential, 
than they do to describe what the journal hopes to promote. As Gisela Berglund writes, 
“Die Neue Literatur war seit ihrer Gründung (1923) ein Kampforgan der ‘völkischen 
Dichter,’ insbesondere ihres Herausgebers Will Vesper, gegen die Literatur der Juden 
und Judengenossen” (7). 
Vesper here also uses a third word for literature, “Schrifttum,” which also saw 
usage during this period. The –tum suffix is like the English –dom, found in words such 
as kingdom or freedom. It implies an essential state or quality of being – the state of 
being free, or an extension of the king’s rule, which is what makes him the king 
anyway.66 The National Socialists were fond of words such as “Schrifttum,” 
“Deutschtum,” or “Volkstum” in part because it imputed this notion of essence to the 
category in question. In 1933, a month before the first widespread book burnings, 
German students in the Deutschen Studentenschaft (DSt), under the auspices of the 
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (NSDStB), wrote and circulated 
“twelve theses against the un-German spirit,” drawing on similar rhetoric as Vesper’s 
journal. The first of these theses makes use of such rhetoric: “Sprache und Schrifttum 
wurzeln im Volke. Das deutsche Volk trägt die Verantwortung dafür, daß seine Sprache 
und sein Schrifttum reiner und unverfälschter Ausdruck seines Volkstums sind.” These 
theses, which were hung around campuses across Germany and published in a range of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 The word was used both positively and negatively, as in the case of the “Liste des schädlichen 
und unerwünschten Schrifttums” which was created in 1935. 
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newspapers and periodicals, inspired over sixty book burnings in the following months. 
Rather than the spiritual space of the nation, per Hofmannsthal, not to mention a 
revolutionary means of displacing reality, per George, literature is the “pure and true 
expression of the Volkstum.” It must express the will of the people, must therefore 
emerge from the people and reflect their collective will – towards revolution, 
transformation, anti-Semitism, etc. This echoes Brandenburg’s argument that the writer 
is the heart of his age and “sein Gedicht eine Form und Ausstrahlung von ihr.” The 
modern is an imposition on the “real” German tradition and history that must be 
rescued but is not yet lost.  
In a speech printed in the party organ the Völkischer Beobachter on May 12, Joseph 
Goebbels explained the reasons for the book burnings as a response to the “modern” 
adulteration of German literature. “In den letzten vierzehn Jahren, in denen ihr, 
Kommilitonen, in schweigender Schmach die Demütigungen der Novemberrepublik 
über euch ergehen lassen mußtet, füllten sich die Bibliotheken mit Schund und Schmutz 
jüdischer Asphaltliteraten.” Like publishing houses and bookstores, libraries were 
perceived in Nazi propaganda as threatened by Jewish, liberal, cosmopolitan, Marxist, 
Communist, decadent, and democratic evils. Goebbles lumps these writers into the 
category of “asphalt literature,” a term that predates the Nazis but which has achieved 
notoriety through their particular usage of it. This “trash and dirt” threatened the sacred 
space of the library, a symbol and archive for German culture as well as a major 
contributor to the purity of that culture. “Die Zustände in den gewerblichen 
Leihbibliotheken scheinen ähnlich wie im Buchhandel gewesen zu sein, wahrscheinlich 
sogar ‘noch schlimmer.’ Im Oktober 1935 klagte die Neue Literatur, daß hier vor allem 
das ‘kitschig verlogene Sofa- und Sensationsbuch’ angeboten werde. Die Verheerungen, 
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die dieser Schund anrichte, seien weitaus größer und gefährlicher als die Wirkungen der 
‘unterirdischen Literatur,’ die ja nur kleinen Kreisen zugänglich sei” (Berglund 17). The 
public accessibility of such Asphaltliteratur was therefore a considerable threat to the 
potential of the library as a disseminator of propaganda. 
In January 1933, the same year and month that Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor 
of Germany, the literary critic Walter Hofmann published an essay in Die Neue Literatur 
entitled “Das Gedächtnis der Nation: Ein Wort zur Schrifttumspflege in Deutschland.” 
In the essay, Hofmann discusses what he sees as the central role of the library in German 
culture, linking its ability to archive and “remember” cultural history with its ability to 
construct national identity. 
Damit ist der Ort der öffentlichen Bücherei in der Gesamtlebensordnung der 
Nation bezeichnet. Denn nicht Bücher ausleihen, unentgeltlich oder billig, ist die 
Aufgabe der öffentlichen Bücherei, sondern nationale Schrifttumspflege in 
Auswahl, Ordnung, Vermittlung… Die öffentliche Bücherei, die mit Auswahl, 
Ordnung, Vermittlung das Unübersehbargewordene wieder übersehbar macht 
und damit das echte Gedächtnis der Nation wieder zu lebendiger Wirkung 
bringt, - diese öffentliche Bücherei ist also nirgends dringlicher als in 
Deutschland. Auch in dieser Zeit, auch in dieser Stunde. Gerade in dieser Zeit, 
gerade in dieser Stunde. (12) 
Hofmann focuses on the library’s ability not to loan out books but rather to foster a 
sense (or the essence) of national literature through a familiar set of terms: selection, 
order, mediation, and a “lebendige Wirkung.” This active role of the institution of the 
library recalls Vesper’s admission upon changing the name of his journal: that it will 
fight for literature (Schrifttum) to have the position it is due in the life of the Volk and the 
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effect (Wirkung) upon which the animation (Beseelung) and salvation of the nation 
depends. Both authors argue in a familiar vein that literature must have a particular 
effect on the people who read it, an effect that will help elevate the spirit and protect the 
eternal German nation from its foes. 
 It is the Wirkung of literature itself that is preconditioned by the selection, 
mediation, and order that Hofmann discusses. That is, the library and the journal serve 
as euphemisms for censorship, the selection of admissible literature by the state. This 
censorship is couched in the positive rhetoric of “Wirkung,” that it is enabling the nation 
to be moved towards a higher, if illusory, transcendent ideal. Vesper writes that his 
journal will ensure a “free, pure, and essential” German literature upon which the soul 
and salvation of the nation depends. Hofmann writes that the library will ensure the 
“selection, order, and mediation” necessary to cultivating and invigorating national 
memory and, presumably, national and cultural (national/cultural) identity. Both 
institutions, while serving the interests of the state, purport to do so in an effort to 
preserve the effect of literature on the individual consumer and citizen. And only 
permissible literature – whether deemed so by a literary critic or a government 
supervisor – can therefore contribute to the goal of establishing a new German nation 
and reclaiming traditional and “pure” German culture from the “trash and dirt” of 
“Bolshevik” and democratic influences.  
 While censorship wears various masks – of a literary journal, for Vesper, and a 
library for Hofmann – serving the higher cause of guaranteeing the triumph of the myth 
of the Third Reich, two opinion pieces from Vesper’s journal from four years prior 
indicate the growing conservative appreciation for the need of the censor. One of these, 
a direct response to some protests against censorship, takes a predictable position: that 
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censorship actually serves as a kind of protection against those forces that seek to 
adulterate spirit, culture, and that which is holy. The free and natural development of 
art, the authors argue, must be reigned in as a form of preemptive defense. Another take 
on the question of censorship, however, makes the argument that censorship, while a 
restriction on freedom, actually helps to cultivate the spirit by keeping it from becoming 
“clumsy and aloof.” That is, censorship somehow mobilizes and energizes the spirit 
rather than facilitating groupthink and herd mentality. The individual soul and intellect 
(Geist) are then enriched as the spirit is forced to “bound over” any barrier put in its 
way. 
 And this rather positive argument for the transformative power of literature, 
paradoxical as it seems in the context of an increasingly regulated and censored book 
market, seems to be the “Wirkung” that Vesper and Hofmann both discuss.  While they 
both seem to advocate the euphemistically-named “fostering” of literature, this fostering 
of literature, like the literature itself, will both affect and effect the individual National 
Socialist citizen, interpellating and transforming him into the German he already is and 
embodying the Germandom that already constitutes the State (enemies of the State, 
however, as a threat to this anti-transcendence, must not be transformed but 
annihilated). Such “Pflege” enables literature to interpellate and yet, by enabling, 
contributes to such interpellation. The journal and the library therefore precondition 
(and allow) the “Wirkung” of the literature itself. One need not think very 
metaphorically to see how concepts that apply to a library, such as “order” and 
“selection,” could be incorporated into Nazi party rhetoric. 
 The “Wirkung,” the desired effect that distinguishes party-approved Dichtung 
from Literatur, is therefore one that will reinvigorate a “Germanic” ethos by remaking 
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German subjects not into something new, but into what they already are, and therefore 
bringing this to consciousness. Vesper’s journal argues that this process involves 
infusing the nation with a soul and thereby saving it from damnation. For Hofmann, it 
involves cultivating a particular national memory – a bastardized Nietzschean 
reclaiming of what has become obstructed or lost in the national history. In both these 
and the other cases I have described, literature has a more public and social role, as 
opposed to a privately aesthetic one per George. In the essay “Dichter und 
Öffentlichkeit,” the Christian literary critic Hans Brandenburg makes this argument, 
responding directly to – and even Orientalizing – “esoteric” movements like George’s 
brand of aestheticism. “Wir haben heute schon Ansätze zu einer esoterischen 
Kunstsprache, zu einer Literatur für Literatur, wie sie in China besteht. Der wahrhaft 
deutsche Dichter wird sich dieser Sprache niemals bedienen” (cite). The writer then, as 
Ernst argues, becomes a public figure leading people to that symbol of transformation 
back to one’s deepest being, the Führer. 
While indebted to a crude understanding of German idealism, there was no 
room in the evolving National Socialist ideology for Kant’s notion of a natural genius 
outside of society, not to mention of art for art’s sake, but rather for his claim that 
judgment is a fundamentally collective undertaking. Kant's understanding of the 
sublime is grounded in this notion of agreement by a social collective; rather than the 
pleasureable universality of subjective understanding and taste, however, the sublime is 
determined by the universality of a collective experience. It is this universality that the 
National Socialists and many of the conservative critics I have cited here strove to 
represent and the experience of which they promised. An example of this is a short piece 
from 1936 by Eugen Hadamovsky, who had the opportunity to sit near enough to see 
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the hands of Adolf Hitler as he was giving a speech. In the piece, called “Die Hände des 
Führers,” Hadamovsky describes an experience of overwhelming awe that recalls the 
close up shots of Hitler’s hands in Triumph of the Will. Precisely as Hitler speaks of a 
great reconciliation in the German people, Hadamovsky observes the Führer’s hands, 
“als forme er ein kostbares Material zu einem Kunstwerk.” They are themselves an 
artwork, but they are also the hands of an artist, the artist who will call the German 
people to working together and to reason. The final line of the account is a quote from 
Hitler, who also expresses an appeal to reason as an agent in overcoming and 
transcendence. “Niemals werde ich mich von jemand unterdrücken lassen, und stets 
will ich in einem ewigen Appell an die Vernunft und an die Einsicht und an den 
Verstand das ganze Volk zusammenfassen.”  
Reason is, of course, like most Nazi rhetoric, pushed to the limits of meaning so 
that it becomes meaningless, and concepts like conflict are entirely eradicated in the 
process of reasoning that Hadamovsky describes. Rather than diagnosing the idea of 
collective experience, or investigating it, by striving to restore some notion of an 
original, nearly primitive German society, the Nazis thematized it. An example of this is 
the “Thingspiel,” developed by the Nazi Youth leader Baldur von Schirach, Reich 
Theater dramaturgist Rainer Schlösser, and the playwright Eberhard Wolfgang Möller 
in 1934. The Thingspiel was performed outdoors so that the Volk could equally partake 
and then reflect on what they had seen in a natural setting. “Its curious name stems from 
the days of the Germanic tribes, when clan members gathered in sacred assembly 
(“Ding”) to make a judgment on an issue of great importance” (Baird 181). Events such 
as the staging of a Thingspiel or the mass rally strove to offer a sense of order, 
community, and homogeneity/similarity that many writers also ascribed to the function 
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of literature. However, because reading and writing are generally solitary endeavors, 
there was the need to figure out how the enterprise of writing fit into the ideology of the 
Volk. The writer was going to be a leader on issues of ethical significance, guiding 
humanity through the sublimity of their art to some higher ideal, but he must also 
remain a member of the people. 
Hans Brandenburg tried to articulate his thoughts of the role of the writer in the 
Volk community in a speech printed in Die Neue Literatur in 1932 entitled “Der Dichter 
zum Tage.” In the speech, Brandenburg focuses specifically on the writer who, he says, 
stands opposite the liberal, democratic, godless Zeitgeist. The writer, in fact, is he who 
can restore a “kingdom of faith” to the German people once again. After quoting two 
stanzas from Eichendorff that end with the line “der Dichter ist das Herz der Welt” (an 
echo from arguments he makes against Becher in 1924), Brandenburg writes, 
“Verschönung und Verklärung durch den Dichter ist nicht verblasener Idealismus, ist 
nicht fauler Zauber, Tünche, und Firnis, es ist Wesenschau und Wesenschöpfung. Sie 
bringt das göttliche Erbarmen, durch das sie ward, in die Welt zurück und baut das 
geendete Reich des Glaubens wieder auf” (492). Rather than a political kingdom, the 
writer builds a kingdom of belief; for someone like Brandenburg or Paul Ernst, this 
belief was one in the “göttliche Erbarmen,” a phrase easily applicable to the eternal more 
generally, which was imputed to the Volk, the Führer, German-ness, etc.  
Indeed, “Der Dichter ist es, der nichts beschönigt, aber alles verschönt” (491). The 
distinction made between “beschönigen” and “verschönen” is significant; while 
“beschönigen” implies making reality merely palatable, “verschönen” implies the 
glorification (Ruhm) of that reality. And such “essential” glorification is what the writer 
makes possible by creating, as Brandenburg says, a “Gegenwelt” to that very reality “in 
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der unsere wirkliche Welt aufgehoben ist: aufgehoben in dem doppelten Wortsinne von 
,bewahrt’ und ‘vernichtet’ (490). By this, Brandenburg seems to mean two things. On the 
one hand, recalling the closing line of Yeats’s “Sailing to Byzantium,” the writer imbues 
the momentary with the eternal, an extreme metaphysics of presence. “Die Gegenwart 
ist in dieser Welt des Dichters zugleich auch Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Es ist eine 
Welt erhöhten Gedächtnisses und doch auch des Vergessens, es ist die Welt, die war, ist 
und sein wird” (490).67 On the other hand, the writer seems able to compare and discern 
that which is detestable or “feindlich” and those very highest ideals of an age, ideals to 
which he has access. 
And in an age of crisis that has completely disavowed God, belief (in God, the 
State, or both) remains the last refuge of the writer. “In dieser Haltung steht er dem 
Tage, steht er der ‘Haltung der Zeit’ gegenüber” (493). And it is here at the end of his 
speech that Brandenburg begins to employ the infamous sensationalized rhetoric of 
sickness that became a later staple of National Socialist propaganda. He does so, 
however, not in an explicit attack on those threats to the German Volk but rather in a 
defense of the need for the writer specifically at this moment in time.  
Auf Poesie ist die Welt gegründet. Nur ein im Kerne gesunder Organismus kann 
lebenbedrohende Krisen bestehen, zur Gesundheit aber gehört der Ausgleich der 
niedrigeren mit den höheren menschlichen Fähigkeiten, das Gedächtnis, das 
Erbe, das Wort, der schöpferischen Sinn – kurz, die Welt des Dichters. Völker, 
die des Dichters entraten zu können glauben, gehen zugrunde. (493)  
Once again Brandenburg places emphasis on the writer’s ability to compare the lower 
human faculties with the higher ones, implying the xenophobia that seems to underlie !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 In a speech to students at Munich University in July 1934, Paul Alverdes, a representative of 
inner emigration, makes a similar argument in an individualist vein, saying that students should 
turn to “great works of art and literature which make the transitory eternal” (Baird 260). 
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his argument without stating it outright. The writer therefore serves, as he says earlier in 
the speech, as a “Vorbild,” as a model of the heights of human capability which, when 
set alongside the “feindlich” and “niedrig,” would help to renew the German Volk and 
restore it to a community built ultimately on faith. More than the heart of his age, the 
writer is the heart of the world, echoing Hofmannsthal’s argument that the nation 
becomes such through a common, eternal language. 
Although Brandenburg also makes this connection, Josef Magnus Wehner more 
explicitly describes such pure inner spirituality in terms of an “eternal Reich.” Two 
weeks before Hitler was named Chancellor, Wehner was selected to give an address at 
the Berlin Philharmonic Hall. This address, titled “Das unsterbliche Reich,” harkens 
back to Hofmannsthal’s speech from 1928; it offers a glimpse into how the National 
Socialists wanted to represent their understanding of cultural and political revolution. In 
the speech, as Jay Baird has evidenced, Wehner claims that  
Germans were to turn to the Reich within, their link to the heavenly realm where 
Christ and the emperors ruled over the cosmos, surrounded by great ancestors 
who have gone home before them. Only then would they find the totality that 
their lives lacked, a wholeness guaranteeing them a life of real meaning.” Above 
all, Baird emphasizes, “he was convinced that for the Volk to become the nation, 
Germans had to be changed from within. (Baird 84)  
Although this position echoes Hofmannsthal’s discussion of inner transformation, 
Wehner’s conception of the nation was not grounded on the eternal German language 
but rather on the eternal German Volk. And unlike Kommerell’s purely spiritual 
conception of the Volk, Wehner ties it intrinsically to nationality. Similarly, Wehner does 
not conflate such nationality with race, though he does seem to be anticipating this 
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understanding more directly than Kommerell or Hofmannsthal. As Baird says, “‘The 
Eternal Reich’ was in essence an exercise in secular religion… In this address, echoes of 
the deep spirituality of his pious Catholic boyhood in the Rhön – bordering on 
superstition and animism – could be heard, as well as the nationalism of the front 
solider. He submitted that the state must become the outward manifestation of the pure 
inner Reich” (79). 
In a brief essay from October 1933, ten months later, Wehner draws a similar 
connection between the writer and the eternal spirit. “Die Frage nach dem Dichter also 
ist die Frage nach der Ewigkeit… Die Dichter sind dem Volke Bürgen seiner Ewigkeit… 
Durch den Dichter hat ein Volk Teil am Geiste” (Wehner 609-610). He also pointedly 
clarifies the difference between the short-lived State and the eternal Reich, asking, “Wer 
gründet das unsterbliche Reich über dem vergänglichen, wenn auch notwendigen 
Staate.” (609)? Poets do this, Wehner claims, by reflecting and giving voice to the 
spiritual unity and feeling of the Volk, the Volksgefühl. He emphasizes that poetic 
language is the “geistige Heimat” of the Volk, that poets are “Brunnen, in denen die 
Sprache immer neu und lebendig aufquillt,” and are therefore “der Ausdruck eines 
tiefen Gemeinschaftsgefühles.” That is, the poet, master craftsman of language, serves to 
reveal to the Volk what it already is. “In den Dichtern hört das Volk sich selbst in seiner 
Tiefe und Schönheit reden, in ihrem Spiegel schaut es sein Doppelantlitz, das ewige, 
unveränderliche, immer wiederkehrende, seine geprägte Form unter den Völkern, 
seinen Charakter – und das werdende Gesicht des Tages, der Geschichte, der Krise, der 
Verwandlung” (609). Like Hofmannsthal, Wehner considers poetic language not only 
the catalyst for political and cultural transformation, which he saw as inextricably 
linked, but also as the substance of that transformation. Insofar as the German people 
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have always reflected and been reflected in their language, have always determined and 
been determined by it, so is the writer able to awaken in and reveal to them the 
immortality of which they are heir.   
One example of this comes from the poetry of Josef Weinheber, which was some 
of the most reproduced in the 1920s and 1930s.68 Like many other poets of the period, 
Weinheber proclaimed a deep indebtedness to Hölderlin, whose style and meter he 
strove closely to emulate; his understanding, however, like Nazi appropriation of the 
Nietzschean “Übermensch,” was an oversimplification. “Was Weinheber an Hölderlin 
glaubte erkannt zu haben, konzentriert er zu einer generellen Ansicht vom Dichter: ‘Aus 
dem Wort, dem Dienst an der Sprache, ergibt sich dem Dichter der Sinn seiner Sendung, 
über die Zeit hinaus.’ Daran bindet sich für Weinheber der Mythos des Dichters als des 
sehenden Sängers” (Ketelsen 307). Hölderlin, the “poet of poets,” exceeds his historical 
and literary context to become the transcendent or archetypal “seeing singer.” This 
mythical figure then serves as a model for all poets, and his poetry, by which Weinheber 
means primarily poetic form, serves as the highest standard. Like the quotation of 
Hölderlin that opens Wehner’s essay on the relationship between the writer and the 
people, Weinheber argues that making poetry, or language, itself the subject of poetry 
provides an anchor for what is fleeting. “Was bleibet aber stiften die Dichter,” says 
Hölderlin; “Die aber die Sprache stiften, damit das Flüchtige bleibe… das sind die 
Dichter,” says Weinheber (in Ketelsen 307). And for Weinheber, as for many other 
conservative poets from the period, such constancy in the face of turbulent change can 
be located in or “given face” through poetic order and form. As Weinheber writes, this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 For example, Weinheber was paid 250 RM in 1940 to do readings at the “Kulturwoche” 
organized by the Reichsschrifttumskammer under the auspices of Goebbels and the RMVP 
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poetic form is so transcendent that it can only be given by God as the face, or 
appearance, of a dream. 
Du gabst im Schlafe, Gott, mir das Gedicht. 
Ich werde es im Wachen nie begreifen. 
Nachbildend Zug um Zug das Traumgesicht, 
Nur sehnen kann ich mich und Worte häufen. 
The poet and his poetry, therefore, play an important social function in such a period of 
unrest, and once again – in this case through the mythologizing of Hölderlin – the role of 
the writer is represented as a particular kind of leader in a particular relationship to the 
people. The writer and his work do not directly lead as a politician would do but rather 
assist the people in discovering something fundamental about themselves and 
motivating them to realize the eternal form that can unite them. Against a backdrop of 
anxiety, the myth writers help to establish leads the people both to this form and to their 
role in a newly ordered German society. “Gegen die Ängste vor den Erschütterungen 
seiner Zeit formulierte Weinheber noch einmal den Mythus vom sinnsetzenden, 
sehenden Sänger, der – wenn er das Schicksal schon nicht bannen kann – das Ausharren 
unter seiner Gewalt doch ermöglicht” (311). Ketelsen calls this social and political 
function a “Zusammenhang von Leseerwartung und Poetizität.” 
 There was of course an active effort by those writers appointed to political, 
government positions to establish the relationship between the writer, literature, the 
Volk, and the state. This relationship was institutionalized in the form of the 
Reichsschrifttumskammer (RSK), a department of the Reichskulturkammer (RKK), 
which was opened in November of 1933 with ceremonial fanfare in the Philharmonie 
attended by Hitler, Goebbels, Göring, and a long list of subordinate party dignitaries. It 
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was quite the affair. “Wände, Podium und Galerien verkleidet und geschmückt mit den 
Emblemen des Nationalsozialismus sowie mit Kranzgewinden, Herbstblumen und 
Immergrün. Gedämpfte Farben, gedämpftes Licht. Im Raume eine Stimmung von 
zeremoniöser Gespanntheit.” The speech that Goebbels delivered, as well as the events 
planned for the evening, sought to both acknowledge “the revolutionary ethos 
[Gesinnung] of National Socialism” and to robustly celebrate masterworks of German 
culture.  
Furtwängler dirigierte die Egmont-Ouvertüre Beethovens, den Freiheitsgesang 
eines unterdrückten Volkes, der Goethes Drama auf seine Weise gleichsam 
umdichtet. Dann sprach Friedrich Kanzler Schillers, des Klassizisten, 
strenggefügte Prosa “Über das Erhabene”, deren subtile Begriffsdramatik freilich 
in dem großen Raume nicht voll zur Geltung kam. Den stärksten Erfolg hatte 
wohl Heinrich Schlusnus mit dem Schubert-Lied “An die Musik” und 
dem”Heimweh” von Hugo Wolf sowie der als Zugabe gespendeten 
“Zueignung” von Richard Strauß. Strauß selbst leitete mit seinem “Festlichen 
Präludium,” das gleichfalls fast klassisch anmutet, prunkvoll zu der Goebbels-
Rede über. Den festlichen Ausklang der Feier bildete der vom Bruno Kittelschen 
Chor gesungene “Wacht-auf”-Chor aus den “Meistersingern.” 
The RSK was not the only organization that the Nazis employed to control the arts, 
however. In May of the same year as the celebration at the Philharmonie, the four-
hundred-year-old Preußische Akademie der Künste was purged of forty artists, who 
were replaced with artists approved of by the party. 
In a December 1933 letter to Hans Johst, a prominent writer and member of the 
new Prussian Academy of the Arts, Hans Friedrich Blunck, the president of the RSK, 
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expressed the nationalist motivation behind the purging. “Wir Dichter kennen nur 
Deutschland. Mögen wir auch aus unserer Landschaft gewachsen sein und weiter in ihr 
wurzeln wollen, wir kennen als unseren magischen Kreis nur das deutsche Volkstum 
und seine führende Staatliche [sic] Form, das Reich… Aus der Preussischen Akademie 
haben wir die der Deutschen Volkschaft gebildet.” These institutional changes, such as 
the development of the RSK and the purging at the Preußische Akademie der Künste, 
were justified in terms of the writer’s relationship with and responsibility to the Volk and 
the Fatherland. The institutional reforms, he seems to argue, mirror the spiritual reforms 
of the German people, leading towards their unity and the undertaking of a new social 
order. “Die Reichsreform, die unser aller sehnlichster Wunsch ist, läßt auf sich warten. 
Wir wissen, dass wir Geduld haben müssen, und dass eine Umwandlung der ja seit 
Jahrhunderten bestehenden Unordnung zur endlichen Einheit unseres Volkstums Zeit 
der Erwägung und der Unterbauung der neuen Formen verlangt.”  
Realizing these nationalist convictions was going to take not only patience but 
also sacrifice, as Blunck articulates in a speech from March 21, 1935. One radical 
conclusion of this speech was not just that the writer needed to give himself fully to the 
cause of the German people and their new order, but that this would involve painfully 
losing that poetic subject dear to so many writers: themselves.  
Bewusst, nennen Sie es selbstbewusst, hat sich das Schrifttum der Gegenwart, 
hat sich das kämpfende Schrifttum, wie es sich um die Wartburg sammelte, wie 
es in den Kräften einer neuen Jugend aufwächst, verbündet und will mitten im 
Volksleben stehen. Es hat die Pflicht zu dieser Neuordnung erkannt, sie ist aber 
auch sein Recht. Der Dichter weiss schmerzlich, dass er damit an persönlichem 
Behagen, an Lebensfreude des kleinen Daseins und an betrachtlichen Stunden 
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lyrischer Deutung der Welt verliert. Er weiss aber auch, dass sein Volk ihn 
braucht, er steht und ist bereit, sein Geschick anders als in der Zeit eines 
übersteigerten Einzelwillens zu seinem eignen zu machen und die 
Volksgemeinschaft aller, auch der Schaffenden, zu bejahren, gläubig zu läutern 
und zu erfüllen. (15) 
The duty and right to contribute to the establishing of a “Neuordnung” entails losing a 
purely lyrical appreciation of the minutiae of the world and a personal sense of well-
being and satisfaction. Rather, the writer must direct his work towards publicly uniting 
the German Volk. 
As Uwe-K. Ketelsen argues, there is a strong tendency towards sentimentalism 
and nostalgia in much party-approved literature of this period, the representation of 
contentment with the banalities of life, particularly in the turbulent years before the 1932 
elections.  
‘Kultur’ wurde als ein Praxisfeld eingeschätzt, das jenseits der unruhigen und 
unerfreulichen Sphären des Alltagsleben liegt… Wer [Texte wie Auf den 
Marmorklippen oder Wem die Stunde schlägt] las, dem ordnete sich eine bedrohlich 
erfahrene Erlebniswelt zu Deutungsmustern; er erhielt Worte, Sätze, Bilder, 
Gedanken, die das Chaos der außer aller persönlichen Reichweite sich 
abspielenden historischen Ereignisse zu muster einer akzeptablen 
Lebensdeutung ordneten und das eigene Leben integrierend anschlossen an 
Bereiche, die der historisch-gesellschaftlichen Realität übergeordnet sein sollten. 
(71) 
Building cultural norms and saving one from cultural crisis, he argues, led to the active 
canon-building that was facilitated through increasing censorship measures, book 
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burnings, the purging of the Preußische Akademie der Künste and subsequent founding 
of the RKK, and the propaganda that accompanied each of these acts, rhetoric that 
elevated literature that either celebrated German culture (experienced or not) or 
provided escape from the turmoil of the age.  
As the Austrian poet Josef Weinheber wrote, “Was noch lebt, ist Traum.” In a 
society under increasing government control and oppression, Germans had few choices. 
Those who decided to stay in Germany, support the party, and believe in the party – 
unlike those who sought an “inner emigration” – by definition needed to believe in the 
fantasy version, the dream, of Germany on which the rhetoric and ideology of National 
Socialism depended. And rather than transcendence, such belief reinscribed the 
materiality of the fascist metaphysics of presence, its necessary articulation in and on the 
racialized body that culminated ultimately in the Holocaust. 
In 1935 Richard Euringer described German “Dichtung” as above partisanship 
and material politics. “Damit ist nun nicht gesagt, daß die nationalsozialistische 
Dichtung ‘Parteidichtung’ sein müsse; denn für den Nationalsozialisten ist die Partei ja 
nicht ‘Partei’, sondern Sauerteig des Lebens. Sie ist das ewig wirkende Deutschland 
dieser Zeit und ihrer Zukunft. Sie ist nicht allein der Staat des Dritten Reiches, sondern 
das Volk in seiner Verkörperung, und sie ist das werdende Reich” (in Wulf 318). In 1937, 
he exemplifies this understanding of Dichtung in his poem “Nun sag ich ja,” which also 
models the expression of embodied affirmation in the register of sacrifice. 
Nun sag ich ja zu Trieb und Drang!  
Will wuchern, nicht mehr geizen.  
Welt, der dich ruft, ist nicht mehr bang 
Vor Reibung und vor Reizen! 
 204 
 
Nun hiß ich erst die Segel hart. 
- Herr Gott, gib guten Segen! -  
Wir stoßen ab zu großer Fahrt 
Sternwärts dem Sturm entgegen! 
… 
Und ist das Werk hier nicht getan: 
Hier sang ichs doch voll Hoffen an 
Mit Weinen und mit Lachen. 
… 
Das wird ein lustig Bauen 
aus Erde, Holz und Stein! 
Die keuscheste der Frauen 
soll eure Mutter sein. 
 
Der hab ich mich ergeben 
mit Haus und Hof und Spind; 
das wird ein lautes Leben 
von Kind zu Kindeskind, 
ein Sparen und Verschwenden 
auf gute deutsche Art, 
ein Schaffen und ein Spenden 
für Zeit und Gegenwart! 
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The poem hopefully celebrates sacrificing oneself “mit Haus und Hof und Spind”; this 
sacrifice creates a “lautes Leben,” a life worthy of remembrance. Contentment with one’s 
individual sacrifice, which is “good” and “German,” derives from the knowledge that a 
loss of the self, both literal and figurative, enables the life of the Volk, which is 
predicated on “ein Sparen und Verschwenden,” “ein Schaffen und ein Spenden.” These 
euphemisms serve to mask the process underlying the meaning of an eternal Volk, which 
equates the process of saving and disappearing, creating and donating. Both of these are 
necessary for the survival of the Volk. As David Pan argues, the life of the Volk is only 
made possible through the cultivation of the individual, despite Nazism’s seeming anti-
democratic anti-individualism. Pan writes, “that the Nazi vision was in fact an 
individualist one in which the free development of individuals, without the interference 
of the state, should lead naturally to the growth of the nation as the collective 
embodiment of individual development” (11). The sacrificing subject depicted by the 
poem can thus be thought of as opposed to “Jews and Communists that have been 
defined as unsuitable for sacrifice within the German national project [and] are violently 
eliminated” (12). Therefore the making public of individual sacrifice, the “yes-saying,” 
becomes a means of concealing the violence that Nazis sought to enact in secret and in 
cultivating a “thoughtless,” in the sense of Arendt, subjectivity. 
 In his essay on the George-Hofmannsthal correspondence, Adorno focuses on 
Hofmannsthal’s own sense of sacrifice.  
In the name of beauty [the poet] consecrates himself to the preponderant thing-
world as a sacrifice… The estrangement of art from life urged by George and 
Hofmannsthal, intended to elevate art, changes into unlimited, adaptable 
proximity to life. In truth, it is not the aim of symbolism to subordinate all 
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material moments as symbols of an inner sphere. It is just this possibility that is 
subjected to doubt, whereas it is the absurd, the estranged thing-world itself, in 
its impenetrability for the subject, which endows the latter with its dignity and 
meaning on the condition that the subject dissolve itself in the world of things. 
Subjectivity no longer regards itself as the animating centre of the cosmos. It 
abandons itself to the miracle that would happen if the mere material, divested 
of meaning, were on its own to animate waning subjectivity. Instead of things 
yielding as symbols of subjectivity, subjectivity yields as the symbol of things, 
prepares itself to rigidify ultimately into the thing which society has in any case 
made of it. (223) 
What Adorno identifies here is what I have isolated as the continuity from conservative 
to fascist poetics, the latter as represented by Hans Friedrich Blunck’s assertation, 
Der Dichter weiss schmerzlich, dass er damit an persönlichem Behagen, an 
Lebensfreude des kleinen Daseins und an betrachtlichen Stunden lyrischer 
Deutung der Welt verliert. Er weiss aber auch, dass sein Volk ihn braucht, er 
steht und ist bereit, sein Geschick anders als in der Zeit eines übersteigerten 
Einzelwillens zu seinem eignen zu machen und die Volksgemeinschaft aller, 
auch der Schaffenden, zu bejahen, gläubig zu läutern und zu erfüllen. 
The difference between sacrificing lyrical subjectivity for the world of things and for the 
world of the Volk, however, marks the fundamental discontinuity between conservative 
and fascist poetics. The difference lies in the process of sacrifice itself. George and 
Hofmannsthal, as Adorno observes, do not merely “refuse to accept the status quo, in 
contrast to the naturalists who are always tempted to affirm the horrors seen by their 
acute artistic eye, as simply existing—now and always.  
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George and Hofmannsthal curried favour equally with the established order. But 
it remained an order which was estranged from them. Organized estrangement 
reveals as much of life as can be revealed without theory, since the essence itself 
is estrangement. The others represent capitalist society, but allow human beings 
to speak fictitiously as though they could still talk to each other. Aesthetic 
fictions speak the true monologue, which communicative speech merely 
conceals. (224) 
The fascist poem, however, operates communicatively; like Adorno’s reading of 
naturalism, it does not operate within the order from which it is estranged. Rather, it 
strives to annihilate that from which it is estranged. It sacrifices lyrical subjectivity in the 
service of rejecting estrangement, whereas the conservative poem sacrifices polemical, 
“engaged” dissent for an aestheticized dissent that reveals the inadequacies of that 
which it challenges. In the conclusion, I will consider a poem by Friedrich George Jünger 
that I think operates in a more ideally Adornian sense by actually ventriloquizing and 
operating within the ideological logic that it subverts.  
 In any case, by sacrificing transcendent lyrical subjectivity for material racializing 
ideology, Euringer’s poem thus performs the means by which Nazi ideology strove to 
annihilate representation and embody pure presence. Another example of this in lyric 
poetry comes from Hermann Claudius, a writer typically associated with inner 
emigration. In 1933, eighty-eight writers published a pledge of support for Adolf Hitler 
in the Berlin-based newspaper Vossische Zeitung, which was replaced one year later with 
the NSDAP party organ the Völkischer Beobachter. One of the names attached to the 
“Gelöbnis treuester Gefolgschaft” was that of the 54-year-old poet Hermann Claudius, 
whose embrace of National Socialism exemplifies the movement’s widespread appeal. 
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Claudius, who was honored by Willy Brandt in 1973 and died a month short of his 102nd 
birthday in 1980, served in World War I and had been involved with youth movements 
and labor unions affiliated with the social democrats before gradually becoming both 
more religious and more conservative. During the 1930s and 40s, he published more 
than ten books with the Nazi publisher Verlag Albert Langen-Georg Müller, was invited 
to participate in several of the so-called “Dichtertagen,” or “Dichtertreffen” organized 
by the party, and won two national literary prizes. In a letter from 26 June 1946, Hans-
Friedrich Blunck, the second chairman of the Deutsche Akademie der Dichtung of the 
Preußische Akademie der Künste and the first president of the RSK cited earlier, wrote 
to Paul Alverdes, the former editor of the then recently-dismantled literary journal Das 
innere Reich, “Hätte ich einen Preis für deutsche Lyrik zu verteilen gehabt, hätte ich ihn 
Weinheber und Hermann Claudius zuge[geben].” 
Claudius therefore represents the opportunistic conservative writer who 
benefited from the rise of National Socialism by not actively resisting it. Of Claudius and 
his poetry, Ernst Loewy writes, “Der naiv-apolitische Gehalt und die intellektuelle 
Anspruchslosigkeit seiner Werke gewannen den Nazis eine anerkennende Haltung ab, 
die er seinerseits durch ein vielzitiertes ‘Führergedicht’ belohnt; das brachte ihn zu 
Unrecht in den Ruf eines ausgesprochenen Nazi-Dichters.” Loewy also explains, 
“Während der Zeit des Dritten Reiches war Claudius Mitglied der Deutschen Akademie 
der Dichtung.”69  
Claudius published often in Die neue Literatur, and the poems in question, which 
concern the role of the writer and the lyric in mediating between the internal and the 
communal, the German citizen and the German State, are from the February, 1935 issue. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 “The naïve-apolitical content and the intellectual modesty of his work won the Nazis’ 
acceptance, which he praised through a much-cited “Führer poem.” This has caused him unjustly 
to be characterized as an outspoken Nazi poet.” 
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They raise a number of questions about the nature of complicity by staging the attempt 
to assimilate conservative (embodied by “Der Dichter”) and Nazi fascist (embodied by 
“An Hans Grimm”) conceptions of the writer as leader and the clash of conservative 
ideals with – but also the concession of those ideals to – Nazi idealism. This is because as 
the poems strive to uphold the precarious tension or distinction between the lyrical and 
the racial-ideological, the poetic subject in each instance completely lacks a sense of 
political (or lyrical) agency, failing to maintain this tension and helplessly witnessing its 
(fascist) collapse. 
An Hanns Grimm 
 
Dein Schwert ist breit und blank und sah die Welt, 
Kreuzfahrer du des deutschen Wandermutes, 
du später Enkel eines edeln Blutes, 
der seinen Schild in müden Händen hält. 
 
Nach innen sucht dein Aug den steilen Pfad, 
da dir dein Herrgott einsamlich begegnet 
und deine Mannesseele dir gesegnet, 
 mit strengen Händen dir gesegnet hat. 
  
Du Gläubiger am Wort, ich grüße dich. 
Du schaust mich lange an und lächelst bitter. 
Du letzter, lieber, treuer, deutscher Ritter, 
du Don Quichotte deines eigenen Ich. 
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Der Dichter 
 
Ich habe so oft 
nach Licht und Raum begehrt— 
nun bin ich fast erschrocken, 
daß man mich ehrt. 
 
Daß man vor allem Volke 
mich erhöht. 
Ich falte meine Hände 
wie zum Gebet. 
 
Daß meine Seele vor Gott 
einsam sei, 
daß sie nicht willig werde 
dem Taggeschrei. 
 
Es kommt der Abend, es gehen 
Baum und Vogel zur Ruh. 
Der Tag hat ausgesungen. 
Seele, bleibe du! 
The poems invite being read together. On the one hand, they physically appear 
on facing pages and both thematize praise for the writer. More importantly, though, 
where the first poem leaves off – the word “Ich,” lyrical subjectivity – the second poem 
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begins. Likewise, where the second poem ends – the word “du” – the first begins 
(“dein”). Both poems are framed by and related through their positing, and thematizing, 
of this fundamental dialectic. The fascist and conservative perspectives embodied by 
each poem exist in relation to each other, but so too is each perspective immanent to 
each poem: the conservative speaker addressing the fascist writer, and the fascist people 
addressing the conservative writer. 
 Over both poems, multiple conservative representations converge on the 
singular fascist attempt to annihilate such representation. For example, in “An Hans 
Grimm, the poet is the witness to and benefactor of Grimm’s linguistic weaponry, which 
recalls the argument of Max Kommerell. In this case, however, the weapons are inflected 
both nationalistically, “Kreuzfahrer du des deutschen Wandermutes,” and bio-racially, 
“du später Enkel eines edeln Blutes,” evoking the argument of someone like Blunck. The 
poet also praises Grimm for being introspective, “Nach innen sucht dein Aug den steilen 
Pfad,” which recalls Hofmannsthal’s “in eines gedichtet werden.” This treacherous path, 
however, leads to the discovery of a “strong, masculine soul” blessed by God with the 
courage to protect the German Volk, once again resolving in the anti-lyrical and anti-
representational materiality of “race.” The final stanza stages the confrontation between 
the poetic subject and Grimm, “Gläubiger am Wort.” His belief in the power of 
language, however, renders him a “Don Quichotte des eignen Ich.” By this reference, 
Claudius does not seem to mean that Grimm is “quixotic,” or irrationally idealistic 
(though this double sense is not lost), but rather the practitioner of an antiquated 
chivalry, modestly willing to sacrifice himself, and his poetic and lyrical subjectivity, in 
order to “save” the German soul. 
 212 
 “An Hanns Grimm” is an address from a poet to a poet, but in the final line 
these distinct subjectivities begin to dissolve, rhetorically, through the use of the 
genitive: “deines eigenen Ich.” Whereas each line of the poem begins with the repetition 
of the word “you,” the final stanza ends with the word “I,” which is repeated as the very 
first word of the following poem, interrupted only by the reflexive title, “Der Dichter.” 
In this poem, the lyric voice responds to his exaltation by folding his hands in prayer. 
Like the trees and birds that have gone to sleep, his soul does not aspite to the daytime 
clamor but rather acts through relative inaction. In addressing his soul in the final line, 
he ascribes to it the same sense of permanence that is associated with his writing. The 
final word “du” directs us to this content by referring back to the previous poem, which 
is saturated by the word “du.” It also draws a relationship between the collective “du” 
of the German Volk and spirit and the individual self who, folding his hands in prayer, 
gives himself, and his lyrical subjectivity, over to such permanence. This “resolution,” or 
“dissolution,” destroys the tension that conservatives such as Hofmannsthal and 
Kommerell believed underlay the dialectics of self and other, individual and Volk, poesis 
and praxis, the inner-spiritual and the outward-ideological.  
And whereas conservatives such as Hofmannsthal and Kommerell valued the 
lyrical potential of this tension, Nazi fascists like Blunck sacrificed such potential by 
collapsing the dialectic in the name of racial ideology. This collapse is what occurs in 
these two poems. The abstract Dichter becomes the embodied, real Nazi Hans Grimm, a 
collapse does not happen consciously or willingly. Continuous between the poems, then, 
is a self-conscious sense of helplessness to stop this dissolution. Exemplary perhaps of 
the perspective of “inner emigration,” the poems demonstrate the difficulty of 
simultaneously preserving lyrical integrity and autonomy – “Ich” – and reproducing 
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fascist ideology – “du” – as the poetic subject alternates between a helplessly reluctant 
agent of political transformation, in the conservative poem “Der Dichter,” and a 
gracious yet helpless witness (he can say nothing else, cannot resist) to that 
transformation, in the Nazi fascist poem “An Hanns Grimm.” This helplessness, then, 
present in both poems, speaks simultaneously to the historical conservative subject’s 
arguably self-conscious passivity, opportunism, and complicity. 
With regard to conservative political aesthetics in the late Weimar and early 
National Socialist periods, there is thus a continuity onto which the work of 
Hofmannsthal and Kommerell can indeed be mapped, but this continuity is marked by 
differences fundamental to the question of the extent to which conservatives (or 
conservative writers) were complicit in the rise of National Socialism (or Nazi 
conceptions of the poet). On the one hand, the texts all privilege the writer’s access to 
some eternal spirit that is greater than the individual. They discuss the internal process 
necessary for a national transformation and the need to draw on literary tradition. Each 
text conceives of the writer heroically, as one who fights for or defends the German 
spirit. Härlen, Wehner, and Brandenburg, however, express the urgency for this defense 
in more actively political terms, whereas Hofmannsthal and Kommerell seek to 
invigorate German letters by returning to German classicism, which will revive a 
general relation to literature as was experienced during that period and thereby remake 
German society. Härlen and the others, however, are explicit about the political and 
spiritual stakes of heeding the classical writer, stakes that under Blunck involve 
preserving the “purity” of the German race. While Hofmannsthal and Kommerell 
nowhere imply this connection, a point that should not be overstated, they also do not 
explicitly deny it, a point that should be critically considered. 
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While both of these men concede that the recognition of a German will may serve 
to restructure German society, they remain indifferent to the specifics of this 
reorganization, no less than the historical process of the reorganization itself. The 
positions of Wehner and Brandenburg represent a possible transition between the 
permissiveness implicit in this position and the active political role of the writer 
espoused by officials such as Blunck and Goebbels. For Wehner and Brandenburg, the 
writer must deploy his ability to inspire individual transformation for the justification, 
protection, and proliferation of the Volk. And this revelation was one that–if their 
biographies are any indication–both men, as well as Kommerell, saw reflected in the 
social transformation brought on by Hitler and the NSDAP. The difference, albeit slight, 
is that for Kommerell and Hofmannsthal, the resurgence of classicism as a literary form 
is primary and the social transformation secondary, whereas for Brandenburg and 
Wehner, who seek to instrumentalize this resurgence, the reverse is true. In other words: 
the conservative position articulated here states that the Volk, which emerges from 
poetic German language, is ephemeral and finite, whereas the Nazi fascist position 
articulated by Blunck and anticipated by Wehner and Brandenburg states that poetic 
German language emerges from and in service to the spiritually-infinite Volk. 
It therefore seems an incomplete accusation to claim that the two texts by 
Hofmannsthal and Kommerell, not to mention George’s poetry, provided the politically-
engaged intellectual groundwork that morphed into active National Socialist extremism. 
Rather, they would more aptly be classified as emblematic of a brand of national 
conservatism, prominent also among many Christian intellectuals of the period, that, 
relatively indifferent to activist partisan politics, encouraged the return to literary 
classicism as a means of externally transforming the German Geist via the 
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metamorphosis that occurs, internal to the individual, in the experience of reading. 
While the Nazis certainly appropriated this discourse, and while many prominent 
national conservative writers did join the Nazi party, the texts themselves do not invite 
such appropriation or make such allegiances. That is, while critical attention has been 
given to the political dimensions of each text, less has been said about how the 
arguments’ fundamentally aesthetic concerns – arguably a withdrawal from political 
activism – constitute a political non-orientation, permissiveness, or vague and aimless 
desire for revolution that would reinvigorate the Volk. In light of studies associating 
Stefan George and his disciples with National Socialism, it therefore seems necessary to 
consider how this political passivity may both characterize the conservative position and 
arguably have contributed more to the rise of National Socialism than the active 
espousal of “pseudo-fascist” ideology.  
While Hofmannsthal and Kommerell may not have had genocide or any of its 
necessary precursors in their minds when they spoke of a conservative revolution and 
“deeply-buried weapons” – while they seem most likely to have had in mind nothing 
other than the immensely transformative power of language – their arguments 
nonetheless reflect a widespread reactionary impulse among conservative aesthetes and 
intellectuals. Whereas they largely turned away from politics as the realm in which a 
social revolution must be imagined and pursued, in this retreat from politics they, like 
practitioners of “inner emigration,” simultaneously forewent the political resistance 
necessary to prevent Hitler’s rise to power and offered another avenue for his regime to 
justify the urgency of its existence. That Kommerell, as well as Wehner and 
Brandenburg, then went on to join the Nazi party provides further evidence that the 
appeal of the movement was widespread, and that it, like the poet, reflected the desire 
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for community and immortality common among conservatives, National Socialists, and 
those who embodied the gray area in between.  
In his collection of essays At the Mind’s Limits, the Holocaust survivor Jean 
Améry made the following statement on complicity and Vergangenheitsbewältigung with 
which I would like to conclude: “Es geht nicht an, nationale Tradition dort für sich zu 
reklamieren, wo sie eine ehrenhafte war, und sie zu verleugnen, wo sie als die 
verkörperte Ehrvergessenheit einen wahrscheinlich imaginären und gewiß wehrlosen 
Gegner aus der Menschengemeinschaft ausstieß. Wenn deutsch sein heißt, der 
Nachkomme des Matthias Claudius sein, dann meint es doch wohl auch, daß man den 
NS-Parteilyriker Hermann Claudius in der Ahnenreihe hat.”70 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Jean Améry, “Ressentiments,” in Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines 
Überwältigten (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1977), 136. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: THE RESISTANCE OF SIMULATION: FRAGMENTATION AND 
TOTALITY IN FRIEDRICH GEORG JUENGER’S “DER MOHN” 
[Ernst] Jüngers Plan geht auf die Planeten, nicht auf eine Nation. Die totale 
Mobilmachung, sinnvoll für einen konkreten politischen Zweck, etwa für den deutschen 
Freiheitskampf, erscheint gerade als totaler planetarischer Vorgang sinnlos. 
-Hans Bogner, “Der neue Übermensch,” 1932 
 
 
My dissertation compares the poetry and poetics of T. S. Eliot and Stefan George, 
situating these poets in the context of the Conservative Revolution and “low” fascist 
cultural productions. One way of conceiving of this comparison is in terms of how 
conservative and fascist writers poeticize fragmentation and totality. In this sense, I 
might also refer to engaged and autonomous art, as I am using the term “fragmentation” 
to imply the disruption of poetry by political engagement and the term “totality” to 
imply the assimilation of political engagement to the poetic sphere. Whereas each 
conservative poet examined in my project may tend more towards fragmentation or 
totality, towards engaged or autonomous art, I insist that in their poetry, national 
politics finds poetic expression in terms of an unstable and unfixed distinction between 
these terms. The conservative indeterminacy that I identify in even the most unexpected 
of poets, Percy Shelley, thus reveals a hybrid art that strives both for autonomy and 
engagement.71  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 For a more thorough discussion of fascism and the totalizing aesthetics of Eliot, Pound, Yeats, 
and Lewis, see Stanfield, “Modernist Poetics and Fascism: The Caliph’s Design.” Scott argues 
against the post-modern tendency to forget the significance of modernist aspirations for 
totalization, to which he refers, following Deleuze and Guattari, as “molarity.” He writes, “A 
totalizing aesthetic made these writers susceptible to the appeals of fascism; we can read their 
texts without at all invoking that aesthetic, if we choose; the modernists themselves apparently 
became disenchanted with it. A case for history’s dustbin, apparently: We may eventually want 
to ask, however, whether we want to dispense entirely and forever with the idea of aesthetic 
totality” (168). The argument presented here explores the possibility that political resistance can 
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  On the one hand, the byproduct of this hybridity is a kind of disinterest in 
material political concerns similar to that fostered by entertainment literature, thus an 
unintended and indirectly facilitated source of fascism’s success. On the other hand, this 
conservative aesthetic tendency is discontinuous with fascist poetics precisely because it 
demands an instable distinction between fragmentation and totality, because it admits 
and affirms both aesthetic and human failure. It is precisely such failure that fascism 
demands be overcome, a demand that manifests in poetry through the collapse of the 
dialectical tension between fragmentation and totality. For the fascist poem, such a 
distinction threatens its very existence. This is why in expressing the difference between 
national and planetary mobilization, Hans Bogner, a conservative revolutionary who 
joined the NSDAP in 1937, insists that total mobilization is meaningless in terms of the 
planetary (aesthetic) totality of Ernst Jünger. Because such totality admits the possibility 
of the distinction between autonomy and engagement, Bogner assimilates it to the 
national (political) fragment, thereby rejecting this distinction and making such a 
fragment the only possible site of meaning.  
The poetry of Stefan George and T. S. Eliot, however, upholds the dialectical 
tension between meaning and its other, between autonomy and engagement or between 
aesthetics and politics, which the fascist poem collapses. Eliot’s poetry from the 1920s 
and 1930s codes his denunciation of liberalism, his attraction to and later 
disillusionment with fascism, and ultimately his withdrawal from material politics 
altogether. Unlike Nazi fascists, who encourage and instrumentalize this withdrawal, 
Eliot’s poetry demonstrates the humility necessary for its avowal. It depicts the 
relationship between the fragmented political subject bounded by temporality and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
reside in the parodying of aesthetic totalization, a parody that reveals the impossibility and 
failure of such totalization. 
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impossible totality of (Christian) eternity speciously offered by fascism. Those 
metaphors that posit the adequacy of this relationship ultimately give way to the failure 
of metaphor, in the form of paradox, and the affirmation of post-lapsarian human, by 
which Eliot means political and poetic, failure. Eliot’s poetic indeterminacy functions 
much like the Niezschean imperative to challenge values that have been ossified in and 
by language, resulting in the poetic affirmation of human (poetic and political) failure 
and, more than that, the ethical affirmation of such failure. 
In one sense, then, Eliot’s political aesthetic does not simply reproduce or 
anticipate literary tropes popular among fascist writers. One prominent example of this 
is the presentation of one’s ancestry, ubiquitous in Four Quartets, to allegorize eternity. 
Unlike the myth of “blood and soil” that formed the ideological basis for Nazi 
Germany’s race laws, Eliot’s language insinuates the impossibility of accessing the 
eternal and the inevitable failure of this for mortal man. For Eliot, art offers us a way of 
conceiving and affirming this impossibility, whereas for Nazi fascists, art is a means of 
affirming its possibility in the form of something like racial wholeness. A more 
provocative comparison, however, would consider the representation of ancestry from 
the early 1930s in the conservative and eventually fascist German literary journal Die 
Neue Literature, which frequently began with idyllic, nostalgic autobiographies. Written 
by writers and poets, these vignettes sought to demonstrate how the romantic 
movement of aesthetic experience doubled that of overcoming the self, experiencing 
oneself as the totality of one’s lineage, itself always rooted in the myth of the Aryan race. 
This idea of totality, however, is conspicuously void of political commentary; it is the 
fascist depoliticizing of politics avant la lettre. While Eliot’s metaphors challenge 
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fascism’s stabilizing of the totality/fragmentation dialectic, they nonetheless avoid the 
subject of material politics altogether by withdrawing into poetry. 
  This move is particularly fraught in the German tradition, where the concept of 
“inner emigration” – a term that has come to signify Germans who physically remained 
in Nazi Germany but covertly resisted the regime – has come under serious scrutiny. My 
dissertation pursues two lines of inquiry in order to address the extent to which 
conservative poets perform and promote passivity during the rise of fascism. The first of 
these is focused on the poet Stefan George, whose political poetry I argue dramatizes a 
privileging of aesthetic experience at the expense of political activism. As the inverse of 
my reading of Eliot, there is a noticeable shift in George’s poetry from the desire for 
aesthetic totality in his early poem Algabal to the fragmented form of “Einem jungen 
Führer im ersten Weltkrieg.” Like Eliot, George’s poetry thematically demonstrates his 
fascination with fascism. Whereas Eliot’s use of the totalizing trope of metaphor reveals 
his ethical critique of the material impossibility of fascism to be what it promised, 
George’s use of fragmenting metonymy demonstrates his understanding of fascism as a 
fundamentally aesthetic, and therefore ideational, phenomenon. I derive this reading 
from Paul de Man’s notion of allegory, the indeterminacy of which I argue is immanent 
to the critical disagreement surrounding George’s relationship to fascism. In this sense, 
George’s poetry performs his own political ambivalence, particularly through the tropes 
of deferral and prophecy, promoting the primacy of aesthetic experience – those 
humanist concerns that Eliot calls the “pre-political” – over political engagement. As 
with Eliot, poetically rendering the subjection of social and political concerns during a 
period of such rapid social and political change amounts to a kind of passivity that Nazi 
fascism later sought to produce in its ambitions for total mobilization. 
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  In this conclusion, I would like to gesture towards one possible lyrical model for 
rejecting rejection, so to speak, that follows from my dissertation’s primary two 
conclusions. The first of these states that the distinction between the lyric expression of 
conservatism and (proto-)fascism can be understood in terms of the de Manian poetic 
image, namely regarding the inadequacy with which it renders the opposition between 
fragmentation and totality. The second, arguably more experimental, claim is that the 
promotion and affirmation of this inadequacy does not free the poetry of Eliot or George 
from accusations of aesthetic or ideological complicity, whether in the case of George’s 
millenarianism or Eliot’s anti-Semitism. In order to posit what a resistant conservative 
poem might look like, I would therefore like briefly to consider Friedrich Georg Jünger’s 
poem “Der Mohn.” The image of the poppy, I contend, neither affirms the inadequacy of 
the fragmentation/totality dialectic nor fixes its terms, performing instead a violent 
challenge to (proto-)fascism from within while nonetheless drawing on the formal and 
philosophical tenants of classicism and conservatism.  
In this sense, it seems necessary to introduce the concepts of “inner emigration” 
and resistance more specifically. Is it uniquely possible for poetry to embed a parodic 
critique of nazism, one that undoes the logic of fascist tropes from within? The 
counterpoint to Jünger’s poem “Der Mohn” is Josef Weinheber’s “Das Gedicht,” which 
in Chapter V I argue performs the intoxicating dream of totality offered by fascism by 
conflating the poem itself with that dream and thus disallowing rhetorical 
indeterminacy. Jünger’s poem, however, fragments the utopian vision upheld by 
Weinheber such that the passive inner emigration valued by Weinheber is rendered 
impossible. Still working within the neo-classical conservative model of securing the 
permanence of poetic tradition, Jünger’s poppy is a violently urgent image that captures 
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the dynamism of Eliot’s metaphor and the indeterminacy of George’s metonymy while 
also rejecting the passivity the possibility for which their poetry allows. Jünger’s poem 
therefore presents a mode of political resistance unique to the domain of poetry: the 
ability to interrupt one’s own withdrawal from political pressures in order to critique the 
political activity from which, and the passivity with which, one withdrew. This is the 
lesson of Nietzsche and the later de Man, both of whom were drawn to fascist and 
proto-fascist ideology, and who located in poetic language the power to inhabit fascism, 
and to expel it. 
Furthermore, this reading of Jünger’s poems seems to be less a challenge to 
Adorno’s argument in his essay on Stefan George, in which he also likens George’s 
poetry to Nietzsche’s project, than an extension of it. On the one hand, Adorno writes, 
“George verblendete sich dagegen, daß, was ihm morbid und dekadent dünkte, auch in 
ihm das Stichhaltigste war. Einer dialektischen Spannung, die Nietzsche noch austrug, 
zeigte dessen lyrischer Erbe schon nicht mehr sich gewachsen” (528). In the essay, 
Adorno focuses on poetry that is “unallegorisch,” absorbed in “sinnlichen Situation,” 
and “speichert… gedrängt bis zum Schweigen… das Gefühl eines Weltalters auf, das 
den Gesang schon verbietet, der noch davon singt” (529). While he argues against a 
dialectical or allegorical tendency in George’s poetry, Adorno insists that this poetry, as 
well as George’s translations, resolve into a kind of Benjaminian “pure language.” 
“Manchmal redet wirklich aus George, wie ein leztes Mal, und wie andere es nur 
vortäuschten, Sprache selber… Mit dem Fremdwort peinen für peine wird, wie 
Benjamin vom Übersetzer es forderte, die eigene Sprache durch die andere erweitert” 
(529-532).  
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Rather than indeterminacy, it is violence itself that George impels to language, or 
poetic signification. “Die Gewalt, die noch einmal zum Wort zwingt, ihr Sieg und das 
maßlose Grauen, das dieser Sieg als selbstvernichtender bereitet – das ist Georges 
Rätselfigur” (535). Despite claiming that George does not admit dialectical movement in 
his poetry, this process nonetheless seems to entail a process of creation and destruction, 
of violence turning against the very language it is forced into creating. “Der gewalttätige 
Wille reicht bis in die rein lyrisch intendierten Gebilde hinein” (525). In his essay on the 
correspondence between George and Hofmannsthal, Adorno characterizes this instead 
as a negative impulse. “Was immer [George und Hofmannsthal] der herrschenden 
Gesellschaft positive kontrastieren mögen, ist ihr untertan als Spiegel des Individuums, 
so wie Georges Engel dem Dichter gleicht, so wie der Liebende im Stern des Bundes am 
Geliebten ‘mein eigen fleisch’ errät. Was überlebt, ist die bestimmte Negation” (237). The 
“puzzling” nature of George’s treatment of violence, or its “determinate negation,” 
allows the grounds for aesthetic disambiguation between the fascist and the 
conservative poem.  
While he presents a close and careful reading of George’s poetry, albeit not the 
political poetry on which my dissertation focuses, Adorno does not take his own 
argument this far.  
Georges bündischen Liturgien paßten trotz oder wegen des Pathos der Distanz 
zu den Sonnwendfeiern und Lagerfeuern jugendbewegter Horden und ihrer 
furchtbaren Nachfolger. Das angedrehte Wir der hier beheimateten Gedichte ist 
so fiktiv, und darum so verderblich wie die Art von Volk, die den Völkischen vor 
Augen stand. Wo George zum Preis von Führertum sich erniedrigt, ist er in 
Schuld verstrickt und nicht wiederzuerwecken. (524) 
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While I don’t necessarily disagree with Adorno’s unforgiving tone in instances where 
George does parrot the ideology of the Volk, I find this argument anachronistic enough 
to speak of multiple complicities, or a constellation of complicities, such that George did 
not promote the Holocaust but may have indirectly endorsed ideas that were 
instrumental in getting Hitler’s party elected. Adorno does however approximate this 
argument, as well as my argument about conservative banality, in his essay on the 
“George und Hofmannsthal: Zum Briefwechsel: 1891-1906,” concerned as it is with 
George’s symbolist phase and insistent, as Adorno is in the “George” essay, on a 
discontinuity between his later political poems and early aestheticist ones. 
Der Flügel der deutschen Rechten, mit dem Hofmannsthal sympathisiert, ist zum 
Nationalsozialismus übergegangen, soweit man es ihm erlaubt hat, oder tobt sich 
in jener geistigen Handweberei aus, deren Figuren Lorenz und Cordula heißen. 
Sie dienen der Propaganda auf eigene Weise: ihr besonnenes Maßhalten 
dementiert das maßlose Grauen… Die Georgesche Schule hat, bei geringerer 
Weltläufigkeit, mehr Widerstand aufgebracht… George selber zumindest blieb 
unverführt von einer mondanité, die auch über Hitler internationale Gespräche 
zu führen verstand. Das ‘geheime Deutschland,’ das George proklamierte, 
vertrug sich weniger gut mit dem aufgebrochenen als das legere Einverständnis, 
das von Anbeginn sich nicht durch die Landesgrenzen beengt fühlte, die später 
revidiert werden sollten. Er hatte den Blick für die fatale Toleranz, die ihm die 
maßgebenden Salons hätten bewilligen mögen. (205-206)72 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Walter Benjamin, in a letter from 1940, critiqued this perception of Hugo von Hofmannsthal. 
“Demungeachtet geht es meiner Überzeugung nach nicht an, [Hans] Carossa einer ‘Schule’, 
deren Haupt Hofmannsthal gewesen sei, zurechnend, von der Gleichschaltung der deutschen 
Schriftsteller im Zeichen dieser Schule, das heißt Hofmannsthals selbst zu redden. Hofmannsthal ist 
1928 gestorben. Er hat ein non liquet in der Strafsache, die Sie gegen ihn vertreten, wenn es ihm 
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Following from Adorno’s sense of George’s “negative” poetics, I contend that his 
political poetry also disrupts the passive, fixed, and unallegorical nature of fascist 
poetry. In any case, Adorno’s argument that George’s poetry lapses into this mode in his 
least political poetry is consonant with my argument. His readings primarily focus on 
these moments, which, while guilty of the assocations of which Adorno accuses them, 
fail to include in their analysis those poems that I argue allegorize the indeterminacy 
that fascism rejected, thereby negating this rejection. In Adorno’s words, “Darum 
überschlägt sich der Georgesche Heroismus. Seine mythischen Züge sind das Gegenteil 
jenes Erbgutes, als welches die politische Apologetik sie beschlagnahmte. Sie sind Züge 
von Trotz” (215-216).  
In this broader context, Adorno’s argument that George’s poems impel violence 
to language provides a useful formulation for thinking about “The Poppy.” First, 
Adorno’s claim about self-destructive language recalls Barthes’s claim that language is 
inherently fascist insofar as it compels speech, and that literature provides the means out 
of this power structure by destabilizing meaning. That is, literature is able to perform an 
act of violence, or revolution, against the very meaning that it purports to impel. When 
this is done within the bounds of a particular ideological lexicon, its potential for 
resistance is amplified. It is for this reason that the “conservative” poem, with recourse 
to exerting power, is arguably more revolutionary than the “liberal” or leftist poem, 
with recourse most generally towards engaged, if revolutionary, polemic. It is this 
approach that Friedrich George Jünger’s poem “The Poppy” takes in its critique of 
National Socialism. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
sonst nicht gesichert wäre, mit seinem Tod erkauft. Ich würde meinen, Sie sollten diese Stelle 
nochmals überdenken; ich bin nahe daran, Sie darum zu bitten” (449). 
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In its time, Jünger’s poem did not escape Nazi authorities. In fact, following its 
publication in 1934, the Gestapo searched Jünger’s Berlin apartment, pressured him to 
move back to Überlingen on the Bodensee and issued him a “Schreibverbot.” The poem 
addresses several subjects of intertextual relevance, including the authoritarian Roman 
general Coriolan, the main subject of Eliot’s only meditation on fascism. In addition and 
related to Coriolan, “Der Mohn” thematizes “Ruhm,” or glory, with which the fascists 
were obsessed. Its opening lines read, 
 Scharlachfarbender Mohn, ich sehe dich gern auf den Gräbern, 
 Wo du den schlafenden Ruhm alternder Grüfte bewachst. 
In loose dactylic hexameter that occasionally substitutes a spondee for the more 
traditional dactyl, these lines present a poppy that rests atop the graves of fallen heroes, 
its bright scarlet color symbolizing, or “awakening,” those heroes’ past, or “sleeping,” 
glory. The poem immediately evokes both the conservative penchant for neoclassical, in 
this case elegiac, form alongside the fascist themes of sacrifice, ancestry, and hero 
worship. While the poppy seems to capture the fascist proliferation of these symbols, 
however, the following stanza begins turning critical not only of such particular 
symbolism, but also of the symbol more broadly. Here, the poem associates the milk of 
the poppy with the easement of pain, “Mohnsaft, du stillst uns den Schmerz,” which 
over the course of the poem becomes intoxication, ignorance, and delusion, “das 
kindische Lied rumhloser Trunkenheit.”  
This line also alludes to F. G. Jünger’s brother Ernst’s essay “Über den Schmerz,” 
which was published in the same year. In this essay, Ernst Jünger makes a similar 
association, albeit with a more celebratory, if equally catastrophic, tone. In describing 
what he considers to be a “new kind of security,” the illiberal and antibourgeois 
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integration of pain into human subjectivity, Jünger writes that “the human will 
disciplines and outfits this flesh with such painstaking care that it now seems more 
indifferent to injury. Today, we again are able to bear the sight of death with greater 
indifference, since we no longer feel at home in our body as we did before.” In drawing 
a parallel beteen this irrational willingness to sacrifice the body and the rise of 
technology, Jünger continues by writing that, “it no longer accords with our style to stop 
a flying show or a car race simply because of a deadly accident. Such accidents lie not 
outside but inside the zone of a new kind of security” (43). Ernst Jünger diagnoses a 
particularly modern and illiberal self-objectification, a detached “second consciousness” 
of the self that integrates pain and sacrifice and rejects the liberal, bourgeois values of 
security and comfort. While Ernst Jünger is enchanted by this emerging stage of human 
history (at least at this point in his life, as he criticized this position following the 
Holocaust), his brother Friedrich Georg is explicitly critical of indifference at the sight of 
death, an indifference he sees ultimately yielding to either applause or permissiveness, 
both of which would be facilitated through propaganda from the top as well as the 
lateral dissemination of that propaganda among an uninformed and unquestioning 
populace.  
In recognizing that the progression of history is marked by war and violence, the 
unending search for “die gewaltigsten Kränze,” the speaker of the poem criticizes the 
political ends for which the concept of glory is marshaled. While the poem opens by 
evoking “schlafenden Ruhm,” it ends with “ruhmloser Trunkenheit.” Meanwhile, the 
scarlet of the poppy gradually fades throughout the poem into the deep red of the Nazi 
flag.  
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Feste seh ich und Feiern, ich höre Märsche, Gesänge,  
Bunt ist von Fahnen die Stadt, immengleich summet der Schwarm. 
Following a description of the senseless violence perpetuated by those dead historical 
figures who would occupy the old graves of the opening lines, the poem takes an 
explicitly political turn. Parodying Nazi rhetoric of hero worship, the speaker is 
transported from the wastelands of history to the wasteland of Germany particularly 
through the invocation of the Volk. 
 Widrig ist mir der Redner Geschlecht. Kalekutische Hähne 
 Höre ich kollern am Markt, höre ich scharren am Platz. 
 Gaukler treiben mit Worten ihr Wesen, Lügner sie deuteln, 
 Retter, sie retten den Trug, Ärzte, sie scheuen den Tod. 
 Wollt ihr betrügen das Volk, so schmeichelt ihm schamlos und lobt es, 
 Dient ihm mit Worten zuerst, eh ihr es redend beherrscht. 
 Hört, es schmeicheln Tribunen dem Volk, es jubeln Betrogne 
 Laut den Betrügern zu, die sie mit Netzen umgarnt. 
 Volk, wo sind deine Toten? Sie schweigen. 
Here the image of the Indian market reveals itself as an allegory, doubling the 
manipulation of language that has seduced and deceived the German people into 
obedience. The abrupt apostrophe invoking the people, asking them where their dead 
are, reveals the poem’s political import. This import is amplified by the allusion to the 
parable of the ring from Lessing’s Nathan der Weise, specifically the moment in which the 
judge, in reference to which of the three brothers possesses the “true” ring, says to them, 
“O so seid ihr alle drei / Betrogene Betrieger!” (82). Like the poppy seduces the poetic 
subject, so too has the Nazi banner seduced the Volk; like poem misleads us through 
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language, so too has National Socialism. Those who have been deceived into parroting 
its ideology deceive themselves and others in turn into believing the truth of that 
ideology. This is not dissimilar from what Ernst Jünger, in his essay on pain, calls the 
“manufacture of consent” that “signifies nothing other than the transformation of the 
masses from a moral agent into an object” (30). 
 The silence of the dead, their absence of language, resonates all the more 
powerfully in the context this stanza establishes of speaking and serving with words. In 
a line reminiscent of the Mann from George’s poem “Das Neue Reich” who “sprengt die 
ketten fegt auf trümmerstätten / die ordnung,” Jünger’s poem asks the people, 
 Habt ihr feindliche Heere geschlagen, die Fürsten gefangen, 
 Risset ihr Ketten entzwei, die euch der Sieger gestückt? 
 Nein, sie bejubeln den Sieg, der über Brüder erfochten, 
 Süsser als Siege sie dünkt, die man in Schlachten erstritt. 
In this moment, the speaker reflects on the “Begeisterung” that accompanies the 
incomprehensible clamor (“Taumel,” “Lärm,” “Geschrei”) of the masses championing 
war. By rewriting (or more literally, renaming) the word from “Begeisterung” to 
“Trunkenheit,” the speaker excises the association of anything spiritual (geistig) from 
total mobilization that would lead to conquest and war.  
 Schmerzend hallt in den Ohren der Lärm mir, mich widert der Taumel, 
 Widert das laute Geschrei, das sich Begeisterung nennt. 
 Wehe! Begeisterung! Silberner Brunnen der Stille, du klarer, 
 Du kristallener Born, nennt es Begeisterung nicht. 
 Tiefer schweigen die Toten, sie trauern, sie hören das Lärmen, 
 Hören das kindische Lied ruhmloser Trunkenheit nicht. 
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The poem thus ends by rejecting the propagandistic overtones of the word 
“Begeisterung” but also by stating that the dead reject the “kindische Lied ruhmloser 
Trunkenheit.” In this double act of negation, the poem rejects rejection, challenging 
fascism’s impulse, which is also language’s impulse per Roland Barthes, to compel 
meaning. Jünger’s allegory, however, is something altogether different from fascist 
propaganda and what I have called conservative indeterminacy (which can give way to 
passivity and indifference). It neither invites nor disavows interpretation but rather 
draws simultaneously on the conservative redemption of high art and neoclassical form 
as well as the fascist tendency to power implicit in language itself. In this way, Jünger’s 
poem represents a lyric mode unlike traditional or avant-garde poetry of both the right 
and left, thus rejecting the complicity of indeterminacy and modeling instead the 
resistance of simulation. It marshals the fascist collapse of racial totality and national 
fragmentation, Germanness itself, in order to reassert both the very human failure, 
death, and aesthetic failure, rhetoricity, the disavowal of which the fascist poem 
necessitates. 
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APPENDIX 
 ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CNBL Christlich-nationale Bauern- und Landvolkpartei 
DAD Deutsche Akademie der Dichtung 
DAF Deutsche Arbeitsfront 
DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
DSt Deutsche Studentenschaft 
NS  Nationalsozialistisch 
NSDAP  Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
NSDStB Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund 
RKK Reichskulturkammer 
RMVP Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda 
RSK Reichsschrifttumskammer 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei 
VKV Volkskonservative Vereinigung 
  
 232 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Adam, Christian. Lesen unter Hitler: Autoren, Bestseller, Leser im Dritten Reich. Köln: 
Verlag Galiani Berlin, 2010. 
 
Adorno, Theodor. “George.” Noten zur Literatur. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 355. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981. 
 
---. “George und Hofmannsthal. Zum Briefwechsel, 1891-1906.” Prismen. Kulturkritik und 
Gesellschaft I. Vol. 10 of Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. 20 vols. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977. 195-237. 
 
---. “Rede über Lyrik und Gesellschaft.” Noten zur Literatur. Vol. 2 of Gesammelte 
Schriften. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. 20 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974. 
 
---. “What National Socialism Has Done to the Arts.” Vermischte Schriften II. Vol. 20 of 
Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986. 
413-429.  
 
Améry, Jean. “Ressentiments.” Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines 
Überwältigten. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1977. 
 
Anderson, Margaret. Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial 
Germany. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 1963. New York: 
Penguin, 1994. 
 
Arens, Katherine. “Hofmannsthal’s Essays: Conservation as Revolution.” A Companion to 
the Works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Ed. Thomas A. Kovach. Rochester: Camden 
House, 2002. 
 
Asher, Kenneth. “T.S. Eliot and Charles Maurras.” ANQ 11.3 (1998): 20-29. 
 
---. T.S. Eliot and Ideology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Baird, Jay. Hitler’s War Poets: Literature and Politics in the Third Reich. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Balfour, Ian. “History against Historicism, Formal Matters and the Event of the Text: de 
Man with Benjamin.” Legacies of Paul de Man Ed. Marc Redfield. New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2007. 
 
Barbian, Jan-Pieter. Literaturpolitik im NS-Staat. Von der “Gleichschaltung” bis zum Ruin. 
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2010. 
 
Barish, Evelyn. The Double Life of Paul de Man. New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation, 2014. 
 233 
 
Barthes, Roland. “Leçon.” Tr. Richard Howard. Paris. 7 January 1977. 
http://www.albany.edu/~rn774/fall96/barthes.html. Speech. 
 
Beck, Hermann. “Between the Dictates of Conscience and Political Expediency: Hitler’s 
Conservative Alliance Partner and Antisemitism During the Nazi Seizure of 
Power.” Journal of Contemporary History 41.4 (October 2006): 611-640. 
 
---. “The Nazis and Their Conservative Alliance Partner in 1933: The Seizure of Power in 
a New Light.” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 6.2 (September 2005): 
213-241. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. “Letter to Theodor Adorno.” 7 May 1940. Gesammelte Briefe 1938-1940. 
Bd. VI. Ed. Christoph Gödde & Henri Lonitz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2000.  
 
Benn, Gottfried. “Rede auf Stefan George.” Essays und Reden in der Fassung der Erstdrucke. 
Vol. 3 of Gesammelte Werke in der Fassung der Erstdrucke. Ed. Bruno Hillebrand. 4 
vols. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997. 
 
Berger, Albert. Josef Weinheber 1892-1945. Leben und Werk – Leben im Werk. Salzburg: Otto 
Müller Verlag, 1999. 
 
Berghahn, Klaus L. “A View Through the Red Window: Ernst Bloch’s Spuren.” Modernity 
and the Text: Revisions of German Modernism. Ed. Andreas Huyssen and David 
Bathrick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 
 
Berglund, Gisela. Der Kampf um den Leser im Dritten Reich: Die Literaturpolitik der “Neuen 
Literatur” (Will Vesper) und der “Nationalsozialistischen Monatshefte.” Worms: 
Heintz, 1980.  
 
Berman, Nina. “Hofmannsthal’s Political Vision.” A Companion to the Works of Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal. Ed. Thomas A. Kovach. New York: Camden House, 2002. 
 
Blunck, Hans Friedrich. “Letter to Paul Alverdes.” 26 June 1946. Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv Marbach. 
 
---. “Vortrag über die Reichsschrifttumskammer.” March 21, 1935. Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv Marbach. Speech. 
 
Bogner, Hans. “Der neue Übermensch.” Die Neue Literatur 33.11 (November 1932): 494-
498. 
 
Brandenburg, Hans. “Dichter und Öffentlichkeit.” Die Schöne Literatur 29.5 (May 1928): 
225. 
 
---. “Der Dichter zum Tage.” Die Neue Literatur 33: 11 (November 1932): 488-493. 
 
 234 
Breuer, Stefan. Aesthetischer Fundamentalismus: Stefan George und der deutsche 
Antimodernismus. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995. 
 
Bullivant, Keith. “Aufbruch der Nation: zur ‘konservativen Revolution.’” Das Literarische 
Leben in der Weimarer Republik. Königstein: Scriptor-Verlag, 1978.  
 
---. “Thomas Mann and Politics in the Weimar Republic.” Culture and Society in the 
Weimar Republic. Ed. Keith Bullivant and R. Hinton Thomas. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1977. 
 
Bullock, Marcus Paul. “Flight Forward: The World of Ernst Jüngers Der Arbeiter.” 
Utopian Studies 23.2 (2012): 450-471. 
 
Claudius, Hermann. “An Hans Grimm.” Die Neue Literatur 36.2 (February 1935): 122. 
 
---. “Der Dichter.” Die Neue Literatur 36.2 (February 1935): 123. 
 
Dawson, P. M. S. The Unacknowledged Legislator: Shelley and Politics. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980. 
 
de Man, Paul. “Heidegger’s Exegeses of Hölderlin.” Blindness and Insight: Essays in the 
Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. Vol. 7 of Theory and History of Literature. 88 vols. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
 
---. “Hölderlin and the Romantic Tradition.” Ed. Amalia Herrmann and John Namjun 
Kim. diacritics 40.1 (Spring 2002): 100-129. 
 
---. “Image and Emblem in Yeats.” The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983. 
 
---. “Intentional Structure of the Image.” The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984. 
 
---. “Lyric and Modernity.” Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism. Vol. 7 of Theory and History of Literature. 88 vols. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
 
---. “Modern Poetics in France and Germany.” Critical Writings 1953-1978. Vol. 6 of 
Theory and History of Literature. Ed. Lindsay Waters. 88 vols. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
 
---. “The Rhetoric of Temporality.” Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism. Vol. 7 of Theory and History of Literature. 88 vols. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
 
---. “Semiology and Rhetoric.” Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. 
 
 235 
Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008. 
 
Eliot, T.S. After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
Co., 1934. 
 
---. Collected Poems 1909-1935. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930. 
 
---. “A Commentary.” The Criterion (November 1927), 386. 
 
---. For Lancelot Andrewes: Essays on Style and Order. 1929. London: Faber & Faber, 1970. 
 
---. Four Quartets.  New York: Harcourt, 1943. 
 
---. “Last Words.” The Criterion (January 1939), 269-275. 
 
---. “The Literature of Politics (1955).” To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings. 1965. New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1991. 
 
---. Selected Poems. New York: Harcourt, 1930. 
 
---. “Shorter Notices.” The Criterion (July 1936), 759. 
 
---. The Waste Land. 1922. Ed. Michael North. New York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Elliott, Mark. “Beyond Left and Right: The Poetic Reception of Stefan George and Rainer 
Maria Rilke, 1933-1945.” Modern Language Review 98, 908-928. 
 
Esty, Jed. “Eliot’s Recessional: Four Quartets, National Allegory, and the End of Empire.” 
Yale Journal of Criticism 16.1 (2003): 39-60.  
 
Euringer, Richard. “Nun sag ich ja.” Die Neue Literatur. 38.7 (July 1937): 379-380. 
 
Feuchtwanger, E. J. From Weimar to Hitler: Germany 1918-33. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1995. 
 
Freedman, William. “Postponement and Perspectives in Shelley’s ‘Ozymandias.’” 
Studies in Romanticism 25.1 (Spring, 1986): 63-73. 
 
George, Stefan. Hymnen, Pilgerfahrten, Algabal. Vol. 2 of Sämtliche Werke. 18 vols. 
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987. 
 
---. Das Neue Reich. Vol. 9 of Sämtliche Werke. 18 vols. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987. 
 
Grathwol, Robert. Stresemann and the DNVP: Reconciliation or Revenge in German Foreign 
Policy, 1924-1928. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1980. 
 
 236 
Griffin, Roger. Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
Guillemin, Anna. “The Conservative Revolution of Philologists and Poets: Repositioning 
von Hofmannsthal’s Speech ‘Das Schrifttum als Geistiger Raum der Nation.’” 
The Modern Language Review 107.2 (2012): 501-521. 
 
Gutschinskaja, Nina. “Sprache als Prophetie: zu Stefan Georges Gedichtband ‘Das Neue 
Reich.’” In Stefan George: Werk und Wirkung seit dem ,Siebenten Ring.’ Ed. 
Wolfgang Braungart, Erich Maria Brauch, & Ute Oelmann. Tübingen: de 
Gruyter, 2010. 
 
Hadamovsky, Eugen. “Die Hände des Führers.” Die Neue Literatur 37: 12 (December 
1936): 747. 
 
Haefs, Wilhelm (Hrsg.). Nationalsozialismus und Exilliteratur (1933-1945). In Hansers 
Sozialgeschichte der Deutschen Literatur. Bd. 9. München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2009. 
 
Harding, Jason. The Criterion: Cultural Politics and Periodical Networks in Inter-War Britain. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. 
 
Härlen, Hasso. “Der Dichter als Führer.” Die Schöne Literatur 31:7 (July 1930): 334-339. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Gesamtausgabe. 4 Abteilungen. Überlegungen II-XI (Schwarze Hefte). 
Peter Trawny Hrsg. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Vittorio Klostermann, 2014. 
 
Herf, Jeffrey. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the 
Third Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
 
Hermand, Jost. Culture in Dark Times: Nazi Fascism, Inner Emigration, and Exile, trans. 
Victoria W. Hill. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013. 
 
Hewitt, Andrew. Fascist Modernism: Aesthetics, Politics, and the Avant-Garde. Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 1993. 
 
Hoffmann, Peter. “The George Circle and National Socialism.” In A Poet’s Reich: Politics 
and Culture in the George Circle. Ed. Melissa S. Lane and Martin A. Ruehl. 
Rochester: Camden House, 2011. 
 
Hofmann, Walter. “Das Gedächtnis der Nation: Ein Wort zur Schrifttumspflege in 
Deutschland.” Die Neue Literatur 34:1 (January 1933): 3-13. 
 
Hofmannsthal, Hugo von. “Ein Brief.” Erzählungen, Erfundene Gespräche und Brief, Reisen. 
Vol. 7 of Gesammelte Werke in zehn Einzelbände. Bernd Schoeller and Rudolf 
Hirsch, eds. 10 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2009. 
 
 237 
---. “Das Schrifttum als Geistiger Raum der Nation.” Reden und Aufsätzen. Vol. 3 of 
Gesammelte Werke. Ed. Bernd Schoeller and Ingeborg Beyer-Ahlert. 15 vols. 
Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1980. 
 
---. “Wert und Ehre der deutschen Sprache.” Gesammelte Werke in Einzelausgaben. Prosa 
IV. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1955. 
 
Hulme, T. E. “Romanticism and Classicism.” The Collected Writings of T. E. Hulme. Ed. 
Karen Csengeri. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
 
Jay, Martin. “‘The Aesthetic Ideology’ as Ideology; or, What Does it Mean to Aestheticize 
Politics?” Cultural Critique 21 (Spring 1992): 41-61. 
 
Jens, Inge, ed. Max Kommerell Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1919-1944. Walter-Verlag: Olten, 
1967. 
 
Jones, Donna. The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy: Negritude, Vitalism, and Modernity. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
Jones, Larry Eugene. “Edgar Julius Jung: The Conservative Revolution in Theory and 
Practice.” Central European History 21.2 (June 1988): 142-175. 
 
---. “Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 
1933-1934.” Journal of Modern History 83.2 (June 2011): 272-318. 
 
---. “Franz von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic 
Conservatism in the Weimar Republic.” Central European History 38.2 (2005): 191-
217. 
 
---. “Nationalists, Nazis, and the Assault against Weimar: Revisiting the Harzburg Rally 
of October 1931.” German Studies Review 29.3 (October 2006): 483-494. 
 
Julius, Anthony. T.S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism, and Literary Form. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Jung, Edgar Julius. Sinndeutung der konservativen Revolution in Deutschland. Oldenburg: 
Gerhard Stalling, 1933. 
 
Jünger, Ernst. On Pain. Tr. David C. Durst. New York: Telos Press, 2008.  
 
Jünger, Friedrich Georg. “Der Mohn.” Sämtliche Gedichte 1. Ed. Citta Jünger. Stuttgart:  
Klett-Cotta, 1985, 44-45. 
 
Kaes, Anton. “The Cold Gaze: Notes on Mobilization and Modernity.” New German 
Critique 59 (Spring/Summer 1993): 105-118. 
 
 238 
Kaplan, Alice. Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, Literature, and French Intellectual Life. Vol. 
36 of Theory and History of Literature. 88 vols. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986. 
 
Ketelsen, Uwe-K. Literatur und Drittes Reich. Schernfeld: Süddeutsche Hochschul-
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992. 
 
---. “Nationalsozialismus und Drittes Reich.” Geschichte der Politischen Lyrik in 
Deutschland. Ed. Walter Hinderer. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1978.  
 
Kitchen, Martin. “Ernst Nolte and the Phenomenology of Fascism.” Science and Society 
38.2 (Summer 1974): 130-149.   
---. The Third Reich: Charisma and Community. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
 
Klüger, Ruth. Still Alive: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered. New York: The Feminist Press, 
2001. 
 
Koelb, Clayton. “The Genesis of Thomas Mann’s ‘Goethe und Tolstoi.’” Monatshefte 75.1 
(1983): 55-68. 
 
Kommerell, Max. Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik. Georg Bondi: Berlin, 1928. 
 
Koonz, Claudia. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge: Harvard University Belknap Press, 
2003. 
 
Krieg, Robert. “The Vatican Concordat with Hitler’s Reich.” America 189.5 (September 
2001): 14-17. 
 
Kroll, Joe Paul. “Conservative at the Crossroads: ‘Ironic’ Vs. ‘Revolutionary’ 
Conservatism in Thomas Mann’s Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man.” Journal of 
European Studies 34.3 (September 2004): 225-246. 
 
Landfried, Klaus. Stefan George—Politik des Unpolitischen. Heidelberg: Lothar Stiehm 
Verlag, 1975. 
 
Le Rider, Jacques. Hugo von Hofmannsthal: Historismus und Moderne in der Literatur der 
Jahrhundertwende. Trans. Leopold Federmair. Vol. 6 of Nachbarschaften, 
Humanwissenschafltiche Studien. Ed. Georg Schmid and Sigrid Schmid-
Bortenschlager. Vienna: Böhlau, 1997. 
 
Lessing, G. E. Nathan der Weise. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000. 
 
Librett, Jeffrey. “From the Authority of Appropriate (De)Form(ation) to—: Toward de 
Man’s Totalitarian Acts.” Responses: On Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism. Ed. 
Werner Hamacher, Neil H. Hertz, & Thomas Keenan. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1988. 
 
 239 
Loesberg, Jonathan. “Materialism and Aesthetics: Paul de Man’s Aesthetic Ideology.” 
Diacritics 27.4 (Winter 1997): 87-108. 
 
Loewy, Ernst. Literatur unterm Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich und seine Dichtung. Eine 
Dokumentation. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1969. 
 
Luft, David. Hugo von Hofmannsthal and the Austrian Idea: Selected essays and addresses. Ed. 
and trans. David S. Luft. Ashland: Purdue University Press, 2011. 
 
Mann, Thomas. Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man. Tr. Walter Morris. New York: F. Unger, 
1983. 
 
Martyn, David. Sublime Failures: The Ethics of Kant and Sade. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Matthews, Steven. “‘You Can See Some Eagles, and Hear the Trumpets’: The Literary 
and Political Hinterland of T.S. Eliot’s ‘Coriolan.’” Journal of Modern Literature 
32.2 (Winter 2008): 44-60. 
 
McNiece, Gerald. Shelley and the Revolutionary Idea. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1969. 
 
Morrison, Paul. The Poetics of Fascism: Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, Paul de Man. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Nabokov, Vladimir. The Annotated Lolita. Ed. Alfred Appel Jr. New York: Vintage Books, 
1991. 
 
Nolte, Ernst. Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism. 
1963. Trans. Leila Vennewitz. New York: Signet, 1969. 
 
North, Michael. The Political Aesthetic of Yeats, Eliot, and Pound. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. 
 
Norton, Robert. “From Secret Germany to Nazi Germany: The Politics of Art before and 
after 1933.” A Poet’s Reich: Politics and Culture in the George Circle. Ed. Melissa S. 
Lane and Martin A. Ruehl. Rochester: Camden House, 2011. 
 
---. “The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment.” Journal of the History of Ideas 68.4 (2007): 
635-658. 
 
---. Secret Germany: Stefan George and his Circle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. 
 
Pan, David. Sacrifice in the Modern World: On the Particularity and Generality of Nazi Myth. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2012. 
 
Payne, Stanley. A History of Fascism 1914-1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995. 
 240 
 
Pyle, Forest. “The Romantic Image of the Intentional Structure.” Releasing the Image: From 
Literature to New Media. Ed. Jacques Khalip & Robert Mitchell. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2011.  
 
Raine, Craig. T. S. Eliot: Lives and Legacies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Raulff, Ulrich. Kreis ohne Meister: Stefan Georges Nachleben. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 
2009. 
 
Rauschning, Hermann. The Conservative Revolution. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1941. 
 
Reiser, Hans. “Unsere Meinung.” Die Schöne Literatur 30:12 (December 1929): 555. 
 
Ricks, Christopher. T.S. Eliot and Prejudice. London: Faber, 1988. 
 
Robertson, Ritchie. “George, Nietzsche, and Nazism.” A Companion to the Works of Stefan 
George. Ed. Jens Rieckmann. Rochester: Camden House, 2005. 
 
Ruehl, Martin. “‘Imperium transcendat hominem’: Reich and Rulership in Ernst 
Kantorowicz’s Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite.” A Poet’s Reich: Politics and Culture in the 
George Circle. Ed. Melissa S. Lane and Martin A. Ruehl. Rochester: Camden 
House, 2011. 
 
Schnell, Ralf. Dichtung in Finsteren Zeiten: Deutsche Literatur und Faschismus. Hamburg: 
Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998. 
 
Schreyer, Lothar. “Heinz Steguweit.” Die Neue Literatur 34:3 (April 133): 153-158. 
 
Scofield, Martin. T.S. Eliot: The Poems. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
Sherratt, Yvonne. Hitler’s Philosophers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. 
 
Sieferle, Rolf Pieter. Die Konservative Revolution: Fünf Biographische Skizzen (Paul Lensch, 
Werner Sombart, Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, Hans Freyer). Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer Taschenbuch, 1995. 
 
Sontheimer, Kurt. Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimar Republic: Die Politischen Ideen 
des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933. München: Nymphenburger 
Verlagshandlung, 1968. 
 
Spengler, Oswald. Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der 
Weltgeschichte. München: Beck, 1923. 
 
Stanfield, Paul Scott. “Modernist Poetics and Fascism: The Caliph’s Design.” Raritan 20.3 
(Winter 2001): 147-168. 
 241 
Stapel, Wilhelm. “Die Situation der deutschen Dichtung der Gegenwart.” Die Schöne 
Literatur 32:9 (September 1931): 401-418. 
 
Stern, J. P. The Dear Purchase: A Theme in German Modernism. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
 
---. Hitler: The Führer and the People. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 
 
Surette, Leon. Dreams of a Totalitarian Utopia: Literary Modernism and Politics. Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011. 
 
Theweleit, Klaus. Männerphantasien. 2 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Roter Stern, 1977. 
 
Travers, Martin. “Fascism and Aesthetic Self-Fashioning: Politics and the Ritualised 
Body in the Poetry of Stefan George.” Renaissance and Modern Studies 42 (1999). 
 
---. Critics of Modernity: The Literature of the Conservative Revolution 1890-1933. Vol. 35 of 
German Life and Civilization. Ed. Jost Hermand. 43 vols. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2001. 
 
Vesper, Will. “Unsere Meinung.” Die Schöne Literatur 31:1 (January 1930): 60. 
 
---. “Strahlenergie der Kunst.” Die Schöne Literatur 25:1 (January 1924): 2-3. 
 
Waters, William. “Stefan George’s Poetics.” A Companion to the Works of Stefan George. 
Ed. Jens Rieckmann. Rochester: Camden House, 2005. 
 
Wehner, Josef Magnus. “Der Dichter und Sein Volk.” Die Neue Literatur 34:10 (October 
1933): 609-610. 
 
Wolin, Richard. The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from 
Nietzsche to Postmodernism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
 
Woods, Roger. “The Conservative Revolution and the First World War: Literature as 
Evidence in Historical Explanation.” Modern Language Review 85.1 (January 1990): 
77-91. 
 
---. The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 
 
Wulf, Joseph. Literatur und Dichtung im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation. Gütersloh: 
Sigbert Mohn Verlag, 1963. 
 
